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ANALYSE DES COALITIONS DANS LES RÉSEAUX HÉTÉROGÈNES SANS FIL ET
LEURS ASPECTS ÉCONOMIQUES
Behdad Heidarpour
RÉSUMÉ
L’investissement massif qui est essentiel à la mise en œuvre d’un vaste réseau sans ﬁl est l’un
des principaux obstacles qui empêche les fournisseurs de services d’offrir des services de don-
nées plus abordables. De plus, l’évolution rapide des technologies sans ﬁl nécessite des mises à
jour fréquentes de matériels et de logiciels qui entraînent des dépenses d’investissement et des
coûts d’exploitation plus élevés pour le fournisseur et, par la suite, des plans de données plus
coûteux pour les utilisateurs ﬁnaux. L’application des stratégies de tariﬁcation sous-optimales
dans le marché sans ﬁl actuel, qui ne tient pas compte des accords de niveau de service et oblige
les utilisateurs à payer pour la connectivité au réseau et le transfert de données est une autre
raison de diminuer la satisfaction globale des abonnés. Considérant les raisons mentionnées,
nos objectifs dans cette thèse sont d’étudier des méthodes de tariﬁcation appropriée basées
sur la réalité du marché actuel et d’envisager des options alternatives qui peuvent réduire les
coûts de service des fournisseurs des réseaux sans ﬁl. Nous étudions la tariﬁcation basée sur le
volume qui est la méthode dominante dans les réseaux cellulaires de nos jours. Nous retirons
les paramètres optimaux du plan de données tels que le plafond de volume des données, le
prix et le débit de données. Considérant des possibilités de réduction des coûts, nous prou-
vons qu’une coalition de fournisseurs dans laquelle ils peuvent servir leurs utilisateurs mutuels
est une alternative valable pour réduire les coûts de mise en œuvre des réseaux en expansion.
Nous construisons notre analyse en appuyant sur la coopération entre fournisseurs hétérogènes
et considérons l’hétérogénéité tant dans les aspects technologiques que dans les services. Nous
évitons les modèles qui considèrent une coalition entre tous les prestataires qui constitue un
monopole et qui est interdite par les entités réglementaires. Par conséquent, nous étudions
les modèles de structures coalitionnelles qui incluent plusieurs ensembles de fournisseurs. De
cette façon, les utilisateurs ont la possibilité de choisir leur plan de données en fonction du ser-
vice offert par un ensemble de fournisseurs coalisés qui peuvent avoir différentes technologies
dans leur réseau d’accès. En ce qui concerne les réseaux hétérogènes axés sur le service, nous
suivons les directions des paiements des fournisseurs de contenus (FdC) vers les fournisseurs
de services (FdS) et ﬁnalement vers les utilisateurs ﬁnaux et essayons de le modiﬁer en fonc-
tion de l’équité sociale. Pour ce faire, nous analysons plusieurs types de contenus basés sur les
modèles d’utilisation des abonnés et trouvons ceux qui peuvent être offerts avec une méthode
de tariﬁcation différente sans entraîner de perte de proﬁt pour les FdC ou les FdS. Notre ob-
jectif est d’établir un cadre de coalition entre les FdC et les FdS qui mène à un accès illimité
et gratuit à certains types de contenus. Nous montrons que de tels accords, si correctement
établis, peuvent accroître le bénéﬁce des FdC et FdS. Tout au long de cette thèse, les modèles
analytiques sont vériﬁés avec des exemples numériques qui sont conçus pour simuler les scé-
narios du monde réel.
XMots clés: Réseau sans ﬁl, Coalition, Fournisseur de contenu, Neutralité du réseau, Four-
nisseur de service, Économie des réseaux, Théorie des jeux
ANALYZING COALITIONS IN WIRELESS HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS AND
THEIR ECONOMIC ASPECTS
Behdad Heidarpour
ABSTRACT
The massive investment that is essential to implement a large area wireless network is one of the
signiﬁcant roadblocks that stops service providers from offering more affordable data services.
The fact that the fast evolution of wireless technologies requires frequent updates of hardware
and software also leads to higher capital expenditure and operation costs for the providers and
subsequently to more expensive data plans for the end users. The implementation of sub-
optimal pricing schemes in today’s wireless market, which does not consider service level
agreements and forces users to pay for both network connectivity and data transfer, is another
reason to decrease the overall satisfaction of subscribers. In view of these issues our objective
in this thesis is to study the proper pricing methods based on the reality of current market as
well as to consider alternative options that can reduce the service costs of wireless providers are
our objectives. We study the volume-based pricing which is the dominant method in cellular
networks nowadays. We derive the optimal data plan parameters such as the data volume cap,
price, and data rate. Considering the cost-reduction possibilities, we prove that a coalition of
providers in which they can serve users of each other is a valid alternative that reduces the
implementation costs of network expansion. We build our analysis based on the cooperation
between heterogeneous providers and we consider the heterogeneity in both technology and
service aspects. We avoid the models which consider a coalition of all providers since it forms
a monopoly and is prohibited by regulatory entities. Hence, we study models of coalitional
structures that include several sets of providers. In this way, users have the option to select
their data plan based on the service offered by a coalitional set of providers that can have
different technologies in their access network. Concerning the service-oriented heterogeneous
networks, we track the directions of payments from the content providers (CP) to the service
providers (SP) and ﬁnally to the end users and try to modify it based on social fairness. To
do so, we analyze several content types based on subscriber usage patterns and we ﬁnd the
ones that can be offered with a different pricing method without causing proﬁt loss to CP
or SP. Our goal is to set a coalitional framework between CP and SP that can lead to a free
unlimited access to particular content types. We show that such agreements, if set correctly,
can increase the proﬁt of CP and SP. Throughout this thesis, the analytical models are veriﬁed
with numerical examples that are designed to simulate the real world scenarios.
Keywords: Wireless networks, Coalitions, Content provider, Network neutrality, Service
provider, Network economics, Game theory
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INTRODUCTION
Fourth generation homogeneous wireless networks (4G) fast approach the theoretical limits of
radio link performance but still cannot provide the 4A paradigm (any rate, anytime, anywhere,
affordable) due to economic and technological barriers. Nevertheless, further signiﬁcant gains
can be achieved by introducing advanced network topologies that also integrate heterogeneous
technologies such as LTE and WiFi. One way to achieve such heterogeneity in the offered
services is to form a coalition of providers. This approach, due to its unique characteristic of
cost reduction in the phase of network expansion as well as the embedded heterogeneity, can
reduce the overall price of the service and give the subscribers the choice to instantly change
their access technology based on the service price or data rate preferences. From another view-
point, the heterogeneity of service types in today’s Internet and the way in which content is
delivered deﬁne a bold line between the business model of content providers (CPs) and service
providers (SPs). In recent efforts, several major SPs in the US market tried to form a coalition
with CPs to deliver free content to the end users (AT&T Data, 2016; Verizon-Data, 2016; T-
Mobile, 2016). However, the interaction of providers in such coalitions should be controlled in
a careful way since they can violate the neutrality of the Internet. In all mentioned cases, the
economics of Internet, especially in wireless markets, and the pricing schemes play a major
role in forming any coalition. In this thesis we address these issues by studying ﬁrst the current
pricing schemes in the wireless markets and then by analyzing possible coalitions in both net-
work and service domains. By doing so, we introduce new frameworks for inter-SP and SP-CP
coalitions. In our approach, we consider the end users and their usage behavior as the core of
analysis and try to improve their overall satisfaction from service while the proﬁt of providers is
increasing due to cooperation. Namely, we believe that due to the competitive market and high
cost of implementing heterogeneous technologies by one operator, all operators will be driven
to form coalitions that can provide not only signiﬁcant economic advantages but also can offer
a signiﬁcantly better level of services with major improvements in coverage, throughput, reli-
2ability, and energy consumption. Nevertheless, to achieve that objective, three key issues have
to be addressed: a) the role of current pricing schemes on the proﬁt of providers, b) the effect
of subscriber’s usage behavior on provider’s pricing strategy, c) the possible cooperations be-
tween major network providers based on the pricing methods and content usage trends. In the
following sections we describe in short the main problems, our objectives, the work originality,
the applied methodology, the thesis content, and the achieved results.
0.1 Problem statement
The wireless technologies have been under very fast development in the past decade. However,
the statistics show that the wireless services are still not available to many users around the
world or even if they were, the cost and quality of this services do not look reasonable to many
users. Also, there exist multiple technologies in the market and for using each of them a user
needs a separate contract with the related provider which can be quite tedious. Moreover, it is
difﬁcult for a single provider to offer all types of services that would be globally accessible and
affordable for all users in the market. This issue brings the idea of forming the coalitions among
service providers to reach a win-win solution for both providers and users. To investigate coali-
tion formation, one should consider the heterogeneity of providers in the current market. To
the best of our knowledge, three general types of heterogeneous networks can be deﬁned. The
ﬁrst type is the topological HetNet which refers to a network that consists of equipment with
different coverage ranges like picocells, femtocells, microcells, and macrocells. The second
type is the technological HetNet which refers to a set of wireless access technologies with vari-
ous speeds and coverage ranges (like WiFi, LTE, and UMTS) that would be offered in the same
market by multiple providers. These two technologies can be accessed concurrently by multi-
interface devices similar to the most smartphones nowadays. A traditional view of the ﬁrst two
HetNet types can be seen in Fig. 0.1 where there are two cellular and two WiFi providers that
are competing in the same area, and as a result, they have coverage overlapping. The third type
3HetNets is referred to as service-oriented HetNets that contains heterogeneity in the offered
services. Two major entities can be indicated in this category. Namely, the group of providers
that offer infrastructure and connectivity and the group of providers that provide content to the
end users. All providers from the ﬁrst two types of HetNets fall into the ﬁrst group of the third
HetNet type. Unlike the technological and service-oriented HetNets, the topological HetNets
are usually deﬁned on a single provider’s network. Hence, we consider the technological and
service-oriented HetNets in our studies for coalition formation.
Figure 0.1 A heterogeneous network with two types of access
technologies and four providers
We consider the problem of coalition formation as a part of economics analysis of the wireless
market. Hence, the pricing strategies and their connection to the network parameters such as
data rate and coverage play a key role in our study. From the market viewpoint, there are many
internal and external parameters that force users to select a speciﬁc provider as their default SP
or to choose a particular data plan within a provider’s network. As with to any other analysis,
4one should focus on the key parameters and make a rational simpliﬁcation of the real market
conditions to be able to derive an acceptable and accurate economic framework. To achieve
this goal, we start our analysis by focusing on the parameters that affect the decision behavior
of subscribers: provider’s coverage size, achievable data rate, and the pricing schemes.
0.1.1 The Case of Technological HetNets
For the case of technological HetNets we consider three main technologies in the current mar-
ket: WiFi, 3G, and 4G cellular networks. Let us consider the general difference between WiFi,
3G, and 4G from the user’s viewpoint as follows:
• Coverage. Among the mentioned three technologies, LTE and 3G have greater coverage
than WiFi. To cover a macrocell coverage area, a WiFi operator needs to implement hun-
dreds of access points. It should be noted that the current service coverage of LTE in the
real market is smaller than 3G.
• Data rate. New standards of WiFi like 802.11n support up to 300 Mb/s which is twice
LTE with 150 Mb/s speed, and it is much better than 3G which gives 15 Mb/s in the best
condition.
• Price. In a real market, operators charge the highest price for the LTE data usage and the
lowest price for the WiFi data usage.
Since users have different expectations of speed, price, and coverage, each user wants to select
a provider that offers the best option from the user viewpoint. Most of the times, it is clear
for the user how much trafﬁc it is willing to use and how much it wants to pay for that. There
is also a general perception about the coverage of each provider when a user wants to buy a
service. Naturally, the most expanded coverage along with the highest speed and the lowest
price seems the optimum service to all users. But providers have some constraints that prevent
5them from offering such an ultimate service. For example, a WiFi provider may offer the best
speed and lowest price per unit of bandwidth in the current technologies. However, WiFi is
using free ISM band as well as limited coverage transceivers which pushes providers to invest
a vast amount of their ﬁnancial resources to cover an area which can be served by just one
macrocell (in cellular technology). The cellular technologies also have their issues such as the
requirement for buying expensive dedicated spectrum and service equipment.
Since the proﬁt of each provider is related to the number of users who are registered to its
network and the average data usage; a provider doesn’t have any choice except offering a
reasonable service compared to others to attract the preferred number of users and make an
incentive for them to utilize its network. Upgrading of services can be carried out in several
ways:
• Investment. As a straightforward solution, a provider can expand the coverage and make
its service better by implementing new equipment. This option may need massive ﬁnancial
resources and comes up with some issues such as making a balance between the service
prices and costs generated by new investments. Many providers do not have enough mon-
etary resources to develop their power in the market.
• Serving users of other providers (roaming capability). The second choice for service
providers is serving users of each other in the area where the users’ primary provider does
not have enough resources. This option is one of our considerations for coalition formation
which needs the price and resource allocation strategies as well as side payment methods
to be deﬁned by the involving entities through a negotiation mechanism that leads to the
coalition service agreement.
• Pooling resources with other providers. Another choice is turning a coalition into a
uniﬁed provider by resource pooling. This case is more complicated in technical term
because it needs a pricing strategy which is unique to all providers’ users and the network
6should be seamless even when the connected technology is changed through a vertical
handover. Since, in a coalition, the coverage of its members is the same, some users may
lose their preference in registering to one special provider’s network that is a member of
that coalition and this will be a roadblock to achieving an agreement with that provider.
In this case, the negotiation is more difﬁcult and the used technology needs more complex
network protocols.
Concerning the technological HetNets, the main goal is ﬁnding a way for offering a better
service to the users and making more proﬁt for the providers by focusing on collaboration
methods which can have a signiﬁcant effect on upgrading network performance. Hence the
general problem of our research is ﬁnding the ways of forming the coalitions with respect to
network technologies, market types and users’ preferred services and then reaching a general
benchmark that shows provider’s position as the consequence of its actions in the market with
the existence of coalitions. Also, the stability of formed coalitions should be analyzed.
0.1.2 The Case of Service-oriented HetNets
In a service-oriented HetNet, the type of service can be the connectivity and infrastructure
that SP offers to the end users and CPs or a speciﬁc type of content that a CP delivers to the
end users through the SP’s network. In both cases, the proﬁt of providers is highly related to
the network selection and content demand behavior of end users. Recently, several major SPs
in the US such as AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile implemented sponsored data plans in which
subscribers can see particular contents from selected CPs without being charged for their data
transfer. We consider such plans as a cooperation between CPs and SPs that is in its early stage.
However, such cooperation encountered several moral and legal issues regarding the neutrality
of Internet. According to the critics, such plans can put the powerful CPs in a position that the
smaller CPs cannot compete with. Also, the SPs would monitor the type of data that is being
7transferred which violates their neutral role based on the traditional philosophy of the Internet.
SPs, on the other hand, argue that such plans beneﬁt their subscribers who are simultaneously
paying for their network connectivity as well as the content type that they demand. In this
thesis, we tackle this problem by ﬁnding particular types of contents such as mapping services
that can be delivered to the end users completely free of charge. Based on the gathered data
from the market, such contents have low-usage pattern, yet they are highly valuable to the end
users. This approach requires close cooperation between SPs and all the CPs who deliver the
contents. We address this type of cooperation in Chapter 3.
0.2 Objectives
The goal of this research is to develop models that can be used to create more proﬁt for
providers by increasing the satisfaction of users. As already indicated, this goal will be pursued
by focusing on forming coalitions among existing providers in the wireless market. Investigat-
ing cooperation between providers requires a general model of wireless market and users’
preferences. This economic model should be developed with respect to all the parameters that
can affect the provider’s strategies for attracting users. Such a model should predict provider’s
proﬁt and the number of users before and after forming coalitions. Furthermore, to analyze
coalitions, we should develop a game-theoretical approach that predicts the optimal coalition
for each provider and deﬁne the best strategies that it can choose to maximize its payoff in the
stable or unstable coalition structures. The general objectives can be classiﬁed as follows:
a. Deﬁning a model for wireless market economics
The ﬁrst objective is to deﬁne a model for wireless market economics. Since the charac-
teristics of current wireless technologies and the economic strategies of providers play a
crucial role in providers’ proﬁts, analyzing the relation between the wireless technologies
8and what the users want (like maximum speed and coverage area) requires a model of the
market. This model should also cover the concepts of service types and pricing structures
so it can estimate the market state in response to any strategy which would be chosen by
each provider. In particular the general model of market economics should answer the
following questions:
• What are the general market forms and how they change the behavior of providers
when they are competing to attract users?
• What is the effect of providers heterogeneity in any speciﬁc type of the market?
• For a provider in a wireless market, what are the main decision factors that can affect
the a provider selection by users?
• How the interaction between the provider and users can be modeled?
• What approach should be chosen to model the equilibrium state of the market?
b. Deﬁning a game theoretical model for coalition formation among the providers
Our research will address the above questions.
The second objective in our research is constructing a framework that deﬁnes the pro-
cess of coalition formation and describes the behavior of heterogeneous providers with
different levels of market power, when they want to collaborate. This model should con-
sider the competitive nature of the market and explain the best actions for each provider
when it wants to select a desired coalition or deviate from a speciﬁc coalition. This model
also should estimate the proﬁt of the provider and consider the effect of contracts among
coalition members. To achieve such a model, the following questions should be answered:
• What approach is most efﬁcient and practical to form coalitions?
• Are game theory based approaches easy to implement or some alternatives including
heuristics should be considered?
9• What are the performance and revenue gains that can be achieved by forming coali-
tions with parallel connections?
• What are the coalition formation processes that can be suitable considering the nature
of the wireless market?
• What are the formed coalitions in each deﬁned process?
Our research will address the above questions.
0.3 Originality
The originality of our work relates to two aspects of market economics. The ﬁrst aspect is
studying the practical volume-based pricing strategy that is used by many providers around the
world. In Chapter 1, we consider different access technologies to model the relation between
spectrum assignment mechanisms and the proﬁt of providers. We propose a method to relate
the data usage pattern of subscribers to data rate and service availability. For the ﬁrst time,
to the best of our knowledge, we consider the available budget of subscribers as a random
variable and introduce a mathematical framework for SLA-based volume-based data plans.
We also model providers with multiple data packages and investigate the package renovation
process for the subscribers during their monthly payment period.
The second aspect is the comprehensive study of coalitions in wireless markets in which we
consider technological and service-oriented HetNets. Our work in Chapter 2 studies the impact
of providers’ cost functions on their strategy of coalition formation. We propose multi-provider
utility functions for users to study their data usage behavior under cellular-cellular and cellular-
WiFi cooperative providers. Unlike many other studies in this ﬁeld, we build our analysis based
the markets with negative externalities. In this way, the convergence of an existing coalition
formation process is proved for wireless market. We model the role of regulatory units in
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coalition formation and analyze their best strategy based on the status quo of the Wireless
HetNet market.
Considering the service-oriented HetNets, our work in Chapter 3 is the ﬁrst work which consid-
ers a class of applications which can be offered free of charge to all users based on a cooperation
mechanism between CP and cellular SP. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that
considers an analysis of the payments’ directions to provide a completely free access for sev-
eral types of mobile services such as mapping applications and intelligent personal assistants.
Our work shows that the directions of payments in today’s cellular market can be altered to
increase the satisfaction of end users at no proﬁt-loss for both SP and CP. We also found the
side-payment from CP to SP by using the concepts of the Nash bargaining solution as well
as the Shapely value that also proves the possibility of our proposed method for selective free
content delivery.
0.4 Methodology
This section describes the main methods used to develop and analyze the models of collabora-
tion among wireless providers. These methods belong to three major categories that are related
to the following issues: a) characteristics of wireless technologies, b) wireless market model,
c) coalition models. In the following subsections, the methods that are useful to solve these
issues and to achieve the objectives of this research are described.
0.4.1 Utility functions
Throughout this thesis, we use the logarithmic form of utility functions to model the data usage
pattern of subscribers (Chapters 2 and 3). The main reason for to use this type of utility is that
it follows the law of diminishing marginal utility that is, with extra usage, the slope of utility
function decreases. This behavior is highly signiﬁcant in economic studies since in a long-
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period analysis, with high data usage, the satisfaction level that subscriber experiences at the
end of a period is not the same as it was at the beginning of the period. For the markets which
a cap on their data volume is applied, we use the linear form of the utility function (Chapter
1). The reason is that the amount of transferable data in volume-based pricing is not high
enough to diminish the marginal utility of the users. Hence, subscribers are always eager to
have more data usage. The main parameters in our utility functions are the data usage level,
price, coverage size and the given data rate in a service.
0.4.2 Wireless Market Models
Since the expected proﬁt of each provider is affected by the form of its market, knowing the
network economics will help to reach a proper model of each market form. These models will
be used in the next stage to analyze coalition formation methods. Two major concepts in our
model are market forms and pricing strategies which are deﬁned as follows:
0.4.2.1 Market forms
In economic analysis, markets can be categorized as follows:
• Monopoly. This form exists when there is just one dominant provider in the market. In
this market form, the competition is minimum and the monopolist has total power to set
the prices in the market.
• Duopoly. In this market form, there are two dominant providers who have the greatest
power in the market.
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• Oligopoly. A small number of providers have the major power in this market form. Each
of these entities is willing to know about the strategies of other providers to maximize its
proﬁt.
• Perfect competition. In this market form, there is no provider with enough power to set
the pricing strategies for wireless services. This market form is optimal for the users since
the service price is equal to the marginal cost which is equal to the marginal revenue. By
this deﬁnition, the provider can get no more revenue than its economic cost which means
there is no proﬁt in a long run competition.
0.4.2.2 Pricing strategies
Another economic concept that has a signiﬁcant role in proﬁt calculation and provider’s decision-
making process is the pricing strategy for the services. Some of the major pricing methods in
wireless market are as follows:
• Flat fee pricing. This is a pricing structure where provider charges users with a ﬁxed price
per data unit. We use this scheme to analyze the technological HetNets in Chapter 3.
• Dynamic pricing. In this strategy, the price is related to some other parameters like the
time of day (several tariffs for different hours) or the amount of data which is used so far.
We use a special case of this pricing scheme to model the volume-based data markets in
Chapter 2.
• Price discrimination. The aim of this strategy is setting different prices for each class of
users. These classes can be based on the users’ capability to purchase a service or regional
conditions.
• Congestion pricing. In this strategy, the users who have a usage higher than what they
agreed to with the provider are charged in higher rates. This type of pricing will help
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providers to control their network utilization by hindering the users that have the data usage
bigger than speciﬁed I the agreement.
Each of the above pricing strategies can lead to a different form of proﬁt function for providers.
Figure 0.2 The user ﬂow diagram in an unsaturated market
There are other market classiﬁcations that are important for this research. For example, the
saturation level of the market can be another factor in network analysis. In an unsaturated
market, there are a lot of newcomers to the market that should select their providers for the ﬁrst
time (Fig. 0.2). This is in contrast with a saturated market where each provider offers some
incentives to attract users being currently with other provider. The saturated market requires
analysis of the lock-in effect in the wireless market. This effect binds the user to its current
service or provider and implies an extra cost to the user for abandoning its current service. For
example, in today’s market, many providers offer two-year contracts where the cell phone cost,
or its part, is waved. Nevertheless, if a user wants to change its default provider before ending
of the contract, there is a penalty fee imposed on the user.
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0.4.3 Cooperative game theory
A cooperative game, especially from an economic viewpoint, is using coalition among decision
makers to increase their proﬁt. In a competitive market, forming coalitions changes the state
of the market from individual competition to coalition competitions. There are two general
forms of coalitional games. First, the canonical cooperative games (Saad et al.) where players
want to form a coalition that consists of all players i.e. grand coalition. In this form, the proﬁt
division mechanisms that make the grand coalition stable are the main subject of study. The
main usage of canonical games’ concepts is in analyzing the proﬁt division among the members
of a coalition mechanisms such as the core, Shapley value, and nucleolus mechanisms. Since
the grand coalition leads to a monopoly market, the regulatory entities do not allow formation
of such coalitions. Therefore, it is not practical to investigate such cooperations for inter-
provider cooperations. Hence, we exclude discussing such games in this thesis.
The second form of cooperative games is the coalition formation games where the structures
and processes that force the players to a particular set of coalitions and the stability of these
coalition structures are the research subjects.
While in the canonical coalition games the payoff is the most important factor, in coalition
formation games the network structure and cost of cooperation (Saad et al.) are the main
factors. A coalition formation game has the following characteristics:
• The game in not necessarily supperadditive, which means that the cooperation does not
always lead to higher overall proﬁt for the coalition unit. Also, the utility function can be
in the form of transferable (TU) or non-transferable utilities (NTU).
• While the coalition forming can provide an additional proﬁt for players, there is also a cost
of formation.
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• The grand coalition is not always the coalition with the maximum proﬁt.
• Environmental changes like players’ strength variation can change the best coalition (Saad
et al.).
Coalition formation games can be divided into two major subcategories: static coalition for-
mation games and dynamic coalition formation games. The former analyzes the effect of an
external factor on the coalitional structure. The latter investigates the process of forming the
coalitional structure (Saad et al.). The coalitional game considered in this research is, by its
nature, a game with negative externalities, which means that players in the market with any
coalitional structure (CS) try to reduce other members’ proﬁt and maximize their revenue. In
our model, the coalition formation process can be sequential or takes place in a parallel manner
for all negotiators.
0.5 Results
We achieved the following results in this thesis:
a. In Chapter 1, we modeled the markets with volume-based pricing and linked the data
usage and price to the offered service data rate based on the utility of users and the avail-
able bandwidth to the provider. We found the optimal service parameters for providers
with different access technologies such as OFDMA and CDMA. The relation between the
available spectrum bandwidth of the provider and the offerable data rate to the users is
investigated based on the data cap and price on a data plan. We considered the budget of
subscribers as a key parameter and modeled their package renovation procedure. A model
for service availability in the dynamic sub-carrier allocation method is proposed in which
provider guarantees a data rate and service availability level to the users regardless of their
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distance from a base station. In this way, we built a mathematical framework that connects
the cap of a data plan and its price to the optimal data rate and service availability.
The markets with multiple packages are analyzed in which the provider adjust the cap of
each package to address a particular group of users based on their monetary resources.
We considered the case of bandwidth splitting in which the provider can assign separated
spectrum bandwidths for its voice and data subscribers. We showed the efﬁciency of our
model in giving the optimal market parameters with the help of several realistic numerical
scenarios.
b. In Chapter 2, we analyzed technological HetNets. We modeled the markets with ﬂat-rate
pricing and found the optimal values of data usage for subscribers based on the data rate,
data unit price and coverage of providers. We analyzed several market forms such as
monopoly, duopoly, and oligopoly and investigated the effect of competition on the ser-
vice parameters. We showed that the providers’ cost function affects their best strategy to
enter a coalition formation process. In particular, we proved that in the case of linear cost
functions, the providers are better off to expand their network without cooperating with
their competitors. In special forms of exponential costs, providers need to form a coali-
tion to increase their proﬁt, otherwise, investing on network expansion is not proﬁtable for
them. We proved the form of a multi-provider utility function which is used to model the
behavior of subscribers when they are under the coverage of a coalition of providers. We
modeled the multi-provider utility functions for cellular-cellular and cellular-WiFi coali-
tional models. The proﬁt of the providers is analyzed based on the usage patterns in the
multi-provider model.
We used an existing coalition formation process which has a mathematical base for the
markets with negative externalities. We proved that in wireless markets in which users
consistently churn to newer technologies, a coalition formation process is always conver-
gent. We provided a model for the role of regulatory units in coalition formation processes
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and proposed a method that ﬁnds the best cooperation strategies for increasing the social
efﬁciency. The regulatory entity uses this method to allow or ban a coalition formation ac-
tion. Various scenarios for coalition formation are analyzed in which we showed that the
cooperation of small providers is an efﬁcient way to compete with a monopolist. The ef-
ﬁciency is measured based on a social efﬁciency function that balances the overall payoff
of the users as well as the proﬁt of the providers.
c. In Chapter 3, we analyzed service-oriented HetNets. We investigated the statistics of real
mobile markets provided by (Ericsson, 2016) and deﬁned three categories of mobile ap-
plications based on the usage patterns of mobile subscribers. We found applications with
particular business models that can be offered free of charge to all subscribers without
being concerned about their data usage in those applications. We call this model a selec-
tive free content (SFC) program. Three categories of such applications are investigated:
the Mapping applications along with intelligent personal assistants, the cloud-based IoT
services, and the smart city and e-governance applications. We showed the difference be-
tween these categories by analyzing the direction of payments in each category that cause
different business models. We showed the possibility of an SFC program by modeling the
interaction between users, service and content providers in a wireless market.
A three-stage Stackelberg game is introduced and solved by backward induction. Each
stage of the game shows the best response strategy of one network entity. The side-
payment from CP to SP is found based on the Nash bargaining solution as well as the
concept of Shapely value. Our model showed that even with a linear proﬁt model for
the CP, an SFC program is possible. We found the proﬁt threshold of SP in which an
SFC program is possible. Several realistic numerical scenarios are analyzed, and the side-
payment from CP to SP is found based on different bargaining powers of SP over CP.
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0.6 Content
This thesis follows the paper-based format of ÉTS. Hence, each chapter represents one journal
paper as follows:
a. Chapter 1 analyses the wireless market with volume-based pricing. The related paper is
submitted to IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management (TNSM).
b. Chapter 2 investigated the competition and cooperation in technological HetNets. The
related paper is submitted to the Elsevier Computer Networks journal.
c. Chapter 3 studies the selective free content program in wireless markets and considers the
coalition between a SP and a CP. The related paper is submitted to IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing (TMC).
d. Finally, in Conclusion and Recommendations, we summarize the results of this thesis and
proposed several directions as the possibilities of future studies.
0.7 Literature Review
Collaboration has emerged as a new paradigm that can have a signiﬁcant effect on the net-
work performance in several layers. In particular, the concepts from game theory, such as
cooperative games and coalitions, are used to optimize and improve resource utilization while
providing a fair distribution of the gains among game participants. Considering the theoretical
works related to the concept of coalition formation, authors in (Hart & Kurz, 1983) created
an endogenous framework for coalition formation. However their method does not consider
the effects of externalities on CS. Another good example of coalition formation is (Yi, 1997)
which considers both externalities and endogenous nature of coalition formation. However,
they solely analyzed symmetric games. Since the wireless market is asymmetric, with negative
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externalities and different provided services, it seems that a method based on relative power
(e.g., Shapley value) of providers is the best way for proﬁt division within a coalition. In
(Bloch, 1996), a sequential stationary game for coalition formation process is proposed. In this
model, players announce their desired coalition based on an exogenously deﬁned order. The
players in the game can have asymmetric power. It seems that such model is the best option
for analyzing cooperations in the wireless market. Hence, in Chapter 2, we use this model to
investigate coalition formations in the wireless market.
In the context of wireless networks, the majority of the studies focused on cooperation among
the nodes or users and mainly address the physical and link layers, e.g., (Mathur et al., 2008),
(Zhang et al., 2013) and (Chan et al., 2013), and the works that consider network layer as well,
(Han & Liu, 2008). However, there is a scarcity of research in the area of network operators’
collaboration. The pioneering work for non-wireless network operator coalitions is presented
in (Gibbens et al., 1991) where coalitions of national operators are analyzed in a game theoretic
framework for international routing. The results show that capacity saving of the order of 20
percent is achievable by forming coalitions. Coalition of network operator is considered in
(Sarkar et al., 2008) and (Singh et al., 2012a). In (Sarkar et al., 2008) the spectrum pooling
in wireless data access networks is studied in a given geographical region and the outcome
shows that the grand coalition of all operators is stable and maximizes the proﬁt. This work
is extended in (Singh et al., 2012a) to multi-hop networks with more relaxed assumptions
allowing variability of channel characteristics and mobile locations. In both mentioned bodies
of work, the main assumption is to form a grand coalition which simpliﬁes the analysis, but it
is not practical. The impracticality of the grand coalition comes from the reality of markets; in
most countries the competition rules prohibit the formation of a grand coalition as it leads to a
virtual monopoly. Therefore what needed is a study of how to form coalitions under realistic
constraints where the optimal solution cannot be a grand coalition, but instead, it can be a set
of coalitions where neither of them is a grand coalition. As already indicated, such games can
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be named coalition formation games as opposed to canonical coalitional games dealing with
grand coalitions. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies of coalition formation
games in the context of cooperation between heterogeneous wireless network operators.
Considering the service-oriented HetNets, the majority of literature focuses on sponsored data
in non-neutral networks which eventually leads to a type of CP-SP cooperation. (Lotﬁ et al.,
2016) investigates the proﬁtability of non-neutral networks and shows that in certain scenar-
ios a non-neutral network is nonproﬁtable. Also, it shows that when the market power of an
SP is small, the end users can obtain a better overall payoff in a non-neutral regime. (El-
Delgawy & La, 2015) analyses the interaction between a CP and SP when SP agrees to offer
a better QoS to CP’s service. This can be seen as a coalition of the two providers which is
achieved by an agreement in a bargaining game. The effect of bargaining power on the QoS
and the social efﬁciency level are the two factors which are considered in this work. (Joe-Wong
et al., 2015) investigates the optimum amount of content that CP sponsors. It shows that with
sponsored data applied, the utility of users increases more than CPs. (Andrews et al., 2016)
considers a case in which an SP proposes a sponsored data service to several CPs. In this case,
SP aims to select one of the CPs for the offered service and to determine the service price
that maximizes its proﬁt. One of the main issues that is addressed in this work is the truthful-
ness of CPs when they report their network parameters. In this thesis, similar to above works,
we consider the concept of non-neutral networks as a way to increase the proﬁt of CPs and
SPs. However, we propose a method in which certain types of contents can be delivered to all
users free of charge without requiring SPs and CPs to limit the content usage of subscribers.
Our method is based on the nature of such contents which carry highly valuable information
with low usage pattern. We call this method a selective free content (SFC) program and will
introduce it in Chapter 3.
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Abstract
Over the past few years, many major wireless providers restricted their unlimited data plans and
replaced them with limited-size ﬁxed-price data packages. While this could be perceived as a
disadvantage for customers, it helps the cellular wireless providers to reduce the trafﬁc intensity
at their base stations. Then the lower trafﬁc intensity leads to a better service quality and higher
rates for concurrently connected users. Hence, there is a trade-off between the data volume
and the data rates attributed to the users. Therefore, to avoid the adverse effect of service
inaccessibility, the cellular providers should carefully set the size and pricing of their data
packages. To do that, the providers need a model that, together with proper market information,
would allow to set the best prices for volume based data and estimate the acceptable quantity
of subscribers along with average data rate for them. In this paper, we propose such a model
that quantiﬁes the relationship between pricing and various market/system parameters such
as data volume size, user budget, data rate and service blocking probability. In particular,
we formulate a set of proﬁt optimization problems for different spectrum assignment criteria
like shared-carrier and dynamic sub-carrier allocation. Finally, several realistic scenarios are
investigated in which the optimal network parameters are computed.
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Introduction
With rapid growth of wireless markets in past twenty years, providers have been evaluating dif-
ferent pricing schemes to maximize their proﬁt. In particular, the providers of packet-switching
networks have considered many ways regarding pricing criteria to achieve a higher amount of
net income. These schemes are highly diversiﬁed from simple ﬂat-rate (Courcoubetis & We-
ber, 2003b) to dynamic pricing methods (Viterbo & Chiasserini, 2001). Schemes that consider
Service Level Agreement (SLA) are not common for the end-users in data networks, yet they
are essential in mid-level and high-level inter-provider contract based methods. Smart pricing
methods (Sen et al., 2013b), such as time-dependent pricing schemes (Ha et al., 2012a), in
which the provider sets the price based on congestion hours, or other network parameters, are
studied in several works but they are not widely accepted by the wireless providers. This is not
only due to the operational complexity of such dynamic pricing schemes but also due to the
difﬁculties in managing customer expectations and educating them on complicated interaction
between user behavior and pricing.
Before 2012, it was common among major players in the cellular wireless market (such as
Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint) to offer low-price unlimited data plans. However, nowadays their
pricing schemes are dominated by plans with a cap on data volume and calling minutes. In this
approach, instead of unrestricted access to the data service, the subscriber pays a certain price
to use up to a speciﬁed amount of data alongside the voice service for a particular duration. For
example, the subscribers pay for one, two or more Gigabytes of data at a particular price. The
available data in the package is being reﬁlled mostly in monthly periods and the user-provider
contract usually stays unchanged for over one or two years. We refer the readers to (Verizon-
Data, 2016; AT&T Data, 2016; Sprint, 2016) for some examples of U.S wireless carriers and
(Telus, 2016; Bell, 2016; Rogers, 2016) for Canadian providers. The universal dominance of
this pricing scheme motivates us to investigate its characteristics and optimality under different
wireless technologies with shared, dedicated or dynamic spectrum allocation policies.
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Analytical framework
We aim to ﬁnd a model that can predict the proﬁt of providers with volume-based data plans.
The key elements of our model are the market and network parameters such as data-volume
size, price, data rate, service availability and user budget. The combination of these parameters
affects user’s subscription behavior. Similar to many real markets, the voice and data services
are assumed to be offered in separated packages. The set of data users is a subset of voice
users which means that if a user wants to have a data subscription, it needs to join the voice
network as well. In this way, we present the market in two stages; ﬁrstly, the voice users enter
the market out of a set of potential subscribers. Secondly, the newly joined users are offered
to have a data package which eventually forms a set of data users. From the user side, the
widely adopted utility theory (Duan et al., 2013c; Gajic et al., 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2004;
Niyato & Hossain, 2009) is used to model the behavior of users in package selection. The cap
of data-volume, price, data rate and service availability are the variables in the utility function.
We start developing our formulation by analyzing the optimal proﬁt of a provider with a single
data package and shared-carrier system. For this case, we show the relation between optimal
data rate and the size of data volume. We then extend the framework to support a multi-
package provider model. In this part, the effect of users’ monetary resources and their budget
distribution on provider’s proﬁt are investigated. The proposed analysis enters the next level
by deﬁning a second method in which the provider dynamically assigns the bandwidth to the
users to guarantee a constant predeﬁned data rate. Since the spectrum is limited in cellular
networks, the majority of analysis in this part is focused on calculating the blocking probability
of data ﬂow requests originated by spectrum shortage. Then, we introduce the provider’s proﬁt
optimization problem in which the optimal values of data-volume, price of data plan, as well
as the data rate, are calculated. Here, to have a precise structure, separated spectrum bands are
deﬁned for voice and data. Hence, the bandwidth splitting ratio is an additional decision value
for the optimization problem. Lastly, several numerical studies related to the optimal values
of data cap, price, and data rate as well as service blocking probability are provided. These
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scenarios present real world market situations with current 3G/4G technologies that support
shared-carrier and dynamic bandwidth allocation methods.
Contribution
In summary, the technical contribution of this paper include:
• We formulate a proﬁt optimization problem to model and quantify the effect of the size of
data volume and its corresponding pricing on expected user data rate and provider proﬁt.
• Our formulation covers two methods of spectrum allocation: shared-carrier method that
covers the TDM and CDMA schemes, and dynamic spectrum allocation method that covers
OFDMA systems.
• We consider user’s available budget as a random variable and use it to derive the number
of subscribing users. The optimization problem in this part covers multi-package markets.
Also, the case of data volume renovation in which users extend the data-cap under their
default plan is analyzed.
• We link the offered data volume size, price and service availability together with a utility
function and calculate the optimal service data rate that maximizes provider proﬁt.
Structure
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 is a brief review of related works in
wired and wireless network economics. The general system model is described in Section 1.2.
Single and multi-package wireless markets regarding the shared-carrier model are analyzed
in Section 1.3. Pricing in dynamic spectrum allocation method is the subject of Section 1.4.
Section 1.5 includes several numerical studies similar to real markets based on shared-carrier
and dynamic bandwidth allocation methods. Finally Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
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1.1 Related Works
Economics of data networks is a well-established branch of network analysis in both engineer-
ing and economic divisions. Considering the Internet as a new opportunity to make wealth and
capital, MacKie-Mason and Varian (MacKie-Mason & Varian, 1995) is one of the early works
in this ﬁeld investigating the Internet pricing schemes. Considering the cellular networks,
(Wright, 2002) is an example of pure economic analysis of call pricing among competitive
network carriers; in particular, the class of pricing for calls from ﬁxed-network to cellular sub-
scribers is analyzed. (Huang, 2008) is another work related to the pricing and call demands in
mobile networks; this work considers different plans, each having a non-linear pricing scheme
and the network demand is computed based on econometric models. The effect of cellular com-
petition and the entrance of new competitors on pricing tactics is the subject of (Seim & Vaiard,
2011). The analysis is based on the data of U.S cellular market in the late 90s, and its main
interest is the effect of market structure on pricing schemes and the optimality of diversiﬁed
pricing methods on overall consumer satisfaction. (Zhang et al., 2014) investigates the service
pricing in two-tier small cell networks. This work proposes a paying mechanism in which the
macro-cell providers incentivize the small cell owners to give access to macrocell users. The
pricing strategies are based on a leader-follower dynamic game. Dynamic pricing of call rates
is analyzed in (Dugar et al., 2015). This work concerns two models of game: provider vs.
provider and consumer vs. provider. Based on these models, the optimal strategies of network
entities are analyzed. The dynamic price of the system is calculated based on several factors
including the available bandwidth. However, the data service is not considered in this work.
With regards to the QoS of cellular networks, (Hou et al., 2002) focuses on congestion control
by combining pricing schemes and admission control algorithms. It considers an optimal call
arriving rate which maximizes the provider proﬁt and user utility and uses an adjustable ser-
vice price based on network parameters. (Yilmaz & Chen, 2009) uses the admission control
tactics to maximize the proﬁt of provider by setting the optimal prices while QoS is set for
each service class of the network. The main QoS parameter considered in this work is call
dropping probability. Different admission control algorithms are also analyzed in this work.
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For the current 3G/4G technologies, there are several pricing recommendations in literature,
e.g., (Wallenius & Hämäläinen, 2002) which suggests QoS based pricing methods which are
aware of service classes. For the further reading, we refer the readers to (Ezziane, 2005) and
(Gizelis & Vergados, 2011) which are surveys on 3G and wireless networks pricing.
This work is different with all above research efforts by considering voice and data packages
as separate options. It also formulates the relation between offered data size, its price, and
network parameters as well as the number of potential subscribers.
1.2 Notation and System model
Figure 1.1 The subscription ﬂow of the potential users. They join the
voice cellular network and then would subscribe to data package
In this section, notation alongside the system model are introduced. We consider a cellular
provider’s network with several macrocells. The provider aims to offer a data plan in which a
certain level of QoS, deﬁned in an SLA, is provided throughout its network. Namely, in the
busy hours of busiest macrocells, predeﬁned levels of voice service availability and minimum
data transfer’s rate are provided. Based on the direct measurements of user distribution over
the time, the provider expects a maximum of NC voice users under the coverage of its busiest
macrocells in the busy hour. NC can be the maximum numbers measured or a threshold value
that is exceeded with a small probability; this probability can be easily integrated into the SLA.
The provider tries to attract a subset of voice users to purchase its data plan. We represent
the number of data users associated with NC as ND. The service prices for voice and data
plans are denoted as pc and pd , respectively. The cap of the data volume is represented by
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cd . The offered data rate is represented by γd . The main challenge is to model the behavior
of users to optimize the network parameters, such as the size of data-volume, price and the
offered data rate, to achieve the maximum proﬁt. In particular, we want to maximize the
proﬁt function π(cd,γd, pd) = ND(cd,γd, pd)× pd . We formulate this model of subscription
backwardly. First, the user response is modeled based on the network parameters. Then, after
ﬁnding ND as a function of NC, we ﬁnd the ﬁnal proﬁt function of the provider. The perceptual
importance of data service is modeled by assigning a random user data valuation number ωd
to each user. This random value emphasizes the signiﬁcance of having data access for each
user. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that ωd is uniformly distributed in interval [0,1],
ωd ∼ U(0,1). In general, a Beta distribution can be assumed for ωd . We will use Uniform
as well as Beta distributions in our numerical examples. Each macrocell’s coverage area is
assumed to be circular with radius RM and users are uniformly distributed in the cell area.
Hence, for each user the random distance from the base station has the following distribution:
f (r) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2r
R2M
r ≤ RM,
0 r > RM.
(1.1)
In the rest of the paper, P(x) represents the probability of x and f (x) and F(x) operators repre-
sent the probability distribution function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the variable x respectively.
1.2.1 Data rate models based on channel access method
User satisfaction and preferences are playing a signiﬁcant role in the package selection. To this
extent, we need to model the fundamental parameters involved in the selection process. One
of these parameters is the data rate (or the service speed) granted to the user. In this section we
present data rate models for two different channel access methods along with admission policy
behind them and their impact on user satisfaction. The analytical models for other channel ac-
cess methods can be extracted from these two. First, we consider shared single carrier methods
that covers schemes like CDMA and WCDMA. In this case, voice and data services can be
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offered by one carrier with time division or two separated carriers each having a fraction of
total bandwidth. Second, we consider dynamic sub-carrier allocation in which provider tries
to guarantee a predeﬁned level of data rate to the users by allocating the proper portion of its
available bandwidth. Here the main concern for the provider is the value of guaranteed data
rate and also the blocking probability of data ﬂows caused by spectrum shortage. Fig. 1.2
illustrates these two types of bandwidth assignment. Since the focus is on service pricing, we
consider the high-level models of access methods which can be extended to different scenarios.
Considering the data rate, our model relies on a general path-loss deﬁnition; supposing the
maximum achievable data rate by each user j in technology X in absence of other users is CMX ,
then the distance related rate is represented by:
CX(r) =CMX
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 r ≤ Rm,(Rm
r
)α
Rm < r ≤ RM,
(1.2)
where Rm is the maximum radius in which the highest rate can be achieved and α ≥ 2 is the
attenuation factor. Generally,CMX is the technology dependent rate which is related to the carrier
bandwidth QD by a spectral efﬁciency factor (ElNashar et al., 2014),CMX = β ×QD. Using this
data rate deﬁnition, in the next two subsections the achievable data rate for these two spectrum
allocation methods are elaborated.
1.2.1.1 Shared single carrier
The ﬁrst formulation is for shared single-carrier method where each user’s data rate originates
from code or time division multiplexing. In (Bonald & Proutière, 2003), a framework for
CDMA networks is proposed That is based on representing a single-carrier macro-cell by a
processor sharing model. In this model, if the arrival rate is λ and each user has a ﬂow request
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Figure 1.2 Two types of bandwidth assignment. a) Shared
carrier model for voice and data. b) dynamically assigned
sub-carrier sets for cellular voice and data
of expected size η , then the average service time 1μ for a user can be calculated as:
1
μ
=
∫ RM
0
η
CX(r)
f (r)dr =
η
CMX
⎛
⎝Rm+ 1Rαm(α +1)(Rα+1M −1)
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ1
=
η ×ζ1
CMX
=
η ×ζ1
β ×QD . (1.3)
In our model, we relate the arrival rate of data ﬂows of each user (λd) to the offered data volume
cap by a scale factor λu: λd = λucd . This simpliﬁcation is mainly due to the rational behavior
of users that try to utilize the network based on their package limits. It is proved ((Tijms,
2003) P.6) that the combination of ND users leads into a Poisson arrival rate of λD = ND×λd .
This distribution is generally called a merged Poisson process. The average load of processor
sharing system is ρ¯ = λDμ =
ND×λu×cd×η×ζ1
CMX
. It is clear that ρ¯ < 1 is the condition of stability.
In the stationary state of the system, the data rate for a user which is located in distance r from
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Table 1.1 General notation
Parameter Description
NC Set of voice users
ND Set of data users
Nx size of the set Nx
QT Total available bandwidth
QC, QD Total available bandwidth to voice and data services
cd data volume cap
pd , pc price of data and voice services
γ general notation for data rate
γc,γd offered data rate to voice and data users
β Spectral efﬁciency
θd leveling factor for user’s utility
ωd valuation factor for the data plan
bg random variable of user budget for data service
η expected size of data ﬂow
λc service request rate of each voice user
λu scale factor for the rate of incoming data ﬂows
λd rate of ﬂow requests for each user λd = λucd
λD overall service request rate of all voice data
1
μc voice service time
Bc expected blocking probability of voice calls
Bd expected blocking probability of data ﬂows
the macrocell is (Bonald & Proutière, 2003):
γ(r) =CX(r)(1− ρ¯), (1.4)
hence the expected data rate is,
γ¯ =
∫ RM
0
γ(r) f (r)dr =CMX
⎛
⎝Rm+ 11−α
⎛
⎝RM(RmRM
)α
−1
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠(1− ρ¯). (1.5)
By setting ζ2 = Rm+ 11−α
(
RM
(
Rm
RM
)α −1),
γ¯ = ζ2×
(
CMX −ND×λu× cd ×η ×ζ1
)
, (1.6)
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which is used as the equation for the data rate for the shared single carrier approach.
1.2.1.2 Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation
In the second model, we suppose that the provider can dynamically assign a fraction of its
available spectrum to each user’s data ﬂow to guarantee a minimum level of data rate during
the busy hours. In this manner, the provider aggregates several sub-carriers based on channel
quality to guarantee the promised quality. Let have γd as the offered data rate to the user and
S(r) as the bandwidth required to achieve γd in distance r from the base station. Considering
the spectral efﬁciency factor which is technology-dependent we can map the maximum rate
to the bandwidth as γd = βSd , where Sd is the bandwidth of assigned spectrum. Using this
deﬁnition in (1.2) gives,
γ(r) = β ×Sd
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 r ≤ Rm,(Rm
r
)α
Rm < r ≤ RM.
(1.7)
To achieve a constant value of γd , the provider needs to allocate the following bandwidth:
S(r) =
γd
β
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 r ≤ Rm,(
r
Rm
)α
Rm < r ≤ RM.
(1.8)
The above equation is the basic model for the required spectrum size (in forms of grouped sub-
carriers or any dynamically allocated spectrum) for each user based on its distance. Regarding
the admission policy, the provider can make two separate groups for data and cellular voices,
each having different required data rate. Since the available spectrum is limited, in the busy-
hour a data ﬂow transfer can be blocked or delayed. Thus, we need to deﬁne the blocking
probability of data ﬂows and a suitable package selection mechanism based on guaranteed
data rate and blocking probability of data ﬂows. We will go deeper into this particular case in
Section 1.4.
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In the next two sections, we deﬁne the volume-based pricing framework. In Section IV we
develop our formulation based on shared carrier scheme. Then, we expand the concepts to
adopt the dynamic spectrum allocation and related blocking probabilities in Section 1.4.
1.3 Data package pricing
1.3.1 Single-package problem
The provider’s proﬁt maximization problem can be divided into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage
provider sets the data service parameters such as the data volume cap, its price and data rate and
offers the plan to the voice users. In the second stage, users decide whether to join the data plan
based on the service parameters. This model can be solved backwardly. Namely, the provider
anticipates the users’ subscription behavior and uses this information to set the optimum values
of service parameters. In the following subsection, we describe all the necessary equations to
model users’ decision criterion.
1.3.1.1 Users’ decision criterion
We start with the formulation of the one data package case and then extend it to the multi-
package counterpart. A volume-based data package is presented by a speciﬁc amount of data
cd with price pd that is valid for a predeﬁned period, e.g., a month, that can be renewed at the
beginning of each period. In the package information the provider announces the following
network parameters:
• Average data rate that can be achieved by a user under network coverage area, which is the
expected data rate from (1.6).
• The size and price of data package.
Each user applies its own evaluation criterion on service parameters to assess the package
desirability. To model this decision behavior, we adopt the general practice of utility theory
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(Duan et al., 2013c; Gajic et al., 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Niyato & Hossain, 2009). In
our case, the utility of user j is represented by:
U j = θd ×ω jd × γd × cd − pd. (1.9)
where γd is the promised average data rate to the user and θd is a leveling factor which de-
termines the combinations of [data volume size, price] that give zero utility for users with the
highest data valuation, ωd = 1, and the network with normalized access data rate of 1. Data
valuation is a random variable ωd ∼ U(0,1). In this decision process, if the value of U j is
bigger than a reserved utility εd , then the user j will subscribe to the data network. In this
manner, the set of data users ND can be deﬁned as follows:
ND =
⎧⎨
⎩ j ∈ NC
∣∣∣∣∣∣ω jd ∈ [0,1]∧ ω jd ≥ εd + pdγdθdcd
⎫⎬
⎭. (1.10)
Note that the applied linear form of user utility is considered in previous literature as well (e.g.
(Chen et al., 2015a)); we use it due to the nature of volume-based pricing in which the bigger
ratio of data to price the higher level of satisfaction.
1.3.1.2 Provider proﬁt
The provider needs to optimize its proﬁt function π = ND× pd . The optimization function has
two constraints. Having a stable system requires ρ¯ < 1 and also the average data rate should
be bigger than the offered value, γ¯ ≥ γd . We can rewrite γ¯ in (1.6) based on the value of ND:
γ¯ = ζ2×
(
CMX −λD×η ×ζ1
)
= ζ2×
⎛
⎝CMX −NCλucdζ1η
⎛
⎝1− εd + pd
γdθdcd
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ . (1.11)
The proﬁt function is strictly increasing with respect to γd which means if the provider can
achieve a data rate value like γ¯ > γd , then it is better off to announce γ¯ . Hence we can set
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γd = γ¯ and solve (1.11) for it:
γ¯ =
ζ2CMX −σcd ±
(
(ζ2CMX −σcd)2+4 σθd (εd + pd)
) 1
2
2
, (1.12)
σ = NCζ1ζ2ηλu.
Eq. (1.12) has two opposite sign values, where the positive value is the only acceptable solu-
tion. We can write the optimization problem of data proﬁt as:
max
cd ,pd
π(cd, pd) = NCpd
⎛
⎝1− εd + pd
γ¯(pd,cd)θdcd
⎞
⎠ (1.13)
γ¯(pd,cd) =
ζ2CMX −σcd +
⎛
⎝(ζ2CMX −σcd)2+4 σθd (εd + pd)
⎞
⎠
1
2
2
subject to:
pd ≥ 0, (1.14)
cd ≥ dm, (1.15)
γ¯(pd,cd)≥ γm. (1.16)
The constraint εd + pd ≤ γ¯(cd, pd)θdcd , which assures the user set ND has a rational size and
also validates (max γ¯) ≤ ζ2CMX , is not required since otherwise the objective function obtains
negative values. The maximum proﬁt does not go to the negative side as pd = 0 is giving
a nonnegative maximum in the worst case. For the QoS conditions and also for regulator’s
minimum service obligations, we added the inequality γ¯(pd,cd)≥ γm as the constraint for the
lower-bound of data rate and cd ≥ dm for the minimum offered data. It can be proved that the
objective function is concave with respect to both pd and cd . We refer the readers to Appendix
I-1 for the proof.
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1.3.2 User monetary resources and budget
Until now we investigated a scenario in which there is no information on monetary resources
of potential subscribers, nor their budget, hence, each subscribed user purchases the package
according to its valuation. We distinguish between the ﬁnancial capacity (or wealth) and the
budget. The former shows the user ability to purchase a package but does not necessarily
mean its service evaluation meets the ability to purchase. One example is a user who values
the high-speed data service and large data volume cap, yet it cannot afford the cost, or on the
contrary, another user who has enough funds to purchase any package but accessing the data
itself is not essential for him. Mathematically speaking, the correlation between valuation and
the available funds is not perfectly positive. The latter concept of budget deﬁnes the amount of
money each user is willing to pay if the package meets its minimum expectations. In particular,
since this type of information shows the usage willingness, data valuation ωd can be replaced
by the budget information if it is presented. We denote the wealth random variable by mr and
the budget by bg. In the next subsection, we extend our formulation to this type of information
in the multi-package market.
1.3.2.1 Multi-package data network with wealth information
In the previous subsection, the data network subscription is deﬁned based on a uni-package
provider. Even though this is a fair way to investigate user behavior under different data sizes,
all users who have a data evaluation under a threshold limit are excluded from data user set
and this is not optimal for the provider. Therefore, it is a common practice for providers to
construct a multi-package service in which each set of [data volume size, price] addresses
a unique group of users. Suppose the provider has n data packages represented by the set
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υ =
{{c1d, p1d}, · · · ,{cnd, pnd}} where
p1d < p
2
d · · ·< pnd, (1.17)
c1d < c
2
d · · ·< cnd, (1.18)
εd + p1d
c1d
>
εd + p2d
c2d
> · · ·> εd + p
n
d
cnd
, (1.19)
are the rationality requirements for the package pricing. Comparing all packages, the highest
data volume attracts the potential subscribers with lowest data valuation and above; As a result,
user wealth has the main role in selecting between the preferred packages. Let deﬁne the joint-
PDF f (ωd,mr) based on market gathered information; then if we represent the subscribers of
package i with NiD, we have:
NiD = NC
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P
⎛
⎝ωd ≥ εd + pidγ¯θdcid , pid < mr ≤ pi+1d
⎞
⎠ i = n,
P
⎛
⎝ωd ≥ εd + pidγ¯θdcid , pid < mr ≤MMr
⎞
⎠ i= n.
where MMr is the highest amount of money someone would pay for data access. We can repre-
sent the above equation in terms of cumulative distribution function; for i = n we have:
NiD
i=n
= NC
⎡
⎣FMr(pi+1d )+FΩd ,Mr
⎛
⎝εd + pid
γ¯θdcid
, pid
⎞
⎠−FΩd ,Mr
⎛
⎝εd + pid
γ¯θdcid
, pi+1d
⎞
⎠−FMr
⎛
⎝pid
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦,
where the CDF parts come from the deﬁnition of joint probability as P(X1 < x≤ X2,Y1 < y≤
Y2) = FXY (X1,Y1)+FXY (X2,Y2)−FXY (X2,Y1)−FXY (X1,Y2) and P(x ≤ ∞,y ≤ Y1) = FY (Y1).
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The exact same concept can be used for NnD. Here the proﬁt function and γ¯ are deﬁned as:
π(υ) =
n
∑
i=1
NiDp
i
d, (1.20)
ρ¯ i =
NiDλuc
i
dηζ1
CMX
, (1.21)
ρ¯
(
υ , γ¯(υ)
)
=
n
∑
i=1
ρ¯ i, (1.22)
γ¯(υ) =CMX ·ζ2
⎛
⎝1− ρ¯(υ , γ¯(υ))
⎞
⎠. (1.23)
The notation of optimization problem is the same as previous sections.
Example 1 (perfect correlation between wealth and data valuation). If we have a perfect cor-
relation between data valuation ωd and user wealth mr, it means user with better monetary
resource always pays for the bigger data volume. Therefore we can combine the concept of
ωd with mr as a single random variable budget (bg ∼ f (bg)). Here budget is deﬁned as the
maximum amount a user is willing to pay for data access. Thus, the utility for user j can be
rewritten as:
U j = b jg×θd × γ¯ × cd − pd, (1.24)
where θd is having the same role as (1.9). The minimum sufﬁcient budget level to join the
network is εd+pdγ¯θdcd which should be equal or bigger than package price pd , hence,
pd ≤ εdγ¯θdcd −1 ·
Now, we can extend our formulation to a multi-package market with packages
υ = {{c1d, p1d}, · · · ,{cnd, pnd}} and rationality conditions of (1.17-1.19). For every package i
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with pid ≤ εdγ¯θdcid−1 , we have the following user quantities:
NiD = NC
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
P
⎛
⎝εd + pid
γ¯θdcid
≤ bg <
εd + pi+1d
γ¯θdci+1d
⎞
⎠ i = n,
P
⎛
⎝εd + pid
γ¯θdcid
≤ bg ≤ bMg
⎞
⎠ i= n,
(1.25)
where bMg is the highest available budget. Converting (1.25) to the form of (1.20) is straightfor-
ward and we exclude it. For the analytical purposes, here we represent the network parameters
for uniformly distributed budget bg ∼U(0,bMg ):
ND =
NC
bMg
(
bMg −
εd + p1d
γ¯(υ)θdc1d
)
, (1.26)
π(υ) =
NC
bMg
⎡
⎢⎣pndbMg − 1γ¯(υ)θd
⎛
⎜⎝ (εd + pnd)pnd
cnd
−
n−1
∑
i=1
(
εd + pi+1d
ci+1d
− εd p
i
d
cid
)
· pid
⎞
⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎦.
The trafﬁc intensity ρ¯ i generated by the users who purchased the package (pid,c
i
d) is:
ρ¯ i =
NCλuζ1η
CMX bMg
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
cid
γ¯(υ)θd
⎛
⎝εd + pi+1d
ci+1d
−
εd + pid
cid
⎞
⎠ i = n,
cnd b
M
g −
εd + pnd
γ¯(υ)θd
i= n.
(1.27)
Total trafﬁc intensity and expected data rate are calculated by (1.22) and (1.23) respectively. In
(1.23), γ¯(υ) is the expected data rate announced to the users and the following solution for it
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can be easily found:
γ¯ =
1
2
⎛
⎝Γ+(Γ2+4σ1σ2) 12
⎞
⎠, (1.28)
Γ=CMX ζ2−ζ1ηcnd, (1.29)
σ1 =ζ1ζ2NCλu, (1.30)
σ2 =
η
θdbMg
⎡
⎢⎣εd + pnd + n−1∑
i=1
cid
⎛
⎝εd + pi+1d
ci+1d
−
εd + pid
cid
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎥⎦. (1.31)
Writing the objective function and KKT conditions of the new optimization problem is rela-
tively straightforward and the concept is not much different from the previous section. Now,
the optimization parameters are 2n values which form n data packages instead of single pair
(pd,cd) in (1.13).
1.3.3 Package Renovation
In many cases a higher valuation of data package by a user does not always mean that this
user has greater monetary resources; there would be many types of potential subscribers who
appreciate a good quality data package for its price, yet they cannot afford it. In such cases the
covariance of ωd and mr can be negative. For the uni-package offer υ = (cd, pd, γ¯), the number
of subscribing users is:
N0D = NCP
⎛
⎝ωd ≥ εd + pdγ¯ · cd ,mr ≥ pd
⎞
⎠= NC ∫ 1εd + pd
γ¯ · cd
∫ MMr
pd
f (ωd,mr) cdωd dmr
= NC
⎛
⎝1−Fωd ,mr
⎛
⎝εd + pd
γ¯ · cd , pd
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ . (1.32)
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The quantity of users who can afford the package-recharge for nth time is
NnD = NC
⎛
⎝1−Fωd ,mr
⎛
⎝εd + pd
γ¯ · cd ,npd
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠. If the wireless provider sets the recharge cost for
extra data as pr = pd , we can modify the above equation by representing:
NnD = NC
⎛
⎝1−Fωd ,mr
⎛
⎝εd + pd
γ¯ · cd , pd +(n−1)pr
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ . (1.33)
Our formulation will not be completed if we do not consider a recharging incentive factor
which indicates the expected probability of purchasing extra service if user has not already
reached the budget limit. We deﬁne a decreasing function
{
G(n)
∣∣∣G(0) = 1,G(∞) = 0,G(a)>
G(b) ⇐⇒ a < b : ∀a,b ∈ [0,1]
}
which shows this effect. This function has a major role in
package deﬁnition since it connects our formulation to the reality of markets by prohibiting the
provider to offer an irrationally small-sized package to utilize all the budget levels. Then, one
can deﬁne the provider proﬁt as:
π(pd, pr,cd) = N0D · pd + pr×
n=M
M
r −pd
pr 
∑
i=1
G(i)NiD. (1.34)
Where · indicates the ﬂoor function. Since some users are purchasing extra bandwidth, we
need to modify the expected arrival rate of ﬂows λd . In the new formulation we have G(n)NnD
(n = MMr −pdpr ) users who generate ﬂows with rate (n+ 1)λucd; (G(n− 1)Nn−1D −G(n)NnD)
users who produce ﬂows with rate nλucd and so on. If we indicate the users with i-fold package
renovation as a group i, the trafﬁc intensity, ρ¯ i, generated by this group is:
ρ¯ i =
λuζ1
ζ2
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(G(i−1)Ni−1D −G(i)NiD)iηcd i = n,
G(i)NiD(i+1)ηcd i= n.
(1.35)
The total trafﬁc intensity and expected data rate are calculated from (1.22) and (1.23). In the
optimization problem of Subsection 1.3.1.2, the objective function along with the γ¯ function
can be updated with the new equations. Here, γ¯ is calculated using a recursive function which
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appears in both the objective function and the inequality constraint. Thus, even though we
reached a better framework to model volume-based data packages, the complexity of ﬁnding
optimal values is increased by adding an iterative loop inside the main optimization problem
to ﬁnd the value of γ¯ . We can take a further step and combine the results of the two recent sub-
sections to achieve a framework for the multi-package market with data recharging, however,
the formulation is straightforward and to avoid redundancy in content and equations we leave
it to the readers.
1.4 Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation Model
In the previous section, we investigated the volume-based data package pricing for shared-
carrier networks. In this manner, provider tries to attract a subset of voice user set, NC, to
subscribe to its data package. We assumed the provider owns bandwidth QD which leads to a
maximum data rateCMX = βQD. In this section, we expand our framework to model the pricing
with regard to another channel access method. In this approach as we described in section
1.2.1.2, the provider guarantees to grant a predeﬁned access data rate to the connected users.
Here, in contrast to the previous method, data rate is not changing based on the distance from
the base station. However, the available bandwidth to the provider is limited and users may be
displeased by service unavailability. This unavailability occurs when the data ﬂow requests are
blocked due to spectrum shortage. Hence one needs to add an extra variable to the utility in
(1.9) to reﬂect the dissatisfaction by service unavailability. Henceforth instead of γ¯ we use the
notation γd to clarify the invariability of data rate in current approach. Since the utility function
presents user’s gain, by deﬁning BTd as the expected blocking probability for data ﬂow requests,
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we deﬁne the utility and user quantity as:
Uj = θd · cd ·ω jd · γd · (1−BTd )− pd, (1.36)
ND =
⎧⎨
⎩ j ∈ NC
∣∣∣∣∣∣ω jd ∈ [0,1] ∧ ω jd ≥ εd + pdθd · cd · γd · (1−BTd )
⎫⎬
⎭ , (1.37)
ND = NC
∫ 1
εd+pd
θd ·cd ·γd ·(1−BTd )
fΩd(ωd)cdωd. (1.38)
Now, we need to ﬁnd the expected blocking probability of data ﬂows which is based on avail-
able bandwidth and carrier allocation in admission control process. Due to zero latency expe-
rience of 5G networks, we suppose any delay of data transfer has a similar effect to the ﬂow
blocking on user utility. Based on (1.8) we have the following relation for spectrum bandwidth
and data rate:
S(r) =
γd
β
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 r ≤ Rm,(
r
Rm
)α
Rm < r ≤ RM.
(1.39)
However, r which is the user distance form the macro-cell is a random variable and conse-
quently S(r) is also behaving as a random variable. With a little math work we have the CDF
and PDF of S(r) as:
FS(s) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 s< γdβ ,(
Rm
RM
)2(β s
γd
) 2
α γd
β ≤ s≤ γdβ
(
RM
Rm
)α
.
(1.40)
fS(s) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 s< γdβ ,
2
α
(
Rm
RM
)2( β
γd
) 2
α
s
2
α −1 CCβ ≤ s≤ γdβ
(
RM
Rm
)α
.
(1.41)
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Figure 1.3 M/M/K/K birth-death model with state dependent
arrival rates
μS = E[S] =
2
α +2
· γd
β
·
((
RM
Rm
)α
−
(
Rm
RM
)2)
, (1.42)
E[S2] =
1
α +1
·
(
γd
β
)2
·
((
RM
Rm
)2α
−
(
Rm
RM
)2)
, (1.43)
σ2S = E[S
2]−μ2S . (1.44)
The above PDF shows the probability density of required spectrum size for each user in the
coverage area. If the overall available spectrum to the provider for the data network is QD,
then the quantity of concurrent active users Ad varies as k= QD·βγd (
Rm
RM
)α ≤ Ad ≤ QD·βγd = K,
where . and . are the ceiling and ﬂoor functions respectively.
We can model the data network as a multi-server model with Poisson arrival λD = NDλu (λu is
the arrival rate for each user’s data requests) and expected service time 1μD = E[td] =
ηcd
γd . td
is connection (data ﬂow) duration with exponential distribution. This is a M/M/K/K system
with no queue and K = QCβγd  servers. In standard model of queue-less multi-server system
the service blocking occurs when the user request arrives in state K which means user observes
K other users are being served in that time. In our model, due to randomness of bandwidth (or
sub-carrier) allocation, a user service request would be blocked in a state j < K. Due to this
fact when the system is stationary, the arrival rate observed by an observer inside the system
is related to its state. This effect is depicted in Fig. 1.3 as follows: the arrival rate is λD in
all states in which the system deﬁnitely has enough resources to guarantee the promised data
rate, as soon as system reaches to the state j > k = QD·βγd (
Rm
RM
)α, due to request blocking, the
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average arrival rate observed by the viewer inside the system is (1−b( j−1))λD where b( j−1)
is the blocking probability of ﬂows in state j− 1 due to resource shortage. The more precise
interpretation of blocking in the state j ≥ k, b( j), is that by having j users in the system, there
is not enough spectrum (in form of sub-carriers) to serve ( j+ 1)th user, hence, in view of a
Markov process, assuming the system is already in state j, the probability of having enough
resources to go to the next state is 1− b( j) = P(QD−∑ j+1i=1 S(ri) ≥ 0). As a result of above
discussion, the instant blocking probability of ﬂows should be calculated for each system state.
With respect to this fact, the general deﬁnition for the expected blocking probability in the
steady state of the system is,
BTd =
K=QDβγd 
∑
j=k=QDβγd (
Rm
RC
)α
b( j)×P( j), (1.45)
where j represents the system state, P( j) is the probability of being in state j. In the following
two subsections, we explain a method to calculate P( j) and b( j).
1.4.1 Finding b( j)
Since the bandwidth random variables for all users are i.i.d, let deﬁne a new random variable
I( j) = ∑ ji=1 S(ri), and we have the following deﬁnitions for it:
fI( j)(ι) = f
j∗
S (ι), (1.46)
μI( j) = j ·μS, (1.47)
σ2I( j) = j ·σ2S , (1.48)
where f j∗(.) indicates the j-fold convolution of f (.). As we indicated earlier, the probability of
being blocked when the system is in state j is P(QD−∑ j+1i=1 S(ri)< 0), which can be represented
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as:
b( j) = 1−FI( j+1)(QD). (1.49)
Since in today’s cellular networks the quantity of concurrent users is usually greater than 10,
with a good approximation, by using central limit theorem, a Gaussian distribution can be
assumed for fI( j)(ι) . Hence, we can represent:
fI( j)(ι)≈ G( jμS, jσ2S ) =
1
(2π jσ2S )
1
2
· e
−
(ι − jμS)2
2 jσ2S , (1.50)
and from (1.49):
b( j) = 1−Φ
(
QD− ( j+1)μS√
j+1σS
)
, (1.51)
where
Φ(x) = (2π)
−1
2
∫ x
−∞
e−x
2
dx. (1.52)
1.4.2 Finding P( j)
The call admission scheme in our system is based on a queue-less multi-server model M/M/K/K
which has state-dependent arrival rates for service requests due to random resource shortage.
In this part, we elaborate this system which is depicted in Fig. 1.3. The stationary probabilities
of states in a standard M/M/K/K system is well-known: for a system with K servers and
trafﬁc intensity ρd = λDμD =
NDλu
μD we have:
P(ρd, j) =
ρ jd
j!
∑Ki=1
ρ id
i!
. (1.53)
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However, since the shortage of spectrum can force the admission controller to reject some data
request in state j < K, then, from the viewpoint of an observer inside the system, the arrival
rate is different from state to state. Hence, we have to write the stationary equations to obtain
the probabilities of states in the system of Fig. 1.3. The stationary equations are as follows:
λDP(0) = μDP(1), (1.54a)
(λD+μD)P(1) = λDP(0)+2μDP(2), (1.54b)
...
(λD+(k−1)μD)P(k−1) = λDP(k−2)+ kμDP(k), (1.54c)
((1−b(k))λD+ kμD)P(k) = λDP(k−1)+
(k+1)μDP(k+1), (1.54d)
...
((1−b(K−1))λD)P(K−1) = KμDP(K). (1.54e)
The above system of equations yields to the Markov chain stationary state probabilities as
follows:
P( j) =δ ×
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ρ jd
j! j ≤ k = QDβγd (
Rm
RC
)α,
(1−b( j−1))ρ
j
d
j! k < j ≤ K = QDβγd ,
(1.55)
δ =
⎛
⎝ k∑
i=1
ρ id
i!
+
K
∑
i=k+1
(1−b( j−1))ρ id
i!
⎞
⎠−1. (1.56)
By putting (1.51) and (1.55) into (1.45) (BTd = ∑
K
j=k b( j)P( j)), we achieve the ﬁnal form of
expected blocking probability for data ﬂows:
BTd = δ ×
⎛
⎝b(k)ρkd
k!
+
K−1
∑
j=k+1
b( j)(1−b( j−1))ρ
j
d
j!
+(1−b(K−1))ρ
K
d
K!
⎞
⎠. (1.57)
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1.4.3 Expected blocking with user utility applied
One of the main parameters of BTd in (1.57) is the trafﬁc intensity represented by ρd . The trafﬁc
intensity can be represented by ρd = NDλuμD ; ND directly comes from (1.36-1.38), and by using
those deﬁnitions we can formulate the trafﬁc intensity as,
ρd =
NCλu
μD
(
1− εd + pd
cdθdγd(1−BTd )
)
. (1.58)
In this representation, ρd is a function of the blocking probability itself and consequently we
can conclude that (1.57) is a recursive function having the form BTd (QD,ρd(B
T
d )).
1.4.4 Optimization problem
For the case of dynamically allocated spectrum, the provider proﬁt optimization problem is,
max
γd ,cd ,pd
ND(γd,cd, pd)× pd, (1.59)
subject to
γd ≥ γm, (1.60a)
cd ≥ dm, (1.60b)
pd ≥ 0, (1.60c)
0≤ BTd (QD,ρd)≤ BM. (1.60d)
We have the user quantity in data network, ND(γd,cd, pd), from (2.8) which includes the block-
ing probability as well. Here we added a constraint for maximum blocking probability BM as
a representation of regulator’s obligations. The complexity of this problem arises from the fact
that BTd (QD,ρd) does not adopt a closed-form solution and the problem is needed to be solved
with numerical methods.
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1.4.5 Final proﬁt
The cellular provider has two sources of proﬁt income from data and voice users. We also
know that the data users are a subset of the voice service users. The total bandwidth available
to the provider is QT . To separately control the level of availability of each service, we can
deﬁne a bandwidth splitting ratio 0≤ ψ ≤ 1. In this manner QC = ψQT and QD = (1−ψ)QT .
Considering this decision value and using the proﬁt model in the previous sections, we can
deﬁne a combined proﬁt function to resolve all the network decision values:
max
ψ, pd ,cd ,γd
πc+d = NC× pc+ND× pd = NC
⎡
⎣pc+ pd
⎛
⎝1− εd + pd
γd(1−BTd ((1−ψ)QT ,ρd))θdcd
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ ,
(1.61)
subject to,
cd ≥ dm, (1.62a)
pd ≥ 0, (1.62b)
ψ0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1, (1.62c)
γd ≥ γm, (1.62d)
BTc (ψQT ,ρc)≤ BMc , (1.62e)
BTd ((1−ψ)QT ,ρd)≤ BMd . (1.62f)
Where BTc (ψQT ,ρc)≤ BMc deﬁnes the upper limit for the probability of call blocking in voice
service. This model of proﬁt optimization upon bandwidth splitting gives a more precise
calculation since it separates the voice and data satisfaction, and gives different perceptual
evaluation-tolerance of each service to the users.
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1.4.6 Multi-package market for dynamic allocation method
In the pricing approaches for the shared-carrier technology, we formulated the rationality con-
ditions for a multi-package market in (1.17)-(1.19). The same conditions are applied to the
case of dynamic allocation technologies. The arrival rate of data ﬂow requests is directly re-
lated to the data volume cap, λd = λucd . Hence, multiple plans with different cap levels,
υ =
{{c1d, p1d}, · · · ,{cnd, pnd}}, affect the overall rate of ﬂow requests. With the analogous nota-
tions to Subsection 1.3.2.1, we can write the following equations for the number of subscribers
in each plan,
NiD
i=n
= NC
⎡
⎣FMr(pi+1d )+FΩd ,Mr
⎛
⎝ εd + pid
(1−BTd (ρ¯d(υ)))γdθdcid
, pid
⎞
⎠
−FΩd ,Mr
⎛
⎝ εd + pid
(1−BTd (ρ¯d(υ)))γdθdcid
, pi+1d
⎞
⎠−FMr
⎛
⎝pid
⎞
⎠,
⎤
⎦, (1.63)
ρ¯d(υ) =
n
∑
i=1
Nidλuc
i
dη
γd
. (1.64)
To obtainNnD from (1.63), M
M
r is substituted for p
i+1 in (1.63). Suppose the values {cid, pid} ∀i∈
n and γd are given. Then, (1.63) and (1.64) together deﬁne a system of nonlinear equations
with n variables. Writing the constraints for the objective function, π(υ) = ∑ni=1NiD(υ)p
i, is
not much different from the previous cases. Since ﬁnding a closed-from solution for NiD is
hardly possible, we use numercial methods embedded in MATLAB to ﬁnd the optimal values
in different realistic scenarios in the next section.
1.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we analyze four realistic scenarios. Firstly, the expected blocking probability
of (1.57) is analyzed. Then, we extend the analysis to the case in which the utility function of
users affects the blocking probability of data ﬂows. In the third scenario, we consider providers
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with the shared carrier and dynamic allocation methods and derive the optimal values of cd ,
pd , and γd . Finally, a provider with multiple data plans is investigated, and optimal network
parameters are derived for different values of λu.
Scenario 1. To justify (1.57), we ran a series of numerical scenarios which are depicted in Fig.
1.4-1.9. Fig. 1.4 represents the value of BTd for different available spectrum sizes (QD) while
trafﬁc intensity ρd is the variable. We selected the guaranteed data rate as rational value 50
Mbps and RM = 4Rm. The spectral efﬁciency (β ) is set to 4 which represents LTE technology
with SISO system (Mogensen et al., 2007). As it is expected, the higher available bandwidth
offers lower blocking probability even though by increasing ρd (simple representation of ρd),
BP goes to 1 eventually. Fig. 1.5 is a close-up of previous setting in interval ρd = [0,1]. Net-
work parameters in Fig. 1.6 are different from the previous group by having a lower guaranteed
data rate γ = 10 Mbps which drastically decreases the blocking probability in lower values of
ρd . Fig. 1.7 represents the probability of the system being in each state when a new request
arrives. Here each curve is analogous to one value of set [5,10,15,20] for ρd . Since the ar-
rival rate is decreasing in state-dependent format, we observe the state probability goes to zero
as the system is in higher states. Fig. 1.8 has spectral efﬁciency β = 30 which is similar to
LTE-advanced with MIMO system. As a result of higher efﬁciency, the non-zero blocking
probabilities spread to a broader range of system states. Finally, Fig. 1.9 depicts the curves as-
sociated with blocking probability in each system state. Each curve represents a different value
of guaranteed data rate varying from 10 to 40 Mbps. Due to spectrum shortage, the blocking
probability eventually goes to 1 in higher state numbers while the lower guaranteed data rate
has better performance as it is expected.
Scenario 2. In the previous scenario, we justiﬁed the expected blocking probability by cases in
which no user utility is involved. In this example we use the same network settings
(Q=350MHz, Rc = 4Rm, α = 2, β = 4) and analyze the expected blocking probability when
the user utility is considered, which is formulated in (1.58). Considering (1.58), we use the
notation ρMd =
NCλucd
μD as the upper limit of trafﬁc intensity and use the ratio
εd+pd
θd×γd×cd (cost to
gain) as the variable for the provider. Fig. 1.10 depicts the blocking probability for different
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Figure 1.4 Expected blocking probability for ρd = [0,100]
Figure 1.5 Expected blocking probability for ρd = [0,1]
values of ρMd while the guaranteed data rate is 50 Mbps. As it is shown in the ﬁgure, when
user’s cost to gain ratio increases, the expected blocking probability decreases due to fewer
network subscription. Fig. 1.11 shows the numerical results in which the guaranteed data rate
γd is constant in εd+pdθd×γd×cd . Five curves represent the offered rate from 10 to 50 Mbps. In this
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Figure 1.6 Expected blocking probability for γ = 10 Mbps
Figure 1.7 Markov chain State Probability (β = 4)
case, by increasing the cost to gain ratio, the provider needs to decrease the offered blocking
probability to maintain the data rate which is assumed to have a lower bound in the busy hour
indicated by γd .
Scenario 3. Here, we consider a realistic busy-hour scenario for each of the two bandwidth
allocation methods and ﬁnd the optimum values with MATLAB. Table 1.2 represents the net-
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Figure 1.8 Markov chain State Probability (β = 30)
Figure 1.9 State blocking probability b( j)
work parameters. We assume that a macrocell has 6 sectors. Concerning the shared-carrier
method, a lower total available bandwidth of QT = 10 MHz and spectral efﬁciency of β = 0.5
are used, which are similar to WCDMA 3G networks. The available bandwidth in dynamic
allocation method is 50 MHz. We consider 150 and 1500 voice subscribers for shared-carrier
and dynamic allocation schemes respectively. In both scenarios, each voice user has an arrival
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Figure 1.10 Expected Blocking Probability (BTd ) with
the ratio εd+pdθd×γdγd as variable. Curves represent different
values of ρC
Figure 1.11 Expected Blocking Probability (BTd ) with
the ratio εd+pdγd×cd×θd as variable. Curves represent different
values of γd
rate of 10−4 and service time of 90 seconds with 150 Kbps of required data rate. The arrival
rate of each data request is taken as an independent variable in both scenarios, and the average
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ﬂow size is η = 100 KB. While data service valuation ωd is assumed to be uniform, we con-
sider a beta distribution for user budget, bg100 ∼ Beta(2,6), which is depicted in Fig. 1.12. In
both scenarios, θd is set to 50 so, with a minimum acceptable data rate of 1 Mbps and data size
of 1 GB, the users with the highest service valuation are willing to pay no more than 50$ for
the data service.
Figs. 1.13-1.15 show the numerical results for the shared-carrier scenario. Fig. 1.13 depicts
the optimal values of data volume cap and service data rate. The scale factor for the arrival
rate of data ﬂows, λu, is the independent variable in all curves. Note that the arrival rate of
each user’s data ﬂow is λd = λucd . Fig. 1.14 depicts the optimal price for voice and data
services and ﬁnally Fig. 1.15 shows the subscribed users to each service. One important aspect
of the price and data rate curves is rather small amount of ﬂuctuations in optimal values. By
increasing the data request rate, the offered data size should be decreased which yields to a drop
in subscriber quantity. This is due to the dependency of the overall number of subscribers to
the ratio of pdγd×cd . In this way, the provider adjusts the value of price and data rate respectively
to maximize the overall proﬁt. This causes a small variation in optimal values. To eliminate
these ﬂuctuations, one option is to ﬁx price and data rate on their average value and having data
volume cap as the only variable in service parameters. For this scenario, the optimal value of
ψ is 0.1 for all values of λu.
For the dynamic allocation scenario, we expect a similar price and data rate adjustment as it is
depicted in Figs. 1.16-1.17. We obtained the results for two values of spectral efﬁciency factor,
β ∈ [4,16]. β = 4 indicates LTE SISO and β = 16 represents LTE MIMO (4× 4). Here the
data volume cap and subscriber quantity are also decreasing in response to the increase of λu.
Due to the availability of broader bandwidth and higher spectral efﬁciency, the provider can
attract more subscribers. The related curves are depicted in Fig. 1.18. The optimal value of
ψ , which is the bandwidth splitting ratio, is 0.5 for β = 4 and 0.1 for β = 16, which remains
constant for all values of λu. Fig. 1.19 shows the data rate for the case in which the provider
adjusts the power of signal to achieve the equation RM = 2Rm. For the both cases of β = 16 and
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β = 4, the data rate dramatically increases. Particularly, for β = 16, provider can guarantee a
data rate of γd = 27 Mbps in the busy hour.
Table 1.2 Network parameters
Parameter Shared carrier Dynamic allocation
NC 150 1500
QT 10 MHz 50 MHz
β 0.5 [4,16]
θd 50 50
ωd U(0,1) U(0,1)
bg
100 Beta(2,6) Beta(2,6)
η 100 KB 100 KB
λc 10−4 10−4
Data λu independent variable independent variable
1
μc 90 seconds 90 seconds
γc 150 Kbps 150 Kbps
Bd - 0.01
Bc - 0.001
RM 5Rm 5Rm
α 2 2
Figure 1.12 Distribution of user budget for data service
57
Figure 1.13 Optimal data rate and data volume cap in shared
carrier network in shared carrier scenario
Figure 1.14 Optimal price the data service in shared carrier
scenario
Scenario 4. For the case of multi-package markets, we considered a provider that uses dynamic
allocation method, and its network parameters are the same as the values in Table 1.2. We used
the spectral efﬁciency β = 4 for LTE SISO. The optimal package parameters are derived for
three values of λu ∈ [0.01,0.05,0.1]. We assumed the price difference between each plan is
a multiple of 5$ and the data volume cap of each plan should be two times bigger than its
inferior plan. Table 1.3 (next page) shows the results. Similarly to the previous scenarios,
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Figure 1.15 Number of subscribed users to voice and data
services in shared carrier scenario
Figure 1.16 Optimal data volume cap in dynamic allocation
scenario
γd is the minimum data rate that each user would experience during the busy hours. As we
indicated before, the small variation in optimal values is due to the dependency of the overall
number of subscribers to the ratio of pdγd×cd . By increasing the value of λu provider decreases
the data volume size and increases the service price to adjust the number of subscribers and
their willingness to over-utilize the network.
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Figure 1.17 Optimal price and data rate for the data service in
dynamic allocation scenario
Figure 1.18 Number of subscribed users to voice and data
services in dynamic allocation scenario
Table 1.3 Three-plan market with guaranteed
minimum data rate γd
λu 0.01 0.05 0.1
(p1d, c
1
d, N
1
D) (20, 2, 306) (25, 0.5, 198) (28, 0.5, 120)
(p2d, c
2
d, N
2
D) (30, 4, 234) (35, 1, 150) (38, 1, 96)
(p3d, c
3
d, N
3
D) (40, 8, 224) (45, 2, 138) (48, 2, 84)
γd (Mbps) 2 2.5 2
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Figure 1.19 The guaranteed data rate for RM = 2Rm
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, an analytical study for pricing in cellular networks with volume-based data ser-
vices is presented. Our goal was ﬁnding the optimal values of data volume cap, its price and the
data rate in the busy hours. We considered two types of channel access methods, shared carrier
and dynamic sub-carrier allocation. We started by deﬁning a model for average data rate in the
shared-carrier method which is linked to the offered data-volume. Then, we modeled the user
utility by considering the random valuation of data and guaranteed data rate. We applied bud-
get information to the model to reach a more realistic scenario. We expanded the framework by
bringing the concept of multi-package market and its effect on proﬁt maximization. We studied
a model for data-renovation by users during a monthly period which is closely related to the
budget distribution. The blocking probability of data ﬂows due to spectrum shortage when the
provider is offering consistent service quality is calculated. In this case, dynamic sub-carrier
allocation is considered. Finally, a proﬁt maximization framework is proposed in which the
provider’s decision values are the prices, dedicated spectrum sizes and blocking probabilities
for voice and data respectively as well as the data volume cap for the data service. For the
future work, we will investigate the multi-provider network and the effects of competition and
cooperation on offered service quality and possible proﬁt.
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Abstract
Mobile users demand better speed, coverage, and reliability. To fulﬁll these requirements in
a cost-effective manner, operators can form coalitions that can include heterogeneous tech-
nologies such as LTE and WiFi. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework that
can help to create stable coalitions of heterogeneous wireless operators and enable wireless
regulatory bodies to determine acceptable coalitions which do not downgrade social welfare
standards. In particular, we derive a simple and efﬁcient generic model that predicts the state
of the market before and after a coalition formation without focusing on short time-scale band-
width allocation problems. The model is based on ﬁnding a pure Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁle that deﬁnes service prices for each provider. The solution is based on experienced costs
of providers and user satisfaction metrics that are related to the offered speed and coverage.
The model features and usefulness are illustrated using some realistic and practical scenarios.
The results show that formation of coalitions can notably increase the proﬁts of providers and
the integrated payoffs of users.
Introduction
Proﬁt maximization is the main concern for all types of wireless service providers as their
business is based on making the proﬁt out of subscribers by providing them a rational quality
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of service (QoS). The better service providers offer, the more subscribers they attract. To be
successful, providers need to expand their coverage areas and provide a better quality of ser-
vice in terms of higher connection speed, reliability, coverage size, etc. However, the monetary
resources of each provider are limited and the networks cannot be expanded or upgraded in-
stantly. This fact motivates us to study a cost-effective approach that can help the providers in a
market of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) to increase their revenue and improve the quality
of service while the incurred costs are minimized. One approach that has been considered in
several works, e.g., (Singh et al., 2011, 2012b), is to form coalitions in homogeneous wire-
less markets. These works try to utilize the concepts of game theory and increase the proﬁt of
providers. This approach is also consistent with the free roaming plans that are offered by sev-
eral operators. For example, since June 2015, Indian operator BSNL offers free national wide
roaming plans in cooperation with MTNL (BSNL). Sprint offers a Global Roaming plan which
includes free unlimited data and text across its worldwide participating networks including the
ones from Canada, Mexico, and Latin America (Sprint, 2016). We aim to expand this idea to
the ﬁeld of heterogeneous operators that offer complementary strengths in terms of coverage,
technologies, tiered service speeds, and pricing. Due to technological differences and imple-
mentation costs, it is critical for the operators to assess the potential gain before committing to
form a coalition. Our work is based on an analytical structure that covers both competitive and
cooperative states of HetNets market. Based on this structure, we derive coalition formation
models for heterogeneous wireless networks that deﬁne roles and interactions of the main deci-
sion makers in the market, namely, users, providers and regulator. It should be noted that we try
to avoid the formation of the grand coalition since it leads to a monopoly which is prohibited
by regulatory units. Thus, our goal is to maintain competition among providers in the form of
established coalitions.
Contribution
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
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a. The proposed analytical framework is based on user’s long-run preferences. In this man-
ner, user’s perspective of service speed and coverage size are the core decision values for
selection of user’s default provider.
b. We analyze provider’s proﬁt in competitive and cooperative states of the market which
allows each provider to choose the best coalition unit.
c. We deﬁne a multi-provider payoff function for users which enables the wireless users to
instantly switch between the networks of a speciﬁc coalition. Since the provider selection
is instant and allowable inside the coalitions, it is an extra degree of freedom for the users.
Hence, coverage size, service speed, and multiple network choices are three long-run QoS
parameters in our work.
d. We propose an analytical framework in order to study a structure of coalitions and its
impact on both user and provider sides. In this manner we deﬁne a coalition formation
process and show that it leads to stable coalitions in wireless networks. While there are
some works in which the Core and Shapley value for the grand coalition are studied, we
avoid formation of a grand coalition since the regulatory units do not allow it (as it leads
to a monopoly).
e. We deﬁne the market fairness metric for the wireless regulator. This metric helps the
regulator unit to decide if forming a coalition a) improves the service experience for the
users; b) maintains a certain level of competition between providers.
Analytical framework
In Sections 2.3 and 2.5, we analyze HetNet markets without coalitions and propose models that
cover two types of interactions: user-provider and provider-provider. We ﬁrst deﬁne metrics
to quantify the effect of user-provider interaction and then we model the procedure of provider
selection by users. This model also helps the providers to choose the best service parameters
and pricing strategies in order to maximize their proﬁts. The model consists of three parts
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which are related to the user satisfaction (a function of link speed), the network/coverage ex-
pansion costs and the pricing strategy. To characterize the behavior of users, we follow the
widely adopted utility theory ((Duan et al., 2013c; Gajic et al., 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2004;
Niyato & Hossain, 2009)). The amount of data usage is the decision factor by each service
subscriber. In user utility, the market-related parameters are speed satisfaction, coverage size
and unit price of data. Among these values, speed satisfaction and the amount of data usage
are evaluated in a fairly long period like a month. In this manner, a short service downtime or
poor quality experience do not have a sudden effect on user payoff. This approach helps us to
solve the higher level decision-making problem since it is separated from short-run power or
bandwidth allocation problems. Accordingly, each user tries to maximize the total obtainable
payoff regarding the general service parameters. Then the optimal pricing strategy of each
provider is evaluated based on the actions of users. This formulation eventually leads to a
two-stage Stackelberg game.
Besides characterizing the interactions between the users and the provider, we also model
the provider-provider interactions as a competition among all providers in the market (which
obviously includes the ﬁrst type of interaction, user-provider as well). At this step, computing
Nash equilibrium prices helps to understand the market state and paves the way to analyze
cooperative markets. We also analyze a numerical example that shows the effect of data usage
cost on the provider’s proﬁt at equilibrium. Since the model is based on general perceptions
of speed satisfaction and the coverage size, one advantage of our approach is that no provider
needs to know the exact coverage and bandwidth details of other providers to formulate its
proﬁt and payoff of users.
After constructing a model for the competitive state of the market, in Section 2.7, we use
this model to develop an analytical framework for cooperative markets which helps us to ana-
lyze possible coalitions. Towards this end, we redeﬁne the uni-provider utility of the users to
accommodate a new concept of multi-provider network. The analytical approach that is con-
sidered in this part and the form of multi-provider payoff function is an important part of our
contribution. Here, the criterion for analyzing user-provider interaction remains the same but
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there are two new challenges: ﬁnding stable coalitional structures and determining allowable
coalitions from the regulatory viewpoint. The ﬁrst problem is related to two characteristics of
the wireless market: 1) negative externalities which cause the proﬁt of any coalition to depend
not only on its members but also on the reactions of other non-coalition members; 2) asym-
metrical nature of HetNets, which is caused by the existence of wireless providers with a broad
range of market powers. To address these issues, we modify the well-known method presented
in (Bloch, 1996) to enable us to develop a process of coalition formation (PCF) for wireless
markets. From the regulator’s viewpoint, the main issue is to deﬁne a weighted social welfare
function and to estimate its value under each coalitional structure. We present several examples
that illustrate the effect of pricing strategies and welfare standards on the cooperative behavior
of the providers.
Structure
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.1 discusses the related works. Basic
notation is developed in Section 2.2 while operator selection criteria are analyzed in Section
2.3. Section 2.5 describes the models for evaluating the provider proﬁts while the analysis
and modeling of coalitions are presented in Section 2.7. Finally Section 2.9 discusses the
conclusions and our future work.
2.1 Related Works
There are several research efforts that are focused on market models. The majority of literature
that is related to the cooperative games tries to ﬁnd a solution for the grand coalition. The grand
coalition is formed with the participation of all entities. An example is the bandwidth allocation
mechanism by access points (APs) in 4G HetNets introduced in (Niyato & Hossain, 2006).
The bandwidth allocation and admission control are analyzed based on the model of N-person
cooperative game in which the allocated bandwidth to each connection is based on Shapley
value. In this type of sharing, coalition members beneﬁt from the overall payoff based on their
power or importance in the coalition. Cooperation among providers in cellular networks is
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modeled in (Singh et al., 2011) and (Singh et al., 2012b). The object of (Singh et al., 2011)
is modeling the market when the payoff to the providers is non-transferable. In this model,
providers try to coordinate their actions and each of them obtains a payoff bigger than the one
achieved in the non-cooperative case. The goal is to form a grand coalition and to ﬁnd the
Core of the game. The aim of (Singh et al., 2012b) is to investigate cooperations in multi-hop
networks where the optimal strategies for selecting the appropriate channels and base stations
are found by solving several optimization problems. Here, the payoff function is modeled by
transferable utility. The goal of this work is also to ﬁnd the stable grand coalition. Our work,
on the other hand, denies the formation of grand coalition. We also propose the concept of
general speed satisfaction and by using it, we develop our market framework. (Anglano et al.,
2014) is a very interesting work which pursues a similar goal to our work. It investigates
the formation of coalition among wireless providers in green networks. Toward this end, an
algorithm for coalition formation is proposed and numerically analyzed. Our work has three
major differences with this work. Firstly, while (Anglano et al., 2014) is focusing on the
problems like resource allocation and base station assignment, we focus on long-run problems
like the overall consumed data by the users in monthly periods. Secondly, we deﬁne a multi-
provider payoff function which gives the choice to users to select among available providers.
Finally, in our work the formed coalitions are protected by long-run contracts and the providers
cannot leave their coalition during the contract period. This is based on the fact that forming
coalitions is a long process which needs co-investment in many technical aspects.
From the economic perspective, (Niyato & Hossain, 2009) investigates the competition among
users of wireless heterogeneous networks when the available bandwidth is limited. The com-
petition is modeled as an evolutionary game. Our model, on the other hand, investigates the
competitive and cooperative strategies of the providers by considering user’ long-run data con-
sumption model and their network selection behavior. The goal of (Duan et al., 2013c) is to
analyze the interaction between wireless providers while they aim to upgrade their networks.
In this manner, the best upgrade time along with the earned proﬁt of the providers are investi-
gated. However, this interesting research effort does not focus on the coalition of the providers.
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The optimal pricing in the WiFi market has been studied in (Duan et al., 2013a) where the rev-
enue of a WiFi provider with ﬂat rate and usage-based pricing has been analyzed. The market
model covers the interaction between users, local WiFi providers and Skype (that wants to co-
operate with local WiFi providers to build a global WiFi service). A duopoly wireless market
has been modeled in (Jia & Zhang, 2008) where the competition of two providers and their
interaction with users form a multi-stage game. Competition between providers for users with
different payoff functions is the subject of (Gajic et al., 2009). Here the market is considered
to be heterogeneous and the problem is solved as a two stage leader-follower game. However,
none of above works analyzes the cooperation among providers in the HetNets market.
Our work is distinguished from all above works with the fact that we consider the heterogeneity
of the market by modeling the behavior of the users when they have different perceptions of
satisfaction. Our work also considers both competitive and cooperative states of the market
based on the user satisfaction model.
2.2 Basic Notation and Assumptions
We consider an unsaturated market where there is an incoming ﬂow of new users who need to
select their default provider. In each period of time (e.g., a day or month), the expected number
of incoming users is a constant represented by Nu which is the size of related user set Iu. Each
provider, from the set Pr = {1,2, ...n}, serves users by one of several access technologies,
e.g., WiFi, 4G or 3G. The new users sign a data service contract with a selected provider.
Provider i has a geographic coverage area (GCA) Ai with size |Ai|. Then we deﬁne normalized
size Gi =
|Ai|
|AT | , where AT is the GCA of the entire market. Note that we have | ∪n1 Ai| = |AT |
and ∑n1 |Ai| > |AT | due to the overlapping areas considered in our notation. Providers charge
users based on the data usage of users and provider i’s data unit price is shown by pi. The
price unit is deﬁned for an agreed unit of data usage, e.g., 1 GB. The market price vector is
P¯ = {p1, ..., pn}. Provider i’s cost function, Ci, has two components. The ﬁrst component, αi,
is related to the cost of one data unit used by a user and the second component, ci(Gi), is the
constant cost related to coverage area. If the user-set of provider i in one period of time is Ii
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and the data usage of j-th user is d ji , j ∈ Ii, then the total cost experienced by provider i for all
of its registered users in that period is:
Ci = ci(Gi)+αi ∑
j∈Ii
d ji · (2.1)
Note that the ability to expand the coverage area is related to the access technology of choice.
For example, a WiFi access point (AP) can serve an area of around 50-meter radius and a 3G
macrocell can cover an area with a radius of several kilometers. The satisfaction factor (SF)
s ji for user j with provider i, is a number in [0,1] that reﬂects the user satisfaction from the
service speed. Base satisfaction factor, Si, for the access technology of provider i is deﬁned
as the ratio of average speed (experienced by users of that technology) to the maximum speed
expected by the greediest user. For instance, if the average access speed for WiFi, 4G and 3G
cellular are 150, 50 and 15 Mbps respectively and the maximum expected speed is 300 Mbps,
the corresponding base satisfaction factors for these technologies are: SWiFi = 0.5, S4G = 0.166
and S3G = 0.05.
We assume for each provider, the user satisfaction factor is uniformly distributed from Si to 1
with probability density function:
fi(si) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
1−Si si ∈ [Si,1],
0 else.
(2.2)
It is highly common to use a uniform valuation in economic analysis. We refer the readers
to (Duan et al., 2013b) and (Chen et al., 2015b) as two well-known examples. The above
assumption implies that users have different perceptions of the same technology, where the
greediest users are represented by Si which is the minimum satisfaction value and the ones with
least bandwidth requirements are shown by si = 1. By applying this assumption we consider
the heterogeneity of network applications. In fact, the subscribers who permanently use high-
demand applications such as HD-video may have less satisfaction comparing to the ones with
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applications such as voice or web browsing. We suppose if the speed satisfaction (SS) of a
speciﬁc user under a particular access technology is known then the SS can be computed for
other technologies, even though the SS is a random variable itself. A linear transformation can
be applied for this case: when user j’s satisfaction from the technology of provider i is known
(s ji ) then this user’s satisfaction for technology of provider m can be calculated as:
s jm = ai−ms
j
i +bi−m =
1−Sm
1−Si s
j
i +
Sm−Si
1−Si , (2.3)
where ai−m and bi−m are the transition constants with respect to the destination network m and
originating network i. If a network provider changes the quality of its service, then the speed
satisfaction of each user will be affected respectively.
2.3 Operator Selection
As mentioned in the previous section, in each long period, there is a ﬁxed expected number
of users, Nu, who join the market. They select their desired provider based on the level of
achievable payoff. Users sign contracts with the selected providers and are charged based on
their data usage. Providers have enough long-run capacity to fulﬁll the total demand of their
corresponding users.
2.3.1 Payoff function for the users
The payoff function is the difference between the user utility (representing satisfaction from
the service) and the service cost. The utility of user j is proportional to the coverage of its
provider (Gi) and the user satisfaction from service speed (s
j
i ). Moreover, it should follow the
law of diminishing marginal utility. Hence, the payoff function can be deﬁned as:
U ji (Gi, pi,s
j
i ,d
j
i ) = Gi s
j
i ln(1+Kd
j
i )− pi d ji . (2.4)
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Table 2.1 Notation
SYMBOL DEFINITION
NT Number of users in the stationary market
Nu Number of new users joining the market in each period
[ ]
j
i Attribute of provider i and user j
Ai Coverage area of provider i
Gi Normalized size of Ai
Si Normalized technology speed of provider i
Ii Set of new users joining provider i in each period
pi Current price of provider i
Pi Price strategy set of provider i
s ji Satisfaction factor (SF) of user j with provider i
d ji Amount of data used by user j with provider i
D ji Maximum amount of data used by user j with provider i
fi(s) PDF of user satisfaction for provider i
αi Cost of providing one unit of data (Provider i)
ci(Gi) Constant cost for provider i
V ji Maximum payoff of user j in the network of provider i
πi(k,m, .) Proﬁt of provider i in each period with respect to the parameters k,m, etc
K Shape factor of payoff function
CS Coalition Structure
W Social Welfare
SWF Social Welfare Function
UWF WiFi Usage Willingness Factor
SWiFi Base satisfaction factor for WiFi
S3G Base satisfaction factor for 3G
S4G Base satisfaction factor for 4G
This payoff function is linear with regard to s ji and Gi, and is concave with respect to d
j
i .
Constant K is the shape factor related to the price elasticity of demand (Duan et al., 2013a) (We
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will study the value K in Subsection 2.4). The value of payoff function deﬁnes the user gain
in one period (e.g., a month) and it is used to select a provider for user j. Note that we adopt
the common practice (see e.g., (Bas¸ar & Srikant, 2002), (Sengupta et al., 2007) and (Duan
et al., 2013a)) of using a logarithmic utility function. Throughout this paper we frequently use
simpler notation for user payoff such as U ji (d
j
i ). We also use the superscript j to indicate a
speciﬁc user’s satisfaction value and payoff.
Figure 2.1 Illustration of a three-provider
market where a new user selects the default
provider maximizing its payoff.
2.3.2 Provider selection mechanism
When user j enters the market, it compares its maximized payoffs for all providers and selects
the one maximizing its payoff, i.e.,
i j = argmax
m
V jm,m ∈ Pr = {1, ...,n}, (2.5)
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where
V jm = max{max
d jm
U jm(d
j
m),0}, (2.6)
argmax
d ji
U ji (d
j
i ) =
s ji Gi
pi
− 1
K
, (2.7)
Djm = max{0,
s jmGm
pm
− 1
K
} , (2.8)
maxU jm(d
j
m)
d jm
= s jmGm ln(
s jmGmK
pm
)− (s jmGm−
pm
K
). (2.9)
Djm is the maximum data usage of user j and V
j
m is the maximum obtainable payoff by j from
provider m.
2.4 Shape factor (K) and the price elasticity of demand (PED) in stationary markets
As we mentioned, K is related to the price elasticity which deﬁnes the usage response of sub-
scribers to a price change. For user j and provider i, PED is deﬁned as:
E ji =
pi
d ji
∂ d ji
∂ pi
· (2.10)
We argue that the rational users maximize their payoff, hence, substituting Dji from (2.8) for
d ji in (2.10) yields:
E ji =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
− s ji GiK
s ji GiK− pi
if Dji > 0,
0 else.
(2.11)
Note that for K 1, PED is close to one for all users while for K= pi
s ji Gi
, PED is equal to inﬁnity
which corresponds to the case of perfect elasticity. Since in a network, users have different
perceptions of satisfaction, the average over (2.11) with respect to the range of satisfaction in
user set Ii, gives the average PED in the network of provider i. To calculate Ei, which is the
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true value of PED in regard to provider i, one computes the sum of all demands requested
by the users
(
henceforth also called aggregate demand DTi (Gi, pi)
)
and substitutes it into the
following equation:
Ei =
pi
DTi (Gi, pi)
∂ DTi (Gi, pi)
∂ pi
· (2.12)
Let the demand of a generic user with satisfaction s be:
Di(s,Gi, pi) =
sGi
pi
− 1
K
, (2.13)
then, for a given number of users NT , the aggregate demand for users with satisfactions density
fi(s) is given by:
DTi (Gi, pi) = NT
∫
s∈Ii(pi)
Di(s,Gi, pi) fi(s) ds· (2.14)
If Ii = [s1,s2] and fi(s) =
1
1−Si ∀s ∈ [Si,1], then:
DTi =
NT
1−Si
⎛
⎝(s2− s1)2Gi
2 pi
−
s2− s1
K
⎞
⎠· (2.15)
We further deﬁne the maximum and minimum usage among the user set for provider i to be:
Maxd =
s2Gi
pi
−
1
K
, (2.16)
Mind =
s1Gi
pi
−
1
K
· (2.17)
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Since in a stationary market, provider i knows the market related values DTi ,Maxd and Mind ,
(2.15 - 2.17) can be used to determine the values of s1, s2 and K. In particular:
K =
2NT pi(Maxd −Mind)
2GiDTi (1−Si)−NT pi(Maxd −Mind)2
· (2.18)
If the user set Ii = [s1,s2] does not change under a small price variation, we can derive an
approximation for aggregate PED as:
Ei ≈−
⎛
⎝ GiK(s2− s1)
GiK(s2− s1)−2pi
⎞
⎠· (2.19)
Note that Ei is equal to the average PED over si thanks to the uniform satisfaction distribution.
2.5 Provider proﬁt in different market forms
2.5.1 Monopoly
In a monopoly market, there is only one provider (indexed here by subscript 1) that serves the
market with a single type of access technology. Users adapt their usage based on the service
price and the monopolist wants to set the price that maximizes its proﬁt. This type of market can
be analyzed as a leader-follower game or a two-stage Stackelberg game (Fudenberg & Tirole,
1991). In the ﬁrst stage, the provider sets its price anticipating the reaction of the rational users.
This type of game can be solved by backward induction (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991). Based on
the data usage of individual users derived from (2.8), all users with d > 0 are in I1 deﬁned as:
I1 =
⎧⎨
⎩s j1 ∈ [0,1]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Dj1 =
s j1G1
p1
−
1
K
> 0
⎫⎬
⎭ , (2.20)
s j1 ∈ I1 → Dj1 =
s j1G1
p1
−
1
K
> 0→
p1
G1K
< s j1 ≤ 1. (2.21)
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This equation implies that:
p1 < G1K. (2.22)
Hence, the proﬁt of provider due to the new users in one period is given by:
π1 = Nu
∫
s∈I1
D1(s)× (p1−α1)× f1(s)ds− c1(G1) =
Nu
∫ 1
p1
G1K
(
sG1
p1
−
1
K
)× (p1−α1)× f1(s)ds− c1(G1). (2.23)
The concavity of proﬁt in the region of p1 < G1K requires:
∂ 2π1
∂ p21
=
Nu
1−S1
⎛
⎝ 1
G1K2
−
G1 α1
p31
⎞
⎠< 0. (2.24)
Then, since p1 ≥ α1, by substituting the minimum amount p1 = α1 we have:
1
G1K2
−
G1 α1
α31
< 0→ α1 < G1K. (2.25)
Note that Inequality (2.25) always holds as a result of Inequality (2.22). Hence, the proﬁt func-
tion is concave and has a maximum value. Denote optimum value of p1 by:
p∗1 = min(max(max(p
r
1),0),G1K), where:
pr1 =
⎧⎨
⎩p1 ∈ℜ : p31+(α12 − G1K ) p21+ α1G
2
1K
2
2
= 0
⎫⎬
⎭· (2.26)
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The set pr1 contains the real roots of cubic equation and in order to ﬁnd them, we need to deﬁne
Δ and Δ0 as follows:
Δ=−2(α1G21K2)×
⎛
⎝(α1K−2G1
2K
)3
+
27α1G21K
2
8
⎞
⎠, (2.27)
Δ0 =
(α1K−2G1
2K
)2· (2.28)
For Δ < 0 there are three real roots. {Δ = 0 and Δ0 = 0 } leads to a multiple root. {Δ = 0
and Δ0 = 0 } presents a double root as well as a simple root and ﬁnally, Δ> 0 causes one real
and two complex roots. Since G1 and K are both nonzero positive values, (2.27-2.28) show
that Δ and Δ0 cannot be 0 concurrently. Thus, we can deﬁne the following inequalities for root
conditions: ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
α1 > 2G1K −3(α1G21K2)
1
3 3 real roots,
α1 = 2G1K −3(α1G21K2)
1
3 1 double and 1 simple root,
α1 < 2G1K −3(α1G21K2)
1
3 1 real root.
Finding the roots of a cubic equation is well-documented and to avoid redundant content in this
paper, we refer the readers to (Neumark, 2014) for a comprehensive analysis.
2.6 Duopoly
In a duopoly market, two dominant providers exist and they may use the same or different
access technologies. Fig. 2.2 shows an example of the maximum-payoff curves, associated
with (2.9), for each network of the two providers as a function of the user satisfaction value si.
Note that in this case the two curves cross. Otherwise, since the maximum payoff offered by
one provider is always bigger than its competitor, there would be no competition. Let s∗1 be the
user satisfaction value corresponding to provider 1 at the crossing point of payoff functions.
Then, supposing that provider 1 offers slower maximum speed, s∗1 can be determined by solving
the following equation:
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Figure 2.2 The curves of maximum user payoff and their
intersection point in a duopoly. The curve related to provider 2 is
mapped to the satisfaction space of provider 1 based on the
Assumption 2
max
d
U1(s1,G1, p1) = max
d
U2(as1+b,G2, p2), (2.29)
a=
1−S2
1−S1
,b=
S2−S1
1−S1
,
where max
d
Ui(si,Gi, pi) for the provider i is:
siGi ln(
siGiK
pi
)− (siGi−
K
pi
)· (2.30)
Considering Assumption 2, we used s2 = as1+b to match the satisfaction values of each user
in the two networks. Since the maximized payoff function is concave over si, there can be one
or two intersection points in the interval si = [S1,1]. Suppose that there is one intersection point
in the mentioned interval (the same approach can be applied for the case of two intersection
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points), then, the proﬁt functions related to new users (Nu) are as follows:
π1 = Nu
∫ ζ
γ
(
sG1
p1
−
1
K
)(p1−α1) f1(s)ds− c1(G1) , (2.31)
γ = max
⎧⎨
⎩S1, p1G1K
⎫⎬
⎭, ζ = max
⎧⎨
⎩s∗1,
p2
G2K
−b
a
⎫⎬
⎭ , (2.32)
π2 = Nu
∫ 1
β
(
sG2
p2
−
1
K
)(p2−α2) f2(s) ds− c2(G2), (2.33)
β = max
⎧⎨
⎩as∗1+b, p2G2K
⎫⎬
⎭· (2.34)
In these proﬁt formulations, we addressed the incoming users only. This is due to the fact that
providers are willing to adjust the service prices for the new users; previously subscribed users
are already bound by a contract. This implies that the new users can have different service
prices from the old users. Obviously, the total proﬁt in each period is related to both of these
groups. If the price is changed for all users in the market, then Nu is substituted by NT . Now
it is important to ﬁnd the best price and coverage size for each provider. This problem can be
tackled by ﬁnding the Nash equilibrium of the system, as explained in the next subsection.
2.6.1 Oligopoly
In an oligopoly market, a small group of dominant providers exists. We assume that these
providers may use different access technologies. In general, oligopoly market consists of few
market leaders and several followers. The difference between the two types of providers is
their market power where only the leaders have the power of price setting for the services. The
followers adjust their prices based on the price of leaders. The market power of leaders comes
from their monetary resources and the number of subscribed users. Hence, when we analyze
the oligopoly market, we assume that the majority of users tend to subscribe to the networks of
few oligopolist. Moreover, the only concern of users is maximizing their payoff and they do not
prioritize the oligopolist networks based on the decisions of other users. Hence, the interaction
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between the users and providers is considered as a strategic game. In contrast to the case of
monopoly market, the closed-form expression for providers’ proﬁts under an oligopoly market
cannot be readily derived. Therefore, we resort to a numerical analysis (in Supplementary
Materials, an analytical approach for the case of duopoly is proposed). First, we deﬁne some
basic notions from game theory which are relevant to our analysis:
Deﬁnition 2.1. A provider full competition game
G(Pr,(Pi)i∈Pr,πi(Si,Gi,(pi,p−i))) consists of:
a. A set of providers, Pr = {1, ...,n}.
b. An action (price) set Pi for each provider.
c. Actions pi ∈ Pi for provider i.
d. Proﬁt functions πi(Si,Gi,(pi,p−i)) , P−→ R, where P=∏
n
i=1Pi is the set of all actions (possible
prices) of providers and p−i is the actions vector of all providers except i.
e. Action proﬁles (pi, p−i).
Deﬁnition 2.2. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium (one action for each player) of game
G(Pr,(Pi)i∈Pr,πi(Si,Gi,(pi,p−i))) is an action proﬁle p
∗ ∈ P such that:
πi(Si,Gi,(p∗i ,p∗−i)) ≥ πi(Si,Gi,(pi,p∗−i)) ∀pi ∈ Pi. (2.35)
Debreu-Gilcksberg-Fan Theorem. A strategic game with a compact and convex set of strate-
gies, and continuous quasi-concave payoff function π(i,(pi, p−i),Gi) over pi which is also
continuous over p−i, has a pure Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991).
Then we introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The full competition game (no coalitions) always has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix II-1.
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In order to ﬁnd the Nash equilibria of this game, we resort to a numerical approach by con-
structing an n-dimensional matrix of all possible payoffs in the game and using well-known
schemes such as Lemke-Howson’s algorithm or global Newton method. This approach is Al-
gorithm 2.1 in which we determine provider proﬁts of the user set and use Gambit (McKelvey
et al., 2013) (a suite of software tools for noncooperative games) to ﬁnd a Nash solution. The
algorithm ﬁrst tries to ﬁnd the pure strategies and uses discretized price and satisfaction sets.
If it does not ﬁnd a pure strategy equilibrium, it will take a smaller discretization value and
will repeat the procedure. In our simulation experiments, with sufﬁciently small discretiza-
tion value, the NE is always unique. Note that the result of this procedure remains valid until
the general characteristics of the provider networks change. Besides prices, it is interesting to
know the coverage expansion behavior of the providers when they experience different cost
functions. The following two propositions consider two different forms of cost function:
Proposition 1. If the constant part of the price is of the form ci(Gi) = ζi× Gi and the provider
i already has πi > 0, then, if enough monetary resources are available, it is optimal for the
provider to set Gi = 1.
Proof. Suppose that users in interval [s1(Gi),s2(Gi)] are registered to provider i, then, provider
proﬁt is given by:
πi = Nu fi(s)
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎝
Gi
⎛
⎝(s2(Gi))2−(s1(Gi))2
⎞
⎠
2pi
−
s2(Gi)− s1(Gi)
k
⎞
⎠× (pi−αi)
⎞
⎟⎠−ζi Gi,
(2.36)
that can be rewritten as:
πi =(Gi (ν −ζi)− (Nu fi(s)
s2(Gi)− s1(Gi)
k
× (pi−αi)), (2.37)
ν = Nu fi(s)
Gi (s2(Gi)2− s1(Gi)2)
2 pi
(pi−αi)).
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Algorithm 2.1 Proﬁt vector calculator
Input :
Provider set Pr = 1,2, ...,n.
Price interval Pi = [Pimin,P
i
max] for each provider i ∈ Pr.
Default discretization value q.
Satisfaction pdf fi(s) for each provider i ∈ Pr.
Output:
Pure strategy equilibrium price and proﬁt vector
1 for each i ∈ Pr do
2 compute Pqi from Pi as the discretized price interval
based on discretization factor q ;
3 Find Smin = min{S1, ...,Sn};
4 Discretize the interval [Smin,1] by reasonable interval like 0.001;
5 Compute the strategy space Pq = Pq1 ×Pq2 ...×Pqn ;
6 end
7 for each vector pq(1, ...,n) ∈ Pq do
8 for each s ∈ [Smin,1] do
9 selectedpr ← argmax
i
Vi Iselectedpr ← ai s+bi
10 end
11 for each i ∈ Pr do
12 Compute π(i, pq,Gi)
13 end
14 Π(pq)← [π(1, pq,G1), ...,π(n, pq,Gn)]
15 end
16 Compute Nash equilibrium and corresponding strategy set;
17 if There is no pure strategy set, then
18 q= q/2 ;
19 Go to 1 ;
20 end
21 else
22 Return current strategy set and equilibrium proﬁt vector;
23 end
Based on the provider selection criteria, we know that by increasing the coverage size, the
interval [s1(Gi),s2(Gi)] can only grow. Hence, when Gi increases in (2.37), the proﬁt also
increases.
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Note that even if the condition of this proposition was satisﬁed, many providers in real markets
would not have enough ﬁnancial resources for network expansions. This motivates our study
presented in the next section where we conduct a game-theoretic analysis of the formation of
provider coalitions without network infrastructure investments.
Proposition 2. Let ci(Gi) = eβi Gi , if provider i already has a positive proﬁt (πi > 0), then,
for known large values of βi, the optimum coverage size can be smaller than 1 (in contrast to
Proposition 1).
Proof. We prove this proposition for the case of monopoly since the providers in other market
forms are under the limits of monopolist. To clarify, in all other forms of market, providers
achieve lower levels of proﬁt comparing to monopoly. Hence, if we prove that the optimum
normalized coverage size for the monopolist is smaller than 1, it is valid for all other forms as
well. One can write the following equation for a monopolist:
πi =
Nu
1−Si (
Gi
2 pi
+
pi
2Gi k2
−
1
K
)(pi−αi)− eβi Gi −→
∂ 2π(i,Gi)
∂G2i
=
pi
K2G3i
−β 2i eβi Gi . (2.38)
Then, by using the second derivation test, it can be veriﬁed that πi is concave over Gi for large
values of βi. Therefore, there is a Gi < 1 that maximizes the proﬁt for those values of βi.
The immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that when the features of access technology
lead to an exponential growth of costs in case of coverage area expansion, it is not always
beneﬁcial to make investments for achieving full network coverage.
2.7 Coalition formation
In the previous sections, we have derived economic models for the competitive state of HetNets
market by using user payoff functions and optimized data usage that is linear with respect to
the coverage and access speed of service. Thus, provider proﬁt can be boosted via capital
investments that increase the network coverage and/or the adoption of new high-speed access
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technologies. Both approaches can be quite capital intensive and thus could reduce proﬁts
signiﬁcantly (at least in the short term). Another way to increase the offered speed and coverage
is to form coalitions among providers in a way that is beneﬁcial to all coalition members. The
coalitions can be based on 1) resource sharing or 2) serving users of one another in limited
coverage areas without sharing resources. The approach presented in this section is valid for
both methods.
In this section, we propose a framework to analyze coalition formation. It is based on the
preferences of users and a provider selection mechanism. These methods are the extensions
of models that are presented for competitive markets in the previous sections. In particular,
we redeﬁne the payoff function to take into account the existence of coalitions and extract its
general properties. Then, we use the new payoff function and generated proﬁts (via Algorithm
1) to develop a coalition formation process which leads to stable coalitions. It should be also
noted that the market constraints (such as the existence of negative externalities, asymmetrical
nature, and coalition size restrictions) prevent providers from forming a grand or very powerful
coalition. The proposed coalition formation process considers these constraints. In the remain-
der of this section, we ﬁrst deﬁne the user-payoffs under coalition followed by the presentation
of the coalition formation process .
2.7.1 Multi-provider payoff for single price networks
Since the utility model of users under coalitions is a foundation to construct a model for the
provider proﬁts, we need to redeﬁne the uni-provider payoff function deﬁned in (2.4). The
multi-provider payoff function should have the following properties:
a. When users switch between different networks, MPP function must be compatible with
the law of diminishing marginal utility. Hence, consuming each extra unit of bandwidth
gives a lower level of satisfaction compared to the beginning of the usage. In other words,
the slope of the payoff decreases with respect to the usage and should be considered when
the provider is changed.
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b. The user payoff for a two-provider coalition having identical prices p1 = p2, and technol-
ogy speed satisfaction, s1 = s2, should be equal to the uni-provider payoff function of a
user with provider j that has coverage size Gj =
|A1∪A2|
|AT | and the same price and speed. In
other words, the coverage overlap should not be assumed twice when we compute users’
usage and costs.
c. For each user, the MPP function is based on the coverage sizes of coalition providers.
This feature is consistent with the form of uni-provider utility that is linear with respect
to coverage size.
Theorem 2. For a coalition C = {1,2, ...,n}, where each i ∈C corresponds to a provider with
price pi, coverage size Gi =
|Ai|
|AT | and technology speed Si, if Ai ∩Ak = /0 ∀i,k ∈ C, then the
three properties of a multi-provider payoff function holds if and only if the payoff function of
a user j follows the form:
U jC(d) = (
|C|
∑
i=1
Gi s
j
i ) ln(1+Kd)−
∑|C|i=1 piGi
∑|C|i=1Gi
d. (2.39)
Proof. See Appendix II-2.
Corollary 1. If coalition C satisﬁes the conditions of Theorem 2, then the coalition can be
represented as a single provider with the following price and cost equations:
pC =
∑i∈CGipi
∑i∈CGi
, (2.40)
αC =
∑i∈CGiαi
∑i∈CGi
, (2.41)
fC(sC) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
1−SC sC ∈ [SC,1],
0 else .
(2.42)
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SC =
⎧⎨
⎩Si , i ∈C | Si ≤ S j∀ j ∈C and j = i
⎫⎬
⎭· (2.43)
Proof. Firstly, since the unique price and costs do not change the form of payoff function for
each user, neither would the overall proﬁt output for the provider, the only part that needs an
explanation is the distribution function of satisfaction in the coalition. Since in the considered
coalition we can have users with different satisfaction levels, the distribution function of sat-
isfaction should cover all satisfaction levels as it is given by fC(s) in (2.42). Note that for the
uniform distribution, a wider range of satisfaction yields a lower level of the probability density
1
1−Si .
Lemma 1. Usage Rationality Lemma: Suppose that some providers of a coalition C =
{1, ...,n} have coverage overlap and each user j has possibly different speed satisfactions de-
noted by {s j1,s j2, ...,s jn} for each of the n providers in C. Then even if the user is served with
expected speed by the default provider, there are some price conditions which drive a user to
switch between operators in the overlapping area to maximize its payoff.
This lemma states that if a user has a better marginal payoff in a speciﬁc network at the be-
ginning of the usage period, it could change the default network afterward to increase the user
payoff. In what follows, we describe and prove the case of a two-provider coalition mathemat-
ically.
Let the coverage area, price and user’s speed-satisfaction of provider i be Gi =
|Ai|
|AT | , pi and s
j
i
respectively. We have the following conditions:
C(1). The ﬁrst condition states that at the beginning, user j gets a better payoff from one of
the networks, say 1. Hence, in the overlapping area where the total coverage difference is not
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U jC(d)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(G1s
j
1+Gl2s
j
2) ln(1+Kd)−
G1p1+Gl2p2
G1+G2−Gi d d < dT
(G1s
j
1+Gl2s
j
2) ln(1+KdT )+(G2s
j
2+Gl1s
j
1)(ln(1+Kd)− ln(1+KdT )) d > dT
−G1p1+Gl2p2
G1+G2−Gi dT −
Gl1p1+G2p2
G1+G2−Gi (d−dT ),
(2.47)
where Gi = |A1∩A2|, Gl1 = G1−Gi and Gl2 = G2−Gi.
U jC(d) = (G1s
j
1+Gl2s
j
2) ln(1+Kd)−
G1p1+Gl2p2
G1+G2−Gi d. (2.48)
considered 1, we have:
lim
d→0
∂U j1 (d)
∂d
> lim
d→0
∂U j2 (d)
∂d
=⇒ lim
d→0
s1K
1+Kd
− p1 > lim
d→0
s2K
1+Kd
− p2 =⇒
K(s1− s2)> p1− p2. (2.44)
C(2). The second condition is that, at a speciﬁc level of usage, user j has the same preference
for using either one of the provider networks. At this usage level, denoted by dT , the slopes of
payoff functions, regarding the network of both providers, are the same. Note that dT is smaller
than dmax(2) = argmax
d
U j2 (d):
dT < dmax(2)→
s1− s2
p1− p2 <
s2
p2
· (2.45)
C(3). Switching between providers means that user obtains a larger payoff:
max
d
U j2 (d)> maxd
U j1 (d)· (2.46)
1 Here the coverage factor is eliminated because the user is already in the overlap area and wants to
choose one of the networks to use and hence, it senses the same coverage at this point
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Proof. Based on three above conditions, Lemma 1 can be proven by constructing an example
which fulﬁlls all three conditions and in which the user payoff is greater when the user uses a
mix of two networks compared to the payoff from a single network. Fig. 2.3 illustrates such
an example with p1 = 0.08, p2 = 0.025, s1 = 0.76, s2 = 0.53 and K = 0.7. Observe from the
ﬁgure that this setting satisﬁes the 3 conditions and the mixed payoff of the user is given by:
maxU{1,2}(d) =U1(dT )+U2(dmax(2))−U2(dT ) = 1.0475
>U2(dmax(2)) = 0.9624
>U1(dmax(1)) = 0.7942.
Figure 2.3 The payoff experienced by the user under two
different networks
Lemma 1 shows an important characteristic of logarithmic utility functions: users at the be-
ginning of their usage cycle are more sensitive to the speed and at the end they are concerned
more about the cost than speed.
Theorem 3. The payoff for user j, with a 2-provider coalition C = {1,2} that has coverage
overlap, is as follows:
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a. If conditions C(1), C(2) and C(3) all hold for the single provider payoff experienced by
user j, then the payoff function is given by (2.47).
b. If any of C(1) to C(3) does not hold, then the payoff function for the user j is given by
(2.48).
Proof. For the case where at least one of C(1) to C(3) does not hold, the marginal payoff
obtained from Provider 1 is always better and the user prefers to utilize the ﬁrst provider solely.
However if all the three conditions hold, then the user begins to utilize the ﬁrst provider (even
in the overlap areas where both providers have coverage) until the usage reaches dT . From this
usage level, the user prefers to utilize the second provider. The proof for the form of the payoff
is the same as Theorem 2 which states the function for the multi-provider payoff function
(MPP) should follow the three main properties of the uni-provider payoff function.
2.7.2 The multi-provider payoff function for dual price scheme networks
Note that the ﬂat rate pricing scheme is commonly adopted by most WiFi providers. In this
scheme, users pay a ﬁxed price for a speciﬁc usage duration, e.g., an hour or a day. Since the
wireless providers incur a cost for the amount of bandwidth that they provide, this method of
pricing that offers an unlimited amount of data usage is useful for the cases where the provider
has limited coverage (e.g., inside the airports and hotels) so that the registered users are not
utilizing the bandwidth all the time.
To deﬁne the MPP function under a dual-pricing network, e.g., one which offers both 4G and
WiFi services but charging differently for each technology (4G and WiFi), we need to deﬁne
the average utilization level by the users when they have free access to the WiFi provider.
Based on our assumptions, the network has stable speed and mobile users appear in all points
of the coverage area in a long-run analysis. Thus, for the greediest users, the WiFi usage is
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given by:
DW =Period time (Sec)×Usage per second ×Coverage size of WiFi. (2.49)
We can also extend our deﬁnition to the average data usage of each user by multiplying DW
with a usage willingness factor (θ ) between 0 and 1 which indicates the expectation level of
willingness (considering all the users) to fully utilize the WiFi network when users have free
access to it, thus we have average data usage of: δ = DW ×θ .
Example 2. By setting the WiFi speed at 150 Mb/s, the usage unit as one GB and the usage
period as a month (which is a billing cycle), we have:
δ = 24×30×3600× (
150
8×1024)×GWiFi×θ
= 47461×GWiFi×θ . (2.50)
The MPP function for a dual-price network, deﬁned by coalition C = {1,2} where Provider 1
is a 4G and 2 is WiFi and the coverage area of WiFi is a subset of 4G area, is given by:
U jC(d1,δ ) =
⎛
⎝((G1−G2)s j1+G2s j2)× ln(1+K(d1+δ ))
⎞
⎠
− p2− p1d1. (2.51)
This MPP is based on the idea that the WiFi coverage area is usually a subset of the coverage
area of 4G cellular services. We also know that users switch from 4G to WiFi connections as
soon as they are under the coverage of the latter due to its ﬂat-rate pricing. Under this infor-
mation, if subscript “1" and “2" refers to the 4G and WiFi provider respectively, the maximum
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cellular usage can be expressed as:
Dj1 = max
⎧⎨
⎩(G1−G2)s
j
1+G2s
j
2
p1
−δ −
1
K
, 0
⎫⎬
⎭· (2.52)
This equation deﬁnes the amount of cellular data usage in a WiFi-cellular utility function. Since
we already deﬁned a metric for the WiFi data usage, the cellular data usage is the amount of
data beside the WiFi usage that can be consumed to maximize the utility. The reason behind
ﬁxing the WiFi usage (in the utility) is due to the nature of package pricing in the WiFi networks
that is time-based. Hence, the user tends to utilize the WiFi network as soon as it is under the
WiFi network coverage. However, the amount of WiFi data consumption is related to the WiFi
coverage size and user’s data consumption greediness which is considered in UWF (θ ) of WiFi.
To sum up, the value of marginal utility is getting lower by consuming more data which means
that if a user has better access to the cheap WiFi data, it is less motivated to use the cellular
data service.
2.7.3 Coalition formation
There are several models for coalition formation, each of them covering a speciﬁc type of game.
(Hart & Kurz, 1983) proposed the γ-stable and δ -stable models where players announce their
desired coalitions to join. In ((Yi, 1997)), a coalitional formation process has been studied
that considers the externalities, but the model only applies to symmetric games. One of the
most relevant models, that can be ﬁtted to our framework, has been developed in (Bloch, 1996)
where the externalities are considered and coalitions are constructed in a sequential manner.
To consider this model, our deﬁnitions in the wireless market and the formation process are set
as follows:
• A random provider starts the game and announces a desired coalition.
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πC{IC ,p1,p2} =πC{I1C ,p1,p2}
+πC{I2C ,p1,p2}
=
Nu
(∫
s1∈I1C
D1(s1)× (p1−α1)+(p2−α2×δ )× f1(s)ds1
+
∫
s1∈I2C
(
s1G1
p1
− 1
K
)(p1−α1) f1(s) ds1
)
− c1(G1)− c2(G2), (2.53)
where:
IC = I1C∪ I2C and
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
I1C = All s
j
1 ∈ [max{
(δ + 1K )P1−bG2
G1+(a−1)G2 ,S1},1]
that max
d1
U jC(d1,δ )≥max{maxd1 U
j
1 (d1),0} ,
I2C = All s
j
1 ∈ [max{ p1G1K ,S1},1]
that max
d1
U j1 (d1)> max{maxd1 U
j
C(d1,δ ),0}·
(2.54)
s j2 = as
j
1+b
[.]1 = 4G parameter[.]2 = WiFi parameterC = coalition of {1,2} (2.55)
• The expected proﬁt of provider i ∈C is calculated based on the following equation:
πi = φi×πCi ∈C , C ∈CS, (2.56)
∑
i∈C
φi = 1.
where CS is a coalitional structure of which C is a member. The proﬁt of provider i is
a portion of the expected payoff, gained by the coalition that includes provider i. φi is a
division factor agreed between coalition members (e.g., the Shapley value). This proﬁt
is calculated under the equilibrium price P∗ (computed by Algorithm 1) while providers
compete under the coalition structure CS.
• All providers who are included in the proposed coalition can agree or disagree. If all
members agree, a coalition C forms and the game is continued with Pr\C players (Pr is
the set of all providers). If a member disagrees, then it proposes its desired coalition in the
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next step. The size of coalitions is restricted by the maximum Size-Limit, deﬁned by the
regulator.
• Once a coalition with size Size-Limit has been formed its members cannot deviate and
leave it. This is reasonable in today’s market where implementing the infrastructure of
cooperation requires a joint investment and is supported by long time contracts between
providers.
Fig. 2.4 (page 14) depicts the coalition formation process which is proposed in Section VI-B
of main paper.
Remark. The proposed coalition formation process leads to a coalition structure which does
not include the grand coalition. Hence, the solution concepts for a grand coalition like Core
and Shapley value are not applicable to all members of the structure concurrently.
Proposition 3. For the wireless markets in which with a known churn rate users leave the
current providers for the newer technologies, the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
coalition game always can be found.
Proof. See Appendix II-3.
Example 3. In this example, we show the coalition structures and their existence conditions in
a market of 3 providers (1,2 and 3). The same process can be applied to bigger networks. In
the following we assume that the formation of grand-coalition, {1,2,3}, is not allowed due to
monopoly avoidance rules. Then the set of all allowable coalition structures is:
{
{{1},{2},{3}},{{1,2},{3}},{{1},{2,3}},{{2},{1,3}}
}
.
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Let us start with {{1},{2},{3}} case that represents the full competition. This structure is
preferable if the following condition is true:
πi
i∈{k,m}
∀k,m∈{k,m,l}
CS={{k},{m},{l}}
≥ πi
i∈{k,m}
∀k,m∈{k,m,l}
CS={{k,m},{l}}
, (2.57)
that means there is no coalition in which both providers can get bigger proﬁt than their full
competition state. This occurs when the providers cannot provide a higher payoff to the users,
hence, all providers have the same technology and 100% coverage overlap. The second case is
when a coalition of two providers can be formed and it gives a higher proﬁt to both of them.
Here, the worst-case scenario is that provider 1 prefers a coalition with 2, 2 prefers 3 and 3’s
choice is 1, which leads to a loop. In our analysis, the coalition proﬁts are the outcome of
extra data consumption and the maximum data consumption is related to the maximum payoff
offered to the users. Thus, in regard to (2.6-2.9) one can write the maximum data and payoff
preferences as:
Dj{1,2} > D
j
{1,3} →V
j
{1,2} >V
j
{1,3}∀ j ∈ Iu,
Dj{2,3} > D
j
{1,2} →V
j
{2,3} >V
j
{1,2}∀ j ∈ Iu,
Dj{1,3} > D
j
{2,3} →V
j
{1,3} >V
j
{2,3}∀ j ∈ Iu,
which leads to a paradox:
V j{1,2} >V
j
{1,3}∀ j ∈ Iu,
V j{1,3} >V
j
{1,2}∀ j ∈ Iu.
Hence, no loop exists in providers’ preferences and one dominant coalition will be formed
eventually. The last possibility is {V j{1,2} =V
j
{1,3} =V
j
{2,3}, p1 = p2 = p3,∀ j ∈ Nu}. This con-
dition is due to the existence of identical providers (in terms of size and technology ) which
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have 0% coverage overlap. In this case, the ﬁrst proposer forms the coalition with its preferred
provider.
2.7.3.1 Regulatory unit policies on coalition formation
From the viewpoint of a wireless market regulator, the market should meet certain levels of
fairness or at least wealth. To evaluate the market fairness, several concepts and corresponding
metrics are developed in economics, each of them addressing a speciﬁc aspect of the mar-
ket. For example, by one deﬁnition, the social welfare (SW) function measures the cumulative
payoffs experienced by all entities in the market (Nisan et al., 2007) and the Gini coefﬁcient
(Garetto et al., 2008) shows the fairness level of wealth distribution which can be called justice.
Note that a lower value of the Gini coefﬁcient yields more uniformity of income (payoff and
proﬁt) distribution. In this paper, we use the social welfare function as our metric although the
same approach could be applied to the Gini coefﬁcient. We indicate the SW function by W
and deﬁne it as follows:
W (CS,W) =W U(CS,W)+W P(CS,W) = ∑
i∈CS
⎛
⎝
User part︷ ︸︸ ︷
wuNu
∫
s∈Ii
maxUi(d(s))
di(s)
ds+
provider︷︸︸︷
wp πi
⎞
⎠,
(2.58)
W= {wp,wu}, (2.59)
wp+wu = 1. (2.60)
Members of CS are coalitions and W is a weighting set.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Suppose that the current coalition structure (status quo) isCS. If some providers
decide to join other coalitions or form a new one (we call it a move), then under the new coali-
tion structure CSN, the move social efﬁciency factor, M , for the new price equilibrium is
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deﬁned as:
M (CSN ,WN ,CS,W) =
⎛
⎝W U(CSN ,WN)−W U(CS,W)
⎞
⎠W P(CS,W)
⎛
⎝W P(CSN ,WN)−W P(CS,W)
⎞
⎠W U(CS,W)
· (2.61)
Deﬁnition 2.4. From regulatory unit’s viewpoint, a move is feasible if the conditions
M (CSN ,WN ,CS,W)≥ 0 and W (CSN ,WN)−W (CS,W)> 0 are both true.
The above two deﬁnitions specify the evaluation criteria for the possible moves in each coali-
tion structure. Being aware of this information can be timesaving for the providers when they
engage in negotiations. In particular, it shows the maximum coalition size and the possible
coalitions that obey the regulator’s criteria. Moreover, it indicates which coalition can maxi-
mize the proﬁt.
2.8 Numerical Analysis
Scenario 1. In this example, we study the coalition of one cellular and one WiFi provider.
As deﬁned before, when a cellular service provider forms a coalition with a WiFi provider,
the user payoff function can be represented by (2.51). By integrating the format of cellular
maximum data usage in (2.52) and WiFi ﬂat pricing model, we obtain Equation (2.53) as the
proﬁt function of the coalition C = {4G,WiFi}. For the sake of simplicity, we indicate all the
parameters related to 4G with subscript 1 and for WiFi we use parameters with subscript 2.
In this equation, the proﬁt is separated into two parts associated with two different user sets,
denoted by I1C and I
2
C. These two sets are deﬁned in (2.54). I
1
C indicates the set of the users who
utilize both WiFi and 4G network. The MPP of these users has a higher maximum level than
their single provider payoff function. This set of users still pay for both WiFi and 4G, however,
in the next example we show that under a coalition the cost incurred is less. I2C represents the
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set of the users who do not pay for coalition service and for which the single provider payoff
function has a higher maximum level than MPP.
Table 2.2 Network settings for
"one WiFi-one 4G" coalition
Property Value
G4G 0.5
GWiFi Variable
α4G 0.2G4G
αWiFi [0.001,0.01,0.1]
UWF(θ) [0.01,0.05,0.1,1]
S4G 50/300
SWiFi 150/300
Ki ∀i ∈C = {4G,WiFi} 10
Scenario 2. To analyze a coalition of “WiFi-4G", let us consider the network settings presented
in Table 2.2. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the coalition proﬁt and aggregate payoff of the users as a
function of the size of WiFi coverage area for three different WiFi bandwidth costs (per unit of
consumed bandwidth) αWiFi = [0.001,0.01,0.1]. As seen in these ﬁgures, by increasing WiFi
coverage size the proﬁt of the coalition and the integrated user payoff initially increase and
then coalition proﬁt smoothly decreases to the no coalition level. At this point, the coalition
is not proﬁtable and should be terminated so that prices are reset to their non-coalition values
(as shown in the no coalition zone in Fig. 2.6). This leads to an immediate drop in the user
aggregate payoffs as shown in Fig. 2.5 (dropping points of two upper curves). At the maximum
level, the coalition proﬁt is 12% higher than the no-coalition proﬁt and the aggregate user
payoff improves by 10%. Also, in Fig. 2.6 we can observe that the pricing under the coalition
can be a two-part tariff with equilibrium prices. For example, the cost of coalition C is given
by:
Cost for user j in Coalition C = pC2+ pC1×d jC1.
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Where pC1 is the price of 4G service under the coalition and pC2 is the price of WiFi under the
coalition. Hence, there are three types of users in the market: 4G only, WiFi only and coalition
users. However, as a result of the coalition, the price is dropped for all three groups (Fig. 2.6).
Thus, two levels of long-run QoS are improved in this coalition; ﬁrstly, the coalition users have
access to high-speed WiFi with cheaper price and secondly by transferring a part of trafﬁc to
the WiFi network, the price and network utilization of 4G provider are decreased which means
a better 4G throughput overall.
Fig. 2.7 shows the coalition proﬁt as a function of the size of WiFi coverage area for three
levels of the usage willingness factor (UWF), θ = [0.01,0.05,0.1]. As we discussed earlier,
θ is an indicator for the usage greediness when users have free access to the network. The
results indicate that with lower levels of θ , a WiFi provider with a larger coverage area can
be accepted as a coalition member and with higher levels of θ , users have more incentive to
utilize the WiFi network. Therefore, with bigger WiFi coverage sizes, the usage and proﬁt of
4G service dramatically decreases since WiFi service is charged based on time and not data
consumption. Hence, as θ increases the coalition is unproﬁtable under bigger sizes of WiFi
coverage.
Table 2.3 Asymmetric 3-provider
network settings
Property Value
G3G 0.5
G4G1(Bigger provider) 0.3
G4G2 (Smaller provider) 0.1
S3G 15300
S4G for both 50300
αi ∀i ∈ {4G1,4G2,3G} 0.2Gi
K 10
Scenario 3. This example considers an asymmetric market where two 4G operators are domi-
nated by a 3G monopolist (4G operators gain much less proﬁt than 3G provider). The context
is realistic in wireless markets where it takes time for newer technologies to expand their cover-
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age and at the same time their service area is only a proper subset of the older technology. The
settings are given in Table 2.3. Concerning the total cost Ci (Equation (2.1)) of the providers,
we used the linear form of αi(Gi) = 0.2Gi in this numerical model and eliminated ci(Gi) for
simplicity. Hence, the cost model is given by: Ci = ∑ j∈Ii d
j
i ×0.2Gi.
Fig. 2.8 shows the simulation results as a function of the coverage overlap of 4G providers.
It contains three sets of data. The ﬁrst set of curves shows the proﬁt of each provider in full
competition state. The second set of curves gives the proﬁts of the 4G-4G coalition and the 3G
provider. The last curve represents the accumulated payoff of all users in the market.
The results in Fig. 2.8 show that the proﬁts of smaller providers are negligible in full competi-
tion mode. This is due to the fact that they are overpowered by the bigger 3G provider. When
4G operators form a coalition, their proﬁt increases while, at the same time, the 3G monopolist
experiences proﬁt loss. It can be also noted that when the coverage overlap of 4G operators
is small, the coalition enjoys its maximum proﬁt and 3G proﬁt is at its minimum level. By
increasing the overlap size, the proﬁt of coalition decreases until it reaches the non-coalition
level at 100% overlap. Thanks to the formation of the coalition, the competitiveness of 4G-4G
coalition is increased, the market is more balanced and the users are enjoying an extra payoff.
Also, it can be noticed that the user accumulated payoff is at its maximum level when the cov-
erage overlap is small. This is due to the extra competitiveness of 4G-4G coalition powered
by small coverage overlap. One hidden advantage of this type of coalition is the creation of an
incentive for the market to upgrade to new technologies. This cooperation is also allowable by
the regulatory unit since it gives better SW value. In contrast, the coalition of 3G and either one
of the 4G providers would lead to a strong monopolist that blocks the proﬁt of other provider.
Therefore, such coalition would not be allowed by the regulator.
Scenario 4. To analyze a simple coalition formation game, we consider the settings presented
in Table 2.4 where there are four symmetric providers that have coverage overlap. In this ex-
ample, we assume 80% coverage overlap that is rational in the case of cellular providers. This
is justiﬁed by the fact that cellular providers usually start to develop their new network in ur-
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Table 2.4 Symmetric 4-provider network
settings
Property Value
Gi ∀i ∈C = {1,2,3,4} 0.5
|Ai∩Aj|
|AT | ∀i ∈C = {1,2,3,4} 0.4
|Aj∩Ai∩Ak|
|AT | ∀i, j,k ∈C = {1,2,3,4} 0.35
|∩4i=1Ai|
|AT | 0.3
Si ∀i ∈C = {1,2,3,4} 50/300
αi ∀i ∈C = {1,2,3,4} 0.2Gi
Ki ∀i ∈C = {1,2,3,4} 10
Table 2.5 Coalition structures and associated proﬁts of Scenario 4
Coalition Provider Aggregate W /Nu W /Nu
structure (CS) proﬁt /Nu user (wp = 0, (wu = 5wp)
payoff /Nu wu = 1)
{1,2,3,4} {0.3079} 0.4464 0.4464 0.4233
{{i,j,k},m} {{0.077},0.0052} 0.75 0.75 0.6387
{{i,j},{k,m}} {{0},{0}} 0.76 0.76 0.6333
{{i,j},{k},{m}} {{0.022},0.0025,0.0025} 0.72 0.72 0.6045
{{1},{2},{3},{4}} {0,0,0,0} 0.70 0.70 0.5833
ban areas and then they expand the coverage area in the remaining years of that technology
life-cycle. Hence, most of their coverage area is the same during the early stages of network
build-up. Table 2.5 shows the market equilibrium proﬁts for different coalition structures along
with cumulated user payoff in the market. The symmetric structures like {{i, j}{k,m}} lead to
zero proﬁt for the providers due to price wars. It is interesting that even in unbalanced struc-
tures, the integrated user payoff can increase due to coverage expansion. As it is depicted in
Fig. 2.9, different weighting values lead to divergent feasible coalition structures. User friendly
values like {wp = 0,wu = 1} can cause more balanced coalitions like {{i, j},{k,m}}. By in-
creasing the weight of providers in social welfare function i.e. in this example {wp = 5wu},
an imbalanced coalition structure like {{i, j,k},{m}} can form. Note that parts a and b of
Fig. 2.9 show the feasible transitions between different coalitional structures from regulator’s
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viewpoint. These transitional diagrams are the tools used by the regulatory unit to deﬁne the
market state based on different social welfare standards.
2.9 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a game-theoretic framework that can help to set up stable coalitions
of heterogeneous wireless operators and enable wireless regulatory bodies to determine ac-
ceptable coalitions which do not downgrade social welfare standards. We derived a simple and
efﬁcient generic model that predicts the state of the market before and after coalition formation
without focusing on short time-scale bandwidth allocation problems. The model is based on
ﬁnding a pure Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle that deﬁnes service prices for each provider.
Our method is also based on the behavior of users and their satisfaction perceptions which are
represented by the random utility. We showed that with speciﬁc types of cost functions, it is
not beneﬁcial for providers to expand their coverage above a certain size. In some other cases,
if the ﬁnancial resources are available, the provider is better off with full coverage on the mar-
ket. We proved the form of multi-provider payoff (MPP) function for the coalitions. Based
on such MPP functions, we constructed a modiﬁed version of the coalition formation process.
Based on the proposed Lemma, we showed that in some cases it is beneﬁcial for the users to
switch between different networks to maximize their payoffs. Finally, the cost and coalition
models are illustrated with several numerical examples. The results show that formation of
coalition can notably increase the proﬁts of providers while increasing the integrated payoffs
of users. In the tested scenarios the proﬁts and the integrated payoffs were increased by up to
12% and 10%, respectively. As future work, we plan to investigate different pricing schemes
and provider selection mechanisms to further enhance and generalize our coalition formation
process.
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Figure 2.4 The coalition process
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Figure 2.5 Coalition proﬁt and cumulative payoff of all users for
αWiFi = [0.001,0.01,0.1]. Note that the three lower curves are
coalition proﬁt and the other three are their associated user payoffs
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Figure 2.6 Optimum price for WiFi and 4G in the coalition for
αWiFi = [0.001,0.01,0.1]. As WiFi coverage size increases, the
WiFi price goes higher and the 4G price decreases. At the
no-coalition zone, the coalition takes apart and prices stand on
their default values
Figure 2.7 Proﬁt of 4G-WiFi coalition when the WiFi coverage
size varies. Three levels of UWF (θ ) are considered
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Figure 2.8 Proﬁt of providers and integrated payoffs of all users
in 3-provider structure (Scenario 3)
Figure 2.9 Feasible moves allowed by regulator for two
weighting rules a) wp = 0,wu = 1 and b) 5wp = wu. Each of these
diagrams shows the possible and allowed moves from any status
quo coalition structure
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Abstract
Over the past several years, sponsored mobile data and the payment directions on the Internet
have been two major subjects in network economics. Several tier-1 service providers (SP) such
as AT&T and Verizon created their frameworks for sponsored mobile data by cooperating with
content providers (CP). Based on these frameworks, users can have free data transfer if they
accomplish a predeﬁned task such as buying an offered product, watching advertised videos
or completing a survey. In this paper, we investigate particular types of data content which
could be delivered to all cellular users free, even those without a data plan. Our approach does
not force users to click on advertised content to obtain free data access. These applications if
offered free of charge, can naturally generate a level of proﬁt for the CP that make it able to
compensate the proﬁt loss of SP by using side-payments. We call this approach a selective free
content (SFC) program that deﬁnes the speciﬁc types of contents eligible for such treatment.
We consider a multi-stage game consisting of cellular users, SP, and CP. We solve this game
by backward induction. In this way, we deﬁne the thresholds of price and data usage and
maximum preferred usage that makes an application suitable for an SFC program. Finally, we
verify our method by several numerical examples.
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Introduction
Since the establishment of ﬁrst telephone companies, network connectivity has been sold as
a product for over a century. The circuit-switched networks have no knowledge about infor-
mation or its worth. Hence, the dominant type of pricing for these networks is based on the
duration of each connection. With the introduction of packet-switched networks in the 60s,
providers were able to resolve the second type of network products which is the size of trans-
ferable data. This service is deﬁned mainly by data amount, transfer rate, and quality. Still,
with pricing based on this deﬁnition, there is no resolution among different types of data and
their value to the end-users during the billing process. Providers do not set the price based on
the content itself but its volume only.
To customize and to improve the current pricing policies, there are several issues to be ad-
dressed. Firstly, putting information-awareness aside, today’s access networks are not content-
aware in the ﬁrst place. Secondly, in each wireless market, the worth of different content
types to the end users are not statistically and economically deﬁned. Concerning the ﬁrst is-
sue, the content-aware networks (CAN) have been the subject of many recent studies e.g., (Yin
et al., 2013) and (Subbiah & Uzmi, 2001). It is expected to have a wide implementation of
such networks in near future Internet. The vast implementation of content delivery networks
(CDN) (Spagna et al., 2013) and edge-computing is the preliminary step toward the future
CAN. Hence, by recent advancement in this ﬁeld, the economic aspects of CAN and the appro-
priate process for revenue making and service billing should be studied. This new opportunity
that comes with a better understanding of the value of each data ﬂow motivates us to study
new types of pricing schemes that have an eye on fairness and user satisfaction. In particular,
we focus on providing mechanisms in which speciﬁc types of data transfer have no cost to the
end users. In this methods, SPs and CPs cooperate to leverage the natural behavior of users
such as on-line shopping to generate proﬁt. Also, providers do not force users to click on ad-
vertised contents to obtain free data transfer. Apparently, such mechanisms do not work for
all content types, and only special kinds of contents can be treated in such way. For example,
video contents with high demand cannot be offered free for all users without experiencing proﬁt
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loss. The applications such as mapping services with embedded advertising capability for local
businesses are the best candidates for our method. Hence, we call our method a selective free
content (SFC) program.
To have a deeper understanding about an SFC program, we ﬁrst explain several industrial and
academic endeavors toward partially free data access. One of the ﬁrst introduced mechanisms
is sponsored data by (AT&T, 2016). In this method, users can have free data access beside
their regular data plan for sponsored content. One example is sponsored videos that are pro-
vided by AT&T approved CPs. If users watch such videos, there is no impact on the usage of
their regular data plan. T-Mobile and Verizon also introduced Binge On (T-Mobile, 2016) and
FreeBee (Verizon, 2016) respectively. They both follow a similar philosophy to AT&T’s plan
with several differences in detail. The key to all of these plans is the presence of CP’s who
are eager to sponsor free data transfer. Due to this reason, the offered free content is restricted
to speciﬁc CPs and moreover, to the selected content that CP sponsors. Also, these plans are
offered to the users who already have a data plan which is a major drawback regarding fairness
and social welfare. Another concern about sponsored data program is the violation of network
neutrality. Since the major SPs can attract powerful CPs by charging them for their access to
the end users, the smaller CP’s and SP’s cannot compete in this ﬁeld; that is in contradiction to
widely accepted practice which suggests an equal and neutral policy on all data over Internet.
For further explanation, we consider the concepts of one- and two-sided payments which are
proposed in (Musacchio et al., 2011). As it is depicted in Fig. 3.1-a, in a neutral network, the
payment for data transfer is from the user side. However, in a non-neutral network, CP should
pay for the contents being transferred to the users as well (Fig. 3.1-b). It is clear that weaker
CP that cannot pay such fees to SP are vulnerable in non-neutral networks.
Challenges mentioned above motivate us to study alternative pricing methods for speciﬁc high-
value/low-usage contents that shift the burden of all the data transfer costs from the end users
to the related CPs. Since we focus on the type of content and not the CPs itself, any applica-
tion that meets the eligibility condition can be offered in an SFC program. Hence, it does not
affect the CPs that are competing and provide similar content types. This approach mitigates
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the adverse effects of an entirely non-neutral network. One example of eligible applications is
mapping services that have small data usages and generate their proﬁt from local businesses.
These businesses can be hotels, shopping centers and any market relying on the on-line ad-
vertisement. The second example of eligible applications is real-time IoT services like health
monitoring wearable devices connected to cloud-based applications. These applications usu-
ally use small amounts of data transfer, yet carry highly valuable information which is pro-
cessed and billed by third-party cloud-based services. We show the major difference between
different types of eligible contents. In all of them, the payment direction of SFC program is
similar to Fig. 3.2, in which user do not pay for the data transfer associated with the eligible
content.
Figure 3.1 The payment directions for a) neutral networks b)
non-neutral networks. U represents users
There are several academic endeavors to study the economics of sponsored data, e.g., (Joe-
Wong et al., 2015) and (Lotﬁ et al., 2015) that analyze the optimal values of sponsored data for
CPs, (ElDelgawy & La, 2015) which analyses the interaction between CP and SP for improving
the delivered QoS, (Andrews et al., 2014) that considers selecting the best CP locations for
offering sponsored data promotions, and (Andrews et al., 2016) which studies the optimal proﬁt
of SP in a sponsored content program. These works consider the same philosophy introduced
by service providers, such as AT&T, for sponsored data and try to optimize several network
and market parameters. They do not discriminate different types of contents based on their
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importance and user trafﬁc pattern. Also, no work considers an entirely free data access for
vital cellular applications like mapping services and this is one of the issues that we aim to
address in this paper.
Figure 3.2 The payment directions for SFC program
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we introduce three categories of
applications that are candidates for the SFC program. These applications are mapping services,
IoT related services and ﬁnally, smart city and e-governance applications. We demonstrate the
eligibility of such applications by analyzing several statistical reports from Ericsson (Ericsson,
2016) and comScore (ComScore, 2016). In this part, the current trafﬁc trends and behavior of
cellular users are also provided. In Section 3.2, the sequential game for the ﬁrst category of
applications is developed and analyzed (we selected for analyzing the ﬁrst category due to its
higher complexity). Section 3.3 includes numerical examples. Finally Section 3.4 concludes
the paper.
3.1 On the possibility of selective free access
In this section we focus on those types of applications that can be offered free of charge to
the end users. For such applications, SP can allow a free of charge data transfer without being
concerned about its proﬁt loss or the extra load of trafﬁc that would be generated. This comes
from the fact that while, under an SFC program, SP loses a part of its proﬁt from the end users,
it can be compensated by CP. To ﬁnd content types that work well with the SFC program we
analyze characteristics of types of content to select the ones that can add value under the SFC
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program. First we deﬁne three categories of the eligible applications. Then, the characteristics
of such applications are extracted from Internet statistics.
3.1.1 Category 1: mapping and other business related applications
First we consider the low data usage applications that are highly valuable to the end users. To
be more precise, consider Fig. 3.3 that shows the most reached mobile applications in U.S.
The data is acquired from comScore’s 2016 report (ComScore, 2016). On top of the list is
Facebook having 80% of the audience. The Facebook application is known for its moderate to
high data usage. In fact, it can consume up to three Megabytes per minute even if the user does
not play any video in it. The second rank is Facebook Messenger which is less trafﬁc greedy.
However, its overall consumption can be very high since it can be used repeatedly during
a short time period as a messaging service. The third most reached application is YouTube
which generates the most trafﬁc when compared with other services in the list. In fact, based
on the YouTube’s statistics, the average viewing session for mobiles is 40 minutes as of 2016
(Youtube, 2016). This means for 480P videos, having 2.5 Mbps data rate, YouTube consumes
750 MB per average session. For 1080P, the required bandwidth is 2.4 GB. With the current
trend in video sharing and the new capability of 4K video recording on smartphones, one can
expect an exponential growth of trafﬁc in this section in the next coming years.
The fourth most reached application is Google Maps with around 55% of reachability in the
U.S market. From SFC viewpoint, Google Map has three interesting features comparing to the
top three services. First, it’s not a social media application or entertainment service. Hence, ev-
ery time a user opens this application, it is due to the importance of information that is required.
Second, while the ﬁrst three applications in the list have moderate to high trafﬁc demand, the
amount of required data transfer for Google Maps is negligible per request; as of today, based
on our measurements, it uses 300-500 KB to process each location request. The ﬁnal aspect is
the new feature of Promoted Pins that lets local businesses to offer different kinds of promo-
tions to their customers. The advertisements appear as pins on the map when a user searches
for a related location. For example, when a user requests for nearby restaurants, the special
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offers would appear. Google Maps also supports the bidding mechanisms for hotels. In all
of these cases, Google highly relies on its reachability to the users which is directly related to
the quantity of data subscribers in local cellular networks. However, as the data acquired from
Table 3.1 Subscriber and trafﬁc shares in advance mobile markets
Taken from Ericsson mobility report
< 100 MB 100 MB−1 GB 1−10 GB 10−100 GB > 100 GB
Subscriber share ≈ 35% 28.8% 32% ≈ 3.5% ≈ 0.7%
Trafﬁc share ≈ 0.7% ≈ 11.5% ≈ 48.2% ≈ 35.2% ≈ 3.5%
Ericsson Mobility report (Ericsson, 2016) in Table 3.1 shows, over 35% of wireless users in
advance markets have a data cap of less than 100 MB. The total trafﬁc generated by this group
is 0.7% of total trafﬁc. The trafﬁc share for the group of 100 MB- 1 GB plans is about 11.5%
while this group includes 29% of all subscribers. Thus, while Google requires high connec-
tivity of users for its business model, near 64% of subscribers do not have the necessary data
connection to use Google Maps freely. The features mentioned above indicate that the mapping
applications such as Google Maps have the potential to be offered under SFC program. The
traditional payment directions for Google Maps are depicted in Fig. 3.4. Where here the end
users pay for their data connectivity, local businesses pay Google for advertisement, and ﬁnally
the end users may pay local businesses for their offers on the mapping application. Under the
SFC program, the payment direction would be deﬁned as in Fig. 3.5. In this case, the end users
do not pay for their usage of Google Maps. Instead, the content-aware cellular network allows
them to use this application free of charge. To compensate for the SP’s lost revenue from the
end users, Google would share part of its extra proﬁt with SP. The extra proﬁt comes from the
increased advertisement clicks which is due to the higher service access by SP’s users. Note
that this alternative scenario is feasible due to unique characteristics of Google Maps. One
could argue that the free access may overload the cellular network. However, the Ericsson’s
data in Table. 3.2 shows that users are not becoming greedy for certain kinds of applications
when the available data volume is increasing. To be more precise, their volume share is di-
minishing unlike, for example, the share of video services that is growing with the amount of
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accessible data. The greediness and other relevant characteristics of potential free services are
deﬁned in more details in Subsection 3.1.4.
3.1.1.1 Other candidates in this category
While Google Maps is one of the best candidates for the SFC program in this category, there
are several other potential services as well. One is Apple Maps which is #12 in comScore’s
list (ComScore, 2016). Aside from mapping applications, two popular intelligent personal
assistants, Siri by Apple and Microsoft’s Cortana are other candidates. They can distribute
offers from local businesses and add value to the cellular operator’s network without putting the
burden on end users; similar to mapping services, the information delivered by these services
has a high value to the users as well.
Figure 3.3 U.S audience reach for mobile applications based on
comScore’s statistics
Taken from comScore (2016)
3.1.2 Category 2: real-time cloud-based IoT services
The second category of applications eligible for SFC program is related to rapid development of
wearable devices, IoT services, and edge-computing. In contrast to the ﬁrst category in which
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Figure 3.4 Traditional payment
direction for Google Maps
Figure 3.5 Alternative payment
direction model for Google Maps
based on free content-aware
connectivity for users
the end users would not directly pay for the services of Google or Apple, in the second category
users pay for the cloud-based services. In the current market model, end user pays for both
data connectivity and cloud-based services that collect event-triggers from sensors and react.
However, there are some scenarios in which the current market model can be inefﬁcient or even
dangerous. For example, consider the health monitoring system which loses its connection to
cloud-based service since the data plan reached its cap. In such scenario, while the user already
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Table 3.2 Application volume shares of different
subscriber groups adopted. Taken from Ericsson
Mobility report
Application < 0.1 GB 0.1−1 GB 1−10 GB 10−100 GB > 100 GB All users
Video 4% 16% 39.5% 67% 67.7% 46.7%
Social 13.7% 17.7% 17.7% 6.5% 1.2% 13.7%
Networking
Web 20% 18.5% 12% 5.6% 2.4% 10.4%
Browsing
Comm. 12% 8.8% 4% 2.4% 0.8% 3.2%
Services
Software 16.1% 15.3% 6.4% 2.4% 1.6% 6.4%
Download
Audio 0.8% 3.2% 3.2% 1.6% 0.8% 3.2%
System 0.2% 1.6% ≈ 0% ≈ 0% ≈ 0% ≈ 0%
File Sharing ≈ 0% ≈ 0% ≈ 0.5% ≈ 1.6% ≈ 16% 1.6%
Other ≈ 33.2% ≈ 18.9% ≈ 16.7% ≈ 15.3% ≈ 9.5% ≈ 14.8%
paid for a critical service, the service cannot save its life. Thus this service could beneﬁt greatly
from the SFC program as well as a broad range of IoT services based on low date usage sensors
that provide valuable information.
The traditional payment model requires the end users to pay both network provider and cloud-
based services located on the edge of provider’s network. This model of payment directions is
depicted in Fig. 3.6-a. The alternative SFC model removes the data transfer and connectivity
cost from the end user. In this model, the cost of data transfer is being paid by cloud-based
service owner. In many markets, similar scenarios have been implemented. For example, the
majority of laptops in the today’s market come with a version of MS Windows and a free
subscription to MS Ofﬁce for a deﬁned period. For several years Samsung offered free 48
GB Dropbox storage with their smartphones. Wacom tablets come with a free license for
Photoshop or Corel applications. The examples in this category are countless and it proves
the effectiveness of such business model. Hence, the SFC program for the second category of
applications can be implemented using experience from the already existing models in different
markets.
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Figure 3.6 a) Current payment directions for cloud-cellular IoT
services b) alternative SFC model
3.1.3 Category 3: Smart cities and the social right to access the Internet
In the previous two categories, the ﬁnal goal of content providers, whether they are single pur-
pose cloud-based companies or giant multi-role corporations like Google, is generating proﬁt
out of users. The third category, on the other hand, is dedicated to those entities whose aim
is leveraging the quality of life by providing ICT services to a broad range of people. These
entities would be governmental or municipal bodies that intend to implement and develop the
concept of smart cities. To achieve a densely interconnected structure, such as smart cities,
it is required to implement several related technologies such as IoT for transport and trafﬁc
monitoring, energy consumption metering and health care systems. This type of services can
also cover electronic governance (e-governance) and on-line voting concepts in which the in-
teraction between governments and citizens takes place via ICT services. Since having access
to the Internet is playing a primary role in future smart cities, public networks are being im-
plemented around the globe. These networks are primarily based on WiFi technology. The
service access is given via paid plans or in some cases freely. The free WiFi access is mainly
provided in governmental facilities or touristic sites. For example, the Old Port neighborhood
of Montreal is offering free Internet access to the public; this is a part of a long-run plan for
city-wide free WiFi access (Montreal, 2016). There are numerous examples of free and paid
urban WiFi. We refer the reader to (Kong, 2016; York, 2016; Toronto, 2016; Liverpool, 2016)
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for several examples. The WiFi service has the advantage of high-speed access to the network
via free license spectrum. However, implementing a city-wide network requires a vast amount
of ﬁnancial resources; this is due to small coverage range of WiFi access points (AP) com-
paring to the cellular counterparts. Deploying hundreds or thousands of APs also increases
the maintenance and managing cost. As of today, the cost of such networks is being paid by
municipal entities or via community support in free service methods or by private companies
for paid or advertised services.
Due to the limited coverage size of current municipal networks based on WiFi, one can consider
an alternative or additional option of selective free cellular access in the urban area. This
option would be mainly useful for the case of free or advertised services that are funded via
predeﬁned budgets dedicated to municipal network plans. For the previous two application
categories proposed for the SFC program, the primary question was how to make selective
free access proﬁtable; in the third category, the major challenge is how to develop the ICT
applications to make them accessible free of charge on cellular networks. This challenge is
mainly related to service type deﬁnition and trafﬁc shaping. In particular, since the cellular data
is traditionally more expensive than the land-line services, the smart city application should
transfer the minimum trafﬁc with the most valuable data. In the next subsection, we deﬁne
general characteristics of all eligible applications for the SFC program.
3.1.4 Characteristics of eligible applications for the SFC program
Until now we deﬁned three categories of applications, shown in Fig. 3.7, that are good candi-
dates for an SFC model. In this paper, our goal is building a mathematical framework in which
the estimated proﬁt values of associated entities are resolved. Hence, to have a precise formu-
lation, we need to ﬁnd the common characteristics of mentioned application. In this section we
deﬁne some general characteristics of the eligible applications while the mathematical deﬁni-
tion of each characteristic is presented in the next section. As discussed until now, a candidate
application for the SFC program has the following characteristics:
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a. Let deﬁne the content unit as the result of a predeﬁned information request such as ob-
taining a map location. Then, in the eligible applications, the required data transfer of a
content unit is relatively small, and its perceptual value to the user is high. On the other
hand, for the content types such as video, the expected size of each video is respectively
high and the data does not have the same importance or time criticality. In other words,
in most cases when a user requires a map location data or health-care service, the request
cannot be postponed till another time. Let us represent the content size with θ and the
perceptual importance to a user with random variable α . Then, the importance to size
ratio is ρ = αθ . Since the two variables are generally independent, the average ratio is
E[ρ] = E[α]E[θ ] . We expect this ratio to be highest for the eligible contents among all content
types in the network. This deﬁnition lacks two pieces of important information. First,
there is no metric for the perceptual importance. Thus, we need to use a utility function
to model the user behavior. Second, ρ does not carry any information about the user
greediness for the application usage which forces us to deﬁne the second property.
b. The second characteristic of eligible applications is that the user should not be greedy
for the application usage. We deﬁne the overall size of content transferred in time t by
application a and user j as Θaj,t(d). Where d is the cap of user’s data plan. Then, the
Application Usage Index (AUI) among all users can be deﬁned as,
Iaj (d) = limt→∞
1
t
Θaj,t(d)
∑Aa=1Θaj,t(d)
· (3.1)
For the eligible applications, the global application usage index should decrease with
increasing d, that is:
Greediness condition:
1
NT
NT
∑
j=1
∂ Iaj (d)
∂d
≤ 0, (3.2)
where NT is the total number of users in the market. This condition is supported by the
data provided by Ericsson in (Ericsson, 2016). Namely, based on Table 3.2, the mobile
application can be categorized in three groups regarding I j(d). Fig. 3.7 depicts the general
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shape of the usage index for each category as a function the cap of user’s data plan. Fig.
3.7-a shows the usage index shape for Type I applications for which users have the highest
usage greediness; this type includes the video applications. Fig. 3.7-b illustrates the usage
index shape for Type II applications. A user considers utilizing these applications if it has
enough bandwidth available. However, these applications are not important enough to
be used in plans with a small data cap. Audio services belong to this category. Finally,
3.7-c depicts the usage index shape for the critical applications that user requires under
any data plan. A user may utilize only these applications when the data cap is limited to a
small value, e.g., one- or two-gigabytes. Also, users are not greedy for these applications
so condition (3.2) is satisﬁed in this case. Web browsing and mapping services belong
to this application type. Being a Type III application is a necessity to be eligible for
SFC program. However, it is not sufﬁcient; the business model should also support the
SFC program. Hence, a third characteristic should be deﬁned to resolve necessity and
sufﬁciency conditions for eligible applications.
c. Until now we considered the usage characteristics of eligible applications. The third char-
acteristic is related to the market condition. For any service to be considered as SFC
eligible, there should be a business or social entity that can compensate the proﬁt loss
of cellular provider. This characteristic may look trivial, but when we compare a map-
ping service with web browsing applications, one can notice a structural difference in the
business model. Namely, for the mapping applications such as Google Map, there is an
explicit ﬁnancial loop from local businesses to Google to SP to users and again local busi-
nesses. On the other hand, there is no such loop for the browsing applications since the
potential gainers are distributed throughout the Internet. The only exception would be in-
jecting direct advertisement from cellular provider to the web browsing data and making
a payment loop similar to Google Map’s business model in 3.4.
Among the three categories of eligible application for SFC program, the ﬁrst category has
the most complicated structure. It includes users, SP and CP that directly affect each other’s
behavior. The SFC feasibility models for category 2 and 3 applications are simpler and can
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Figure 3.7 Three categories of candidate applications for
selective free access
(a) Type I (b) Type II (c) Type III
Figure 3.8 Three types of mobile applications based on
subscriber’s usage behavior deﬁned by Iu(d)
be derived by some modiﬁcation of the ﬁrst category model. Hence, in the reminder of the
paper we propose and analyze a detailed analytical model for SFC feasibility of the Category
1 applications.
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3.2 The Game for Category 1 applications
In this section, we consider a three-stage game which deﬁnes the best strategies of SP and CP
to whether join to or refuse an SFC program for an eligible Category 1 application. The game
consists of three entities; namely, cellular users, SP and CP. Users adjust their subscription and
data usage behavior based on the offered price from SP. CP generates its proﬁt based on the
number of subscribed users and the amount of content requests they generate. Similar to any
market, since the volume of content requests is in close relation to the unit data price offered by
SP, CP earns an extra proﬁt if SP applies the minimum possible price. Our goal is to investigate
and deﬁne the conditions in which an entirely free access gives the sufﬁcient amount of extra
revenue to CP to compensate the proﬁt loss of SP. We model this scenario as a Stackelberg
game and solve it by backward induction. The three stages of our game are deﬁned as follows:
a. Each user observes the offered data unit price from SP and decides the amount of data
consumption for each application. In this stage, the amount of content requests for the
target Category 1 application is resolved.
b. In the next stage, SP calculates its proﬁt for two scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario is a standard
pricing strategy and the second scenario considers the presence of an SFC program for
speciﬁc content. In this part, an SP-CP cooperation means SP provide SFC to all users
and demands from CP the compensation from its proﬁt loss. If CP cannot compensate the
proﬁt loss of SP, then SP does not participate in the SFC program.
c. In the last stage, CP should decide whether to take part in the SFC program or not and if
it participates, what share of proﬁt should be proposed and transferred to SP.
In what follows, we demonstrate the details of each stage of the game.
3.2.1 Stage III: user’s utility and best response
Since the user behavior analysis is the foundation of this framework, we need to deﬁne the
proper metric to ﬁnd the amount of data consumption. Similar to many related works, we use
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the concepts from utility theory to formulate this part. With the help of the data provided by
Ericsson (Ericsson, 2016) in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we know that 70% of current users have a lim-
ited data plan with less than 2 GB; the primary concern of these users is choosing between high
priority services like mapping applications and other less critical application such as video. For
these users, the utilization percentage of high demanding applications such as video is negligi-
ble. For the rest of users who share almost 80% of overall trafﬁc, the decision concern is mainly
about the amount of trafﬁc they need to buy for their video streaming applications. For these
users, the trafﬁc ratio of high-value applications to the rest of services is under 10% (Type-III
applications in Fig. 3.7). Hence, we can deﬁne a two-part utility function which considers the
importance of eligible application in one part and the high demand services in the other part.
For each part, we use the familiar form of logarithmic utility function due to its conformity to
the law of diminishing marginal utility (Hall & Lieberman, 2012). The adaptation of this law is
essential in studying the cases of data consumption. Also, the logarithmic utility is a common
practice in related works e.g. (Bas¸ar & Srikant, 2002), (Sengupta et al., 2007), (Duan et al.,
2013a) and (Lotﬁ et al., 2015). The utility for a speciﬁc user j has the form of:
u j(p) =
α jeβelog(1+d je)− pd je
Ue
+
α jr βrlog(1+d jr )− pd jr
Ur
· (3.3)
The ﬁrst part of the above function deﬁnes the gained normalized payoff from using an SFC
eligible application. This application is indicated by subscript e. The second part belongs to
the rest of applications with lower importance and higher trafﬁc demand indicated by index r.
α ji i ∈ {e,r} is a random variable which shows the importance of the application i to user j.
This importance is coupled with the amount of money that user is willing to pay for a speciﬁc
type of content. For the sake of simplicity in analysis, we assume that α je and α jr are i.i.d
having a uniform PDF of U(0,1). βi is a user-independent variable which controls the amount
of data consumption for a given price. d ji is the amount of preferred data usage for each content
type. We also deﬁne constant Di which indicates the maximum amount of data consumption
users tend to achieve. Based on the deﬁnition, we expect De to be negligible comparing to Dr.
p ∈ℜ+ is the unit price for data implied by SP. Finally, Ue and Ur are the normalizing factors
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which control the peak of utility for each content. These two constants are essential since the
two parts of utility have different peaks, yet they may represent the same amount of satisfaction
to each user. By this deﬁnition, Ui = βilog(1+Di) and the maximum of u j(p) for the most
demanding user can be 2. For the rest of users the maximum utility is u jM(p) = α
j
e +α jr < 2
which shows that the maximum value of satisfaction is related to the perceptual importance of
the services to the user. it is clear that u j(p) is concave with respect to d je and d
j
r . The ﬁrst
derivative of u j(p) with respect to d ji is:
∂u j(p)
∂d ji
=
1
Ui
(
α ji βi
1+d ji
− p
)
, (3.4)
d j′i =
α ji βi
p
−1, (3.5)
where d j′i is the global maximum of u
j(p). By considering the positivity and the maximum
level of usage, we have the optimum value as:
d j
o
i = min
(
max
(
α ji βi
p
−1,0
)
,Di
)
. (3.6)
The above equation indicates that p ≥ α ji βi leads to zero usage for the content of type i, and
p≤ α
j
i βi
1+Di
gives the user the opportunity to reach the maximum demand for the content of type
i. To have the analysis of user’s best responses, we need to categorize the users based on usage
threshold orders. These orders can be represented by two main sets:
Order set I-
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1)α jeβe ≥ α jr βr > α
j
eβe
1+De
> α
j
r βr
1+Dr
,
2)α jeβe > α
j
eβe
1+De
> α jr βr > α
j
r βr
1+Dr
.
(3.7)
Order set II-
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
3)α jr βr > α jeβe > α
j
eβe
1+De
> α
j
r βr
1+Dr
,
4)α jr βr > α jeβe > α
j
r βr
1+Dr
> α
j
eβe
1+De
,
5)α jr βr > α
j
r βr
1+Dr
> α jeβe > α
j
eβe
1+De
.
(3.8)
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The main difference between the two sets is the user’s content prioritizing behavior. The ﬁrst
set represents the users who prioritize the Type e contents and the second set is for those who
favor the Type r applications. To have a better understanding of the user behavior, let us deﬁne
the best response function as follows:
Proposition 4. The best response data values for the users in the ﬁrst order (set I-1) are as
follows:
BR/I-1
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d j
o
e = 0, d
jo
r = 0 p> α jeβe,
d j
o
e =
α jeβe
p −1, d j
o
r = 0 α jr βr < p≤ α jeβe,
d j
o
e =
α jeβe
p −1, d j
o
r =
α jr βr
p −1 α
j
eβe
1+De
< p≤ α jr βr,
d j
o
e = De, d
jo
r =
α jr βr
p −1 α
j
r βr
1+Dr
< p≤ α jeβe1+De ,
d j
o
e = De, d
jo
r = Dr p≤ α
j
r βr
1+Dr
.
(3.9)
Proof. The thresholds come directly from (3.7) and the optimum values follow (3.6).
Table 3.3 General notation
Parameter Description
NT Set of all users of SP
NT Size of NT
I(d) Application Usage Index (AUI)
u j(p) utility of user j when the data unit price is p
α je ,α jr Random variables indicating the perceptual importance
of service e and r respectively for user j
αe,αr The general form of above.
βe,βr Trafﬁc shaping factors
De,Dr maximum preferred usage for content types e and r
d je ,d
j
r The overall usage of content Type e and r for user j
p price of data service
po optimal price strategy of SP
pCP Side-payment unit price, from CP to SP
πCP, πSP proﬁt of CP and SP respectively
η proﬁt factor of CP for content utilization
ζ Bargaining power of SP over CP
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The best response for the rest of the threshold orders can be easily deﬁned based on the above
deﬁnition. We omit their presentation to simplify the presentation. Instead, we show the typical
curves of best responses for the threshold orders in Fig. 3.9. As depicted in Fig. 3.9(a)-(e), the
main difference between the best response curves is the usage behavior when the price is high.
Sub-ﬁgures 3.9-(a) and (b) represent the users who prioritize the eligible contents over the
rest of applications. Hence, when the price is high, they use only the eligible application. This
makes a signiﬁcant difference in the AUI curve. The single-user AUI of the eligible application,
Ie(p) =
de(p)
de(p)+dr(p)
, for the ﬁrst two orders is similar to the one of the Type-III applications (a
horizontally ﬂipped version of the curve in Fig. 3.7, having d inversely related to p). Order
II-1 shows a pattern similar to the Type-II applications for the presumably eligible applications.
Orders II-2 and II-3 represent our eligible applications similar to Type-I applications. Based
on the three characteristics of the eligible applications for the SFC program, we know that only
Orders I-1 and I-2 are a realistic representation. This assertion does not imply that all users act
based on the ﬁrst two orders. However, since the marketwide AUI (Eq. (3.1)) represents the
aggregated usage of an application in the entire market, when it comes to an eligible application
the majority of users behave based on Orders I-1 and I-2. Hence we can propose the following
proposition:
Proposition 5. For an eligible Category 1 application, βe > βr always holds.
Proof. See Appendix III-1.
3.2.2 Stage II: The best strategy for SP
In Stage II, after the analysis of users’ best responses, SP should resolve its best strategy. As
discussed earlier, SP decides whether it wants to participate in the SFC program or not and
also, sets the data price that maximizes its proﬁt. Thus, the SP’s strategy is deﬁned by triple
(p,γSP, pCP) where γSP ∈ {0,1} deﬁnes the participation strategy and pCP is the data unit price
for the Type e content when SP participates in the SFC program, γSP = 1. pCP is the base for
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(a) Order I-1 (b) Order I-2
(c) Order II-1 (d) Order II-2
(e) Order II-3
Figure 3.9 Best response of users base on threshold orders
any payment from CP to SP to compensate the SP’s proﬁt loss. In the following, we derive the
optimum proﬁt values for each strategy triple.
The proﬁt of SP when it does not participate in SFC program is directly related to the overall
data consumed by the subscribed users. When SP agrees to join the SFC program, it loses a
part of its proﬁt which comes from the eligible application’s trafﬁc. However, in this scenario,
CP may compensate the proﬁt loss of SP by making a side-payment. Thus, having NT as the
total number of users in the SP’s network, we can deﬁne the proﬁt function of SP as:
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πSP(γSP = 0, p) = NT ×
⎡
⎣∫ 1
αe=1
de(αe, p)dαe+
∫ 1
αr=1
dr(αr, p)dαr
⎤
⎦, (3.10)
πSP(γSP = 1, p, pCP) = NT ×
⎡
⎣∫ 1
αr=1
dr(αr, p)dαr+De ∗ pCP
⎤
⎦. (3.11)
Eq. (3.10) represents the non-SFC proﬁt and (3.11) is the proﬁt of SP under the SFC program.
In (3.11) the side-payment from CP to SP it is deﬁned as NTDepCP that implies that under the
SFC program, in which users are not charged for transferring Type e contents, all users reach
maximum usage De. Based on the above proﬁt equations, we deﬁne a detailed proﬁt structure
of SP based on its pricing and participation strategies in the following two subsections.
3.2.3 The proﬁt of SP in non-cooperative strategy (γSP = 0)
When SP is not engaged in the SFC program, its only source of proﬁt are the direct payments
from the users for their data usage. In this case, SP should set the price value that maximizes
its proﬁt. Based on (3.6), the price threshold above which user j does not demand any content
i is p = α ji βi. Hence, if SP sets the price p > βi, no user would demand content type i. We
have two thresholds p = βe and p = βr representing the upper limit of price for each content
type. Also, for the same user j, p <=
α ijβi
1+Di
leads to maximum data usage. We can take the
thresholds p = βi1+Di and p =
βr
1+Dr
as the price values for which greediest users start to enjoy
full data usage for the respective content. Based on above deﬁnitions and Proposition 5, there
are two orders of thresholds:
SP’s price threshold orders:
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1) βe > βr ≥ βe1+De > βr1+Dr ,
2) βe > βe1+De ≥ βr > βr1+Dr .
(3.12)
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The above deﬁnitions can also be derived from order set I in (3.7). Since the above orders are
related to the nature of applications and general user behavior, we select the ﬁrst order as the
base for the further analysis. The same framework can be applied to the wireless markets with
the second order. We deﬁne the SP’s best response price and the associated proﬁt under each
threshold regime as follows:
3.2.3.1 Ultra-high price regime: βr < p< βe
When SP applies an ultra-high price regime, no user reach its maximum usage regarding con-
tent Type e. However, as it is depicted in Fig. 3.10, all the users with αe ≥ pβe can enjoy a
partial usage of de =
αeβe
p −1. Considering the Type r applications, since p is above the mini-
mal usage threshold, no user will utilize these applications and hence dr = 0 for all the users.
The overall proﬁt of SP is:
πSPuh (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT p
∫ 1
αe= pβe
αeβe
p
−1 dαe = NT
(
p2
2βe
− p+ βe
2
)
.
The ﬁrst derivative of above proﬁt function is NT (
p
βe − 1) and the second derivative is
NT
βe .
Hence, the proﬁt function in ultra-high price regime is convex and its maximum occurs at the
boundary price p= βr:
max
p
πSPuh (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT
(
β 2r
2βe
−βr+ βe2
)
. (3.13)
3.2.3.2 High price regime: βe1+De < p< βr
Considering the user’s best responses, the difference between the ultra-high and high price
regimes is that in the latter, a part of users with αr ≥ pβr utilize the r type applications. The best
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Figure 3.10 Optimal content usage with respect to αe and αr in
ultra-high price regime βr < p< βe
Figure 3.11 Optimal content usage with respect to αe and αr in
high price regime βe1+De < p< βr
response for e type application remains the same. This behavior is depicted in Fig. 3.11.
πSPh (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT p
⎡
⎣∫ 1
αe= pβe
αeβe
p
−1 dαe+
∫ 1
αr= pβr
αrβr
p
−1 dαr
⎤
⎦
= NT
(
p2(βe+βr)
2βeβr
−2p+ βe+βr
2
)
. (3.14)
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The proﬁt function of (3.14) is convex and similar to (3.13) the maximum value is in lower
boundary of price p= βe1+De :
max
p
πSPh (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT
⎛
⎜⎝βe+βr2
(
βe
βr(1+De)2
+1
)
−2 βe
1+De
⎞
⎟⎠. (3.15)
3.2.3.3 Moderate price regime: βr1+Dr < p≤
βe
1+De
Figure 3.12 Optimal content usage with respect to αe and αr in
moderate price regime βr1+Dr < p≤
βe
1+De
In the moderate price regime, SP allows a part of users with αe ≥ p(1+De)βe reach their maximal
usage for content e. However, with such price regime no user is willing to achieve a maximum
usage for content r. These conditions are shown in Fig. 3.12. The proﬁt of SP in moderate
price regime is deﬁned as shown in Eq. (3.16).
Proposition 6. The proﬁt function in moderate price regime has a maximum at
p = βeβr(De−1)βr((1+De)2−1)−βe , if De > 1 and Dr >
De(βr(De+2)−βe)
βe(De−1) , otherwise, the maximum occurs
at lower boundary price p= βr1+Dr .
Proof. See Appendix III-2.
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πSPm (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT p
[∫ p(1+De)
βe
αe= pβe
αeβe
p
−1 dαe+
∫ 1
αe=
p(1+De)
βe
De dαe+
∫ 1
αr= pβr
αrβr
p
−1 dαr
]
= NT
(
p2
2
(
1
βr
− 1
βe
(
(1+De)2−1
))
+(De−1)p+ βr2
)
(3.16)
3.2.3.4 low price regime: p≤ βr1+Dr
Figure 3.13 Optimal content usage with respect to αe and αr
in low price regime p≤ βr1+Dr
When the low price regime is applied, a part of users achieve the maximum usage for content
types e or r or both, as depicted in Fig. 3.13. The proﬁt of SP is given by (3.18) that is placed
on the next page. The quadratic proﬁt function of (3.18) is concave and the optimal price is
given by:
pl =
βeβr(De+Dr)
βe ((1+Dr)2−1)+βr ((1+De)2−1) · (3.17)
Since Dr >> 1, it can be easily proved that pl <
βr
1+Dr
and the maximum value of concave
proﬁt function is the optimal value within the price boundary.
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πSPl (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT × p×
[∫ p(1+De)
βe
αe= pβe
αeβe
p
−1 dαe+
∫ 1
αe=
p(1+De)
βe
De dαe
+
∫ p(1+Dr)
βr
αr= pβr
αrβr
p
−1 dαr+
∫ 1
αr=
p(1+Dr)
βr
Dr dαr
]
= NT
(
− p
2
2
(
1
βr
(
(1+Dr)2−1
)
+
1
βe
(
(1+De)2−1
))
+(De+Dr)p
)
(3.18)
The optimal value of p is the one which maximizes the proﬁt of SP. Since we derived the
optimal value for each pricing regime, the ﬁnal value can be deﬁned as:
πSPo (γ
SP = 0, p) = max
⎛
⎝max
p
πSPuh (γ
SP = 0, p),max
p
πSPh (γ
SP = 0, p),
max
p
πSPm (γ
SP = 0, p),max
p
πSPl (γ
SP = 0, p)
⎞
⎠, (3.19)
po = argmax
p
πSPo (γ
SP = 0, p). (3.20)
3.2.4 The proﬁt of SP in cooperative strategy (γSP = 1)
In the previous subsection, we analyzed the proﬁt of SP under non-cooperative strategy, γSP =
0. We categorized the best price responses of SP into four regimes which yield different usage
patterns for both content-types e and r. Consequently, the proﬁt values for these regimes vary.
If SP decides not to cooperate, then it selects the price regime that maximizes its proﬁt. Since
the proﬁt in all price regimes is related to four market parameters βe, βr, De and Dr, we must
adopt a parametric solution for the cooperative strategy of SP as well. In this manner, by
assuming that each price regime is applied to the SP’s network, one can derive the cooperative
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proﬁt counterpart. We start our analysis by deﬁning user behavior when SP participates in the
SFC program.
When SP aims to implement the SFC program, users are not charged for demanding content
Type e. The worst scenario for SP is that all users utilize content e to its maximum level
De and, simultaneously, no user is willing to raise its content r demand. Since the very ﬁrst
condition in the SFC program is the price invariance, SP loses all the proﬁt from the content e
without obtaining extra value transfer of content e. This condition is previously formulated in
(3.11). One can apply this equation to different price regimes to obtain the proﬁt of SP in the
cooperative state. For example:
3.2.4.1 Ultra high price regime: βr < p< βe
In the ultra-high price regime, the entire data trafﬁc belongs to content Type e. Hence, by
participating in the SFC program, the proﬁt of SP solely comes from CP as follows:
πSP(p,γSP = 1, pCP) = NT ×De× pCP. (3.21)
It is clear that SP agrees to participate in the SFC program if and only if πSP(p,γSP = 1, pCP)≥
πSP(γSP = 0, p). Based on (3.13) and (3.21), pCP > 1De
(
β 2r
2βe −βr+
βe
2
)
is the sufﬁcient condi-
tion for this case. Deriving the proﬁt function for the other three price regimes is straightfor-
ward so it is omitted to simplify the presentation.
3.2.5 Stage I: The strategies of CP
In Stage I, CP decides if the SFC program is proﬁtable to itself and if yes, which data unit price
should be offered to SP for its proﬁt loss. Hence, one can deﬁne the strategy pair (γCP, pCP)
for CP in which γCP ∈ {0,1} represents the SFC participation of CP and pCP ∈ℜ+ is the data
unit price as a base for payment to SP. As we discussed in the previous section, a Category 1
application is offered free of charge to the users and the central part of CP’s proﬁt comes from
advertisements. The ad price is related to the number of clicks, and it is accepted in related
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studies to connect the click frequency to the number of content requests from users. While it
is common to consider a logarithmic payoff function for CP (e.g., see (Lotﬁ et al., 2015)), we
aim to consider a worst-case scenario in which the proﬁt of CP is linearly related to the content
requests. The beneﬁt of such consideration is that by proving the possibility of SFC program
under a linear proﬁt model of CP, the logarithmic proﬁt model also holds valid. The reason
for the validity is the direction of payment which is from CP to SP. Thus, the more proﬁt CP
makes, the bigger chance of SFC possibility. Since the type of proﬁt for the CP and SP is
deﬁned based on actually gained money, their utility is transferable by a side-payment. We
deﬁne the proﬁt function of CP as follows:
πCP(γCP = 0) = NTη
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, p)dαe, (3.22)
πCP(γCP = 1, pCP) = NTDe
(
η − pCP
)
, (3.23)
where η is the CP’s proﬁt ratio for overall usage of content Type e. When γCP = 0, CP does not
make a side-payment to SP and hence, pCP = 0. The overall data usage for γCP = 1 is NTDe
which is considered along with a side-payment to SP in (3.23). To make a cooperation feasible,
CP’s proﬁt after cooperation should be greater than the sum of its proﬁt before implementing
SFC program and the proﬁt loss of SP, that is:
NTDeη > NT (η + po)
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe →
η >
po
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe, p
o)dαe
De−
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe, p
o)dαe
, (3.24)
where po is the optimal price of SP in Stage II.
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe, p
o)dαe is the overall usage of
content e in the non-cooperative form of the game. If the above feasibility condition holds, CP
can consider the SFC program. Otherwise, the best response of CP is γCP = 0. In the case
of possible cooperation, the only remaining decision value for CP is pCP or in general, the
amount of side-payment to SP. Several options can be considered in such case. One can ﬁnd
this game as a bargaining game and compute pCP as the solution of a Nash bargaining game
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(Rubinstein & Osborne, 1990). Another option is considering the game as a cooperative type.
In this case, the solution concepts such as Core and Shapley value (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991)
can be applied. In this paper, we consider both the bargaining solution and Shapley value.
3.2.6 Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
In this part, we ﬁnd pCP as a solution to the Nash bargaining game (NBS). Nash ﬁrstly intro-
duced the NBS in (Nash Jr, 1950) and described a bargaining situation in which players try to
reach an agreement. The agreement can be a price deﬁnition or a contract between bargainers.
Nash built his solution based on four axioms. Namely, Invariance to Equivalent Utility Repre-
sentations, Symmetry, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Pareto efﬁciency. We refer
the reader to (Rubinstein & Osborne, 1990) for more information on these axioms. In what
follows we give a general deﬁnition of two-player NBS.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Consider two players 1 and 2 who try to reach an agreement in a bargain-
ing game. Set A contains the agreement alternatives. If they cannot reach the agreement, a
disagreement event D occurs. Players have a preference ordering on set A∪D. We deﬁne
Ui : A∪D→ℜ as the utility of player i. The union of all payoff pairs (U1(a),U2(a)) a ∈ A is
indicated by S. The disagreement utility point is deﬁned by the pair d = (U1(D),U2(D)).
Deﬁnition 3.2 ((Rubinstein & Osborne, 1990)). The unique solution to Nash’s four axioms of
bargaining in a two player game is a pair f 2 ∈ℜ2 given by:
f 2(S,d) = argmax
(d1,d2)<(s1,s2)∈S)
(s1−d1)(s2−d2). (3.25)
If player 1 has a relative bargaining power ζ ∈ [0,1] over its opponent, NBS is given by:
f 2(S,d) = argmax
(d1,d2)<(s1,s2)∈S)
(s1−d1)ζ (s2−d2)1−ζ . (3.26)
Based on the above deﬁnition, we can deﬁne the following solution for our problem:
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Proposition 7. In a CP-SP game in which SP has a bargaining power ζ ∈ [0,1] over CP, if
ζ ≥ p
o(De−
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe,p
o)dαe)
ηDe−(η+po)
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe,p
o)dαe
and feasibility condition in (3.24) is satisﬁed, then the NBS
price pCPb is given by:
pCPb = ζη −
(ζ (η + po)− po)∫ 1αe=0 de(αe, po)dαe
De
, (3.27)
otherwise, a disagreement occurs.
A proof is given in Appendix III-3. Nonnegative NBS price in (3.27) is supported by the SFC
feasibility condition in (3.24). In other words, NBS price (3.27) is not a solution for a SFC
program if feasibility condition of (3.24) does not hold. NBS price pCP should be calculated
for each pricing regime of SP and its associated overall usage of content e. In Stage II of
the game, since we already derived a closed-form representation of the parameters mentioned
above under each pricing regime in Stage II of the game, we omit redundant equations that are
created by straightforward parameter substitution.
3.2.7 Shapley value
The multi-stage game is considered as a strategic type and should be solved by the related so-
lution concepts as we did in the previous subsection. However, in the game that we consider,
increasing the proﬁt of CP does not decrease the proﬁt of SP. To be more precise, CP and SP
are not direct competitors. Thus, one can consider the CP-SP game as a cooperative form.
There are several options to solve a coalitional game. As an option, we consider Shapley value
which deﬁnes the proﬁt of each player by its relative power in the market. As previously men-
tioned, we know that the direction of payment is from CP to SP. Also, the utility of providers is
represented by a monetary unit which is transferable. For such case, the deﬁnition of Shapley
value is as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.3. Consider an n-player game which the set of players N. The function v(S) de-
ﬁnes the utility of coalition S ⊂ N. The Shapley value to player i ∈ N is deﬁned by a unique
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function Φ that satisﬁes Shapley’s three main axioms. Namely, Symmetry, Carrier and Linear-
ity (see (Myerson, 1991)) and is given by:
Φi = ∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(|N|− |S|−1)!
|N|! (v(S∪ i)− v(S)) . (3.28)
For a two person game, the above equation gives:
Φ1 =
1
2
(v(12)+ v(1)− v(2)) , (3.29)
Φ2 =
1
2
(v(12)+ v(2)− v(1)) , (3.30)
where v(12) is the proﬁt of cooperation.
Proposition 8. In the CP-SP game, the Shapley value of SP, ΦSP, is given by De × pCPb|ζ= 12 ,
where pCP
b|ζ= 12
is the NBS price with ζ = 12 . Hence,
ΦSP =
NT
2
(
ηDe− (po+η)
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe
)
. (3.31)
For the proof, see Appendix III-4. In the next section, we show the feasibility of SFC program
and the value of shared proﬁt for several numerical scenarios.
3.3 numerical results
To have a visual representation of the feasibility of SFC program, we consider several examples
which differ in user and provider parameters such as De, βe, η and bargaining power ζ . Similar
to real markets and characteristics of Type e and r applications, we set βe > βr andDr >> 10De.
These settings assure us that the numerical examples exactly follow the real behavior of cellular
users covered in Ericsson’s statistics. Hence, throughout this analysis the only constants are
Dr = 100, βr = 5. The main parameters that we like to analyze are the proﬁt values of SP and
CP, side-payment price pCP, and the minimum required bargaining power of SP, ζ , that makes
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the SFC program feasible. We take De which is the maximum desired usage of the eligible
application as the primary independent variable in the x-axis. However, in each example, there
is an additional variable whose effect is shown by introducing several curves in each ﬁgure. For
example, Figs. 3.14 and 3.15 represent the proﬁt of SP and CP for 2≤De ≤ 5 and βe ∈ {6,10}.
As indicated in Fig. 3.14, when SP has the equal bargaining power, ζ = 0.5, the desired SFC
area starts from De  2.1 when βe = 6. Increasing βe to 10, leads to higher proﬁt for non-SFC
program for SP and it requires a value of De > 3.9 to make SFC feasible. The same analysis
can be applied to the proﬁt of CP in Fig. 3.15. In Figs. 3.16 and 3.17 we decided to freeze
βe at 10 and change η as the proﬁt factor of CP. As it is expected, increasing the value of η ,
decreases the required value of De for SFC feasibility, that is, for η = 2 the minimum value for
De should be 3.9 while for η = 4, De can be 1.5 or higher. Fig. 3.18 shows the unit price for
side-payment and the minimum bargaining power, ζMin, for the feasibility of SFC. For βe > βr,
ζMin acquires a lower value comparing to βe = 10. The main reason can be found in Fig. 3.14
where a lower βe gives a higher proﬁt value to SP which contrasts with what happens to CP in
Fig. 3.15. Hence, SP needs less bargaining power to dictate the SFC program.
Figure 3.14 Proﬁt of SP with and without SFC program for
different values of De and βe
Finally, in Fig. 3.19 we take the bargaining power of SP, ζ , as the independent variable in the
x-axis. Here we can observe two effects considering De and ζ . Firstly, by having a higher
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Figure 3.15 Proﬁt of CP with and without SFC program for
different values of De and βe
Figure 3.16 Proﬁt of SP with and without SFC program for
different values of De and η
value of De, the overall proﬁt of both CP and SP increases. Secondly, by increasing ζ , SP can
force CP to pay it a bigger chunk of proﬁt in SFC program. Also, a bargaining power of 1
leaves no additional proﬁt for CP in SFC program. In summary, the presented results show the
possibility of SFC program for the eligible applications, even if CP’s proﬁt is linearly related
to the size of transferred content.
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Figure 3.17 Proﬁt of CP with and without SFC program for
different values of De and η
Figure 3.18 Minimum bargaining power, ζ , for SFC program
and related pCP
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the recent statistics of user behavior in cellular markets and identiﬁed
three types of services. Type I that requires a vast amount of data transfer, yet has low priority
to the users. Type II where the services require high data transfer, but users are not greedy to
utilize them constantly. Type III contains important applications that require low bandwidth
but carry sensitive information for the users. We showed that there are several examples of
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Figure 3.19 Proﬁt of SP and CP with and without SFC program
for different values of De and ζ
the Type III services that can be candidates for a selective free content (SFC) program for the
users. This program should be implemented by cooperation between SP and CP. Three cate-
gories of such services are introduced. Namely, mapping and personal assistant applications,
real-time cloud-based services and non-proﬁt e-governance applications. Then, we analyzed
the Category 1 services which are the most complicated group for analysis among the three
categories. A mathematical framework for the feasibility of SFC program is introduced. We
built the framework by modeling the game as a Stackelberg game with three stages. In each
stage, one group of market entities is involved; namely, users, SP and CP. The game is solved
by backward induction. Finally, several numerical examples are demonstrated. These cases are
constructed based on the real behavior of users that were acquired from recent Internet statis-
tics. With these examples, we visually explained the conditions in which an SFC program is
feasible.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this thesis, we investigated several types of pricing schemes in the heterogeneous wireless
networks and used them to build a framework for coalition analysis. In the ﬁrst part of this
thesis, we started by analyzing the volume-based pricing plan which is the dominant type
of pricing in today’s market. We used a utility function to model the plan selection process
of users. The main parameters in the user’s utility are the price and cap on data plan along
with the data rate and service availability. To model the access methods and subsequently the
guaranteed data rate we considered two spectrum allocation methods in the access networks:
the shared carrier scheme and the dynamic spectrum allocation. The service availability is
modeled based on the number of users who subscribed to the plans and their usage pattern
based on the size of data plan. A multi-package market in which user’s budget deﬁnes its
plan selection mechanism is studied in the next stage. The ﬁnal objective was to maximize the
proﬁt of the provider based on the price of data plan and the number of users. The analysis is
supported by several numerical examples which simulate the real world market and network
conditions. The outcome of numerical scenarios showed that our analytical framework is a
suitable benchmark to build volume-based plans with SLA included.
In the second part of the thesis, we analyzed the ﬂat pricing method in which users pay for their
data usage based on a ﬁxed data unit price. Concerning the potential users entering the market,
we used a form of the utility function that has the parameters of price, data, and speed. We
used a speed satisfaction random variable in the utility function which shows the perceptual
importance of service speed to each user. Several market forms including monopoly, duopoly,
and oligopoly are studied. The analysis of oligopoly market is the foundation to deﬁne the
competitive state of a real wireless market. We proved that when the providers experience a
linear cost increment with respect to their coverage size, they are better off to expand their net-
work without forming any coalition. However, in certain forms of exponential costs, providers
would gain higher proﬁt under cooperation. Then, we deﬁned a multi-provider payoff function
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for the users which is used to analyze their usage behavior when they subscribed to a multi-
provider coalition. We also deﬁned a utility function designed speciﬁcally for the coalition of
cellular and WiFi providers. In this function, the ﬁxed-price ﬁxed-time pricing scheme is con-
sidered which is popular in WiFi markets such as the ones in hotels and airports. Finally, we
used a coalition formation process and modiﬁed it based on the proﬁt of heterogeneous wire-
less providers. We proved that in wireless markets, in which there is a churn rate for the newer
technologies, the coalition formation process is always led to stable coalitions. We investigated
several scenarios such as WiFi-Cellular, WiFi-3G-4G, and multi-cellular markets and showed
that forming coalitions can increase the proﬁt of the providers.
In the third part of this thesis, we focused on service-oriented HetNets in which content
providers, service providers, and users are the main entities. We studied the usage patterns
on cellular subscribers based on the type of content such as video, voice, web browsing, etc.
We showed that for certain types of data content such as the ones associated with mapping ap-
plications, users are not greedy to utilize them regularly, yet the information delivered by such
applications is highly valuable to the users. We used this fact, derived from real market infor-
mation, to build a type of coalition between CPs and SPs in which the candidate content types
are delivered to the end users free of charge. In this case, the SP proﬁt loss is compensated
from the CP increased proﬁt associated with advertisement sources. In such way, users pay
only for their data connectivity and not the data transfer. We showed that such treatment is not
applicable to the video contents since users are extremely motivated to utilize such applications
continuously.
For the future work, we see many research opportunities in this ﬁeld. For example, the multi-
provider market for the volume-based pricing is one of the potential areas. Since the majority of
wireless providers set their primary data plans based on the data volume cap, a comprehensive
analysis of their competition strategies is required. Another research opportunity is analyzing
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the usage pattern of the subscribers based on a given data rate and price. Since the utility func-
tion is playing the fundamental role in game theory based analysis, we need to deﬁne the value
of main network parameters in a way that represents the real user’s behavior. This analysis can
be based on regional interests and can cover multiple wireless technologies as well. Finally,
we believe that a pilot implementation of the SFC program can be a perfect complement to the
results of this thesis and can help us to estimate the required network parameters for the further
analysis.

APPENDIX I
PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 1
1. Concavity of objective function in Eq. (1.13)
The objective function in Eq. (1.13) has the form:
max
cd ,pd
π(cd, pd) = NC× pd
⎛
⎝1− εd + pd
γ¯(pd,cd)θdcd
⎞
⎠ , (A I-1)
γ¯(pd,cd) =
ζ2CMX −σcd +
⎛
⎝(ζ2CMX −σcd)2+4 σθd (εd + pd)
⎞
⎠
1
2
2
. (A I-2)
1.1 Concavity with respect to cd
Set X = ζ2CMX −σcd and Y =
(
(ζ2CMX −σcd)2+4 σθd (εd + pd)
)
. Hence γ¯ =
1
2
(X +Y
1
2 ) and:
∂π
∂cd
=
2NC(εd + p)
θd
× (X +Y
1
2 )− cd(σ +σXY −12 )⎛
⎝cd(X +Y 12 )
⎞
⎠2
, (A I-3)
∂ 2π
∂c2d
=
2NC(εd + p)
θd((X +Y
1
2 )cd)3
×
⎡
⎣(−σcd −σcdXY −12 − (σ +σXY −12 )− (σX)2Y −13 )×
((X +Y
1
2 )cd)−
(
(X +Y
1
2 )− cdσ(1+XY
−1
2 )
)
×
2
(
X +Y
1
2 − cdσ(1+XY
−1
2 )
)⎤⎦. (A I-4)
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The only positive term in the numerator of above equation is 2σcd(2X +X2Y
−1
2 +Y
1
2 ) which
is smaller than negative parts. Hence the objective function is always concave for all cd > 0.
1.2 Concavity with respect to pd
Set X and Y the same amount of above equations, we have:
∂π
∂ pd
= NC
⎛
⎝1− 2
cd
(εd +2pd)(X +Y
1
2 )− 2σ pd(εd+pd)θd Y
−1
2
(X +Y
1
2 )2
⎞
⎠ , (A I-5)
∂ 2π
∂ p2d
=
2NC
cd(X +Y
1
2 )2
×
⎡
⎣−2(X +Y 12 )−4 σ
θd
pd(εd + pd)Y
−3
2
−
(
2σ
θd
)2
pd(εd + pd)Y−1
X +Y
1
2
+
σ
θd
(εd +2pd)Y
−1
2
⎤
⎦. (A I-6)
The positive part σθd (εd+2pd)Y
−1
2 can be written as the sum of 2σθd (εd+ pd)Y
−1
2 and a negative
excess. Setting the equivalent 2σθd (εd + pd) =
1
2(Y −X2) we have:
∂ 2π
∂ p2d
=
2NC
cd(X +Y
1
2 )2
×
⎡
⎣−2(X +Y 12 )+ 1
2
(Y −X2)Y −12 − . . .
⎤
⎦. (A I-7)
Considering the values of X and Y , the above equation is clearly negative for all values of pd
and concavity is proved.
APPENDIX II
PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 2
1. Proof of Theorem 1
Since the possible actions, Pi, for each provider form a compact and convex set and the proﬁt
function is continuous over pi, all we need is proving the quasi-concavity of the proﬁt function
over pi. If pi = αi, then the proﬁt will be −ci(Gi). For the large value of pi = GiK the usage
will be zero (based on (2.8)) and again the proﬁt goes toward −ci(Gi). Hence, there are two
possible types of providers when pi ∈ [αi,GiK]:
Type 1) Providers that cannot attract any user. Hence, their only strategy in a competitive
market is choosing pi = αi and their proﬁt is always −ci(Gi).
Type 2) The providers for which pi ∈ [αi,GiK] leads to a positive number of new registered
users, e.g., Ii = [s1i,s2i], and pi = αi + ε , ε → 0, leads to an increase in the provider proﬁt
that becomes greater than −ci(Gi). Now with increasing price pi, the user set remains constant
or reduced, but the proﬁt is increased until a price level (denoted by pMi ) in which increasing
the price by the provider, causes no change or a reduction in the provider proﬁt. Price levels
higher than pMi lead to continuous decrease on provider proﬁt (due to smaller user-set and
lower maximum usage level). With the help of the πi continuity, we can conclude that the
proﬁt functions of these providers are concave or quasi-concave. Hence, for the providers who
are involved in the game and their actions can make a change in their proﬁt, the proﬁt functions
are concave or quasi-concave and the game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
2. Proof of Theorem 2
We ﬁrst prove the sufﬁciency.
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a. The ﬁrst derivative of the payoff with respect to the usage d leads to :
∂U jC(d)
∂d
=
K (∑|C|i=1Gi s
j
i )
1+Kd
− ∑
|C|
i=1 piGi
∑|C|i=1Gi
, (A II-1)
which is a decreasing function of d and conﬁrms the ﬁrst property.
b. The second property can be readily achieved by using the same price and speed for all
providers.
c. The payment to the Provider k in MPP is pk Gk
∑|C|i=1Gi
d which is the proportion of the coverage
area of provider k to the sum of all coverage area sizes of all the providers in the coalition
and this is consistent with Property 3.
To complete the proof, it must be shown that the three properties also lead to the same
payoff function. In what follows, we prove the case for coalitions with 2 providers. The
proof for coalitions of 3 or more providers can be constructed by following the same.
When a user selects the service powered by a two-provider coalition, the probability of
utilizing Network 1 is G1 and respectively G2 for Network 2. If the user is under the
coverage of Network 1, then by consuming a relatively small amount such as Δd, it gets
the utility amount s1 KΔd1+KΔd and pays p1Δd for it. However, the payment has a conditional
probability, that means the user is charged under price p1 if it uses network 1 rather than
network 2 and vice versa. Hence, the probability of being charged under price p1 (if user
already consumed the amount Δd) is G1G1+G2 . Combining the three properties, we have the
following expected payoff:
UC(Δd) =G1 (s1
KΔd
1+KΔd
)+G2 (s2
KΔd
1+KΔd
)−
G1
G1+G2
p1Δd−
G2
G1+G2
p2Δd.
(A II-2)
Now, suppose that the same user wants to consume an additional amount of Δd, here
every element of (A II-2) remains the same except for the gained utility. Based on the
ﬁrst property which is the law of diminishing marginal utility, the marginal utility of user
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decreases by more consumption, which means the subscriber is most satisﬁed with the
ﬁrst amount of data usage and so forth. Hence, the user gains si KΔd1+2KΔd instead of si
KΔd
1+KΔd
and we have the conditional payoff:
UC(2Δd|Δd) =G1(s1
KΔd
1+2KΔd
)+G2(s2
KΔd
1+2KΔd
)−
G1
G1+G2
p1Δd−
G2
G1+G2
p2Δd.
The overall payoff is the accumulation of all small payoffs. By setting the desired overall
usage d as the ﬁnal consuming amount and letting Δd→ 0, the summation∑[
d
Δd ]
i=1 UC(iΔd|(i−
1)Δd) becomes an integral which leads to (2.39).
3. Proof of proposition 3
The proof is similar to the one that is given for Proposition 2.4 in (Bloch, 1996). Let the
proﬁt of provider i in each period be multiplied by a period discount factor, 0 < σ < 1, which
is inversely proportional to the churn rate (lower churn rates lead to the higher values of σ ).
Hence, the proﬁt of the provider i in the period n is: πni = σ
n πi, where πi is the proﬁt at the ﬁrst
period. Let indicate the sequential coalition game by Seq and the new game (with the discount
factor) be Seqσ . The game Seqσ is an inﬁnite horizon game with continuity at inﬁnity, which
means with inﬁnite repetition of coalition offers (negotiation sequences), the gained payoff in
the higher periods becomes less important (due to the discount factor of proﬁts). For such a
game the one stage deviation principle always holds, that is, if γ is a sub-game perfect strategy
and hn is the history of game until period n, then there is no other sequential strategy like γˆi and
history hn¯ in which γˆi has the same actions as γi except in one period, and γˆi is a better response
to γ−i conditional reaching the same history hn¯. Hence, by applying this principle, the SPE can
be found. We refer the readers to the Theorem 4.2 of (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991) for the proof
of “one stage deviation principle".

APPENDIX III
PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 3
1. Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing types e and r contents, if Type e content belongs to Type III category of applica-
tions, we have limd→0 Ie(d) > Ir(d). For d → 0 ( p < max(βe,βr)), the data usage for each
content type i and user j is indicated by α
j
i βi
p − 1. With this condition, there are two types of
users; ﬁrstly, the group of users with αeβe > αrβr who prefer the application Type e over r
and the group with αeβe < αrβr. As stated above, to have content e as a Type III application,
when d → 0, the overall usage of the ﬁrst group should be greater than the second group, which
means at near zero usage, the number of users in favor of content e should be greater than the
other group, that is:
∫ 1
αe=0
∫ βeαe
βr
αr=0
f (αr) f (αe)dαrdαe >
∫ 1
αr=0
∫ βrαr
βe
αe=0
f (αe) f (αr)dαedαr →
βe
βr
>
βr
βe
→ β 2e > β 2r , (A III-1)
since both values are positive, the above inequality gives βe > βr.
2. Proof of Proposition 6
We must prove the concavity of the proﬁt function for De ≥ 1. The proﬁt of SP in moderate
price regime has a quadratic form with ﬁrst and second derivatives as follows:
πSPm (γ
SP = 0, p) = NT
⎛
⎜⎝ p22
⎛
⎝ 1
βr
− 1
βe
(
(1+De)2−1
)⎞⎠+(De−1)p+ βr2
⎞
⎟⎠,
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∂πSPm (γSP = 0, p)
∂ p
= NT
⎛
⎜⎝p
⎛
⎝ 1
βr
− 1
βe
(
(1+De)2−1
)⎞⎠+(De−1)
⎞
⎟⎠, (A III-2)
∂ 2πSPm (γSP = 0, p)
∂ p2
= NT
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎝ 1
βr
− 1
βe
(
De(De+2)
)⎞⎟⎠. (A III-3)
The ﬁrst derivative has one extreme point at p= βeβr(De−1)βr((1+De)2−1)−βe . To have this point as a global
maximum, we can prove that for De ≥ 1, the extreme point is always positive and the second
derivative in (A III-3) is always negative:
NT
⎛
⎜⎝
⎛
⎝ 1
βr
− 1
βe
(
De(De+2)
)⎞⎟⎠< 0→
βr >
βe
De(De+2)
(A III-4)
which is always true, since the threshold order is βr > βeDe+1 . The above inequality also proves
that the denominator of extreme point is always positive. Since De ≥ 1, we have a positive
extreme point with negative second derivative. Hence the extreme point is a global maximum
for all De ≥ 1, otherwise, for all De < 1 the extreme point is negative and the maximum of
proﬁt function occurs at the lower limit of price βrDr+1 ·
3. Proof of Proposition 7
First we show the optimum value of pCP and then prove the boundary value of ζ . By tak-
ing the equations πSP(γSP = 0) from (3.10), πSP(γSP = 1) from (3.11), πCP(γCP = 0) from
(3.22), πCP(γCP = 0) from (3.23), and putting into the NBS objective function (3.26), we
achieve (A III-5). Based on the feasibility condition of (3.24) both parts of (A III-5) are al-
ways positive. The ﬁrst derivative of objective function in (A III-6) has one extreme point in
pCPb = ζη −
(ζ (η+po)−po)∫ 1αe=0 de(αe,po)dαe
De
. The second derivative of objective function with re-
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spect to pCP is given by (A III-7) and is always negative. Hence the extreme point is a global
maximum. For the lower and upper limits of ζ , we just check the given global maximum
pCPb with ε1(p
CP
b ) > 0 and ε2(p
CP
b ) > 0 in (A III-5). This gives us the boundary condition
po(De−
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe,p
o)dαe)
ηDe−(η+po)
∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe,p
o)dαe
≤ ζ ≤ 1 for the relative bargaining power of SP.
f (pCP) = N2T
(
πCP(γCP = 1, pCP)−πCP(γCP = 0)
)ζ
×
(
πSP(γSP = 1, po)−πSP(γSP = 0, po)
)1−ζ
= N2T
(
De(η − pCP)−η
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe)
)ζ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε1(pCP)ζ
×
(
DepCP− po
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe
)1−ζ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε2(pCP)1−ζ
, (A III-5)
∂ f (pCP)
∂ pCP
= N2TDeε
ζ
1 × ε−ζ2 ×
(−ζε−11 ε2+1−ζ) , (A III-6)
∂ 2 f (pCP)
∂ (pCP)2
=−N2TD2eζ (1−ζ )εζ1 × ε−ζ2 ×
(
ε−21 ε2+2ε
−1
1 + ε
−1
2
)
. (A III-7)
4. Proof of Proposition 8
Considering the content Type e, we have the total proﬁt of SFC program as v(12) = v(SPCP) =
ηDe. Taking Shapely value of (3.29) and substituting the proﬁt of content Type e from πSP(γSP =
0) (3.10) for v(1) and πCP(γCP = 0) of (3.22) for v(2), we have the following proﬁt share for
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CP and SP:
ΦSP =
NT
2
⎛
⎜⎝η(De+∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe
)
− po
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe
⎞
⎟⎠, (A III-8)
ΦCP =
NT
2
⎛
⎜⎝η(De−∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe
)
+ po
∫ 1
αe=0
de(αe, po)dαe
⎞
⎟⎠, (A III-9)
since ΦSP is deﬁned as the side-payment from CP to SP, we can achieve pCP as:
pCP =
ΦSP
NTDe
=
1
2
⎛
⎜⎝η + (η − po)
(∫ 1
αe=0 de(αe, p
o)dαe
)
De
⎞
⎟⎠, (A III-10)
which is the NBS price in (3.27) with ζ = 12
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